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ABSTRACT 
 
FINANCIALIZATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES MARKET  
AND ITS EFFECTS ON PRICES 
 
SEPTEMBER 2014 
 
MANISHA PRADHANANGA 
B.A., MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE 
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Robert Pollin 
 
 
After declining for almost three decades, the food price index of the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) rose by 90 percent between January 2002 and June 
2008. Besides the magnitude, the rise in prices was remarkable for its breadth, 
affecting a broad range of commodities including agricultural (wheat, corn, soybeans, 
cocoa, coffee), energy (crude oil, gasoline), and metals (copper, aluminum). 
According to the US Department of Agriculture, this price spike was responsible for 
increasing the number of malnourished people by 80 million. These dramatic 
developments in prices coincided with a rapid inflow of investment into the 
commodities futures market -- the number of open contracts between 2001 and June 
2008 increased by more than six-fold, from around 6 million to 37 million. The new 
investment was primarily driven by portfolio diversification motives of a new class of 
traders who were neither producers nor direct consumers of the underlying 
commodities. 
This dissertation examines the potential causal links between this 
financialization of the commodities futures market and the 2008 global spike in food 
prices and other commodities. The dissertation consists of three major chapters. The 
second chapter analyses the relationship between spot and futures markets for a range 
of commodities. The third and fourth chapters seek to understand the role of 
vi 
 
financialization in causing the 2008 price developments. Chapter 3 explores 
commodity markets individually, studying the correlation between the inflow of 
liquidity and price changes. Chapter 4 studies the issue at a more macro level by 
investigating if the inflow of investment can explain the increase in comovement of 
prices between unrelated commodities.   
My results show that i) for many commodities, prices are determined in the 
futures markets, and ii) financialization of the futures market was an important factor 
in causing the 2008 price rises for a range of commodities. These results underscore 
the increasingly important role of financial motive, financial markets, and financial 
instruments in the operation of the commodities market. The findings are especially 
relevant with respect to debates as to the relative efficiency of financial markets and 
the need to regulate them.  
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1.1 Background 
For almost three
between 1975 and 2000 world food prices declined by 53 percent
economists,2 to theorize about declining long
trend was reversed – between January 2002 and June 2008, the food price index of the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) rose by 
2008, prices dropped precipitously only to rea
Figure 1.1) Besides the magnitude, the 2008
were remarkable for the breadth of commodities affected 
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Various factors have been attributed to this sharp rise and fall of commodity 
prices. As these price developments were seen in a broad range of unrelated 
commodities, economists have questioned commodity-specific demand and supply 
shocks (such as drought and use of corn and oil-seeds for producing biofuels) and 
emphasized factors that affect many commodity markets simultaneously (Gilbert 
2010b, Frankel and Rose 2009). These include increased demand from emerging 
markets (Krugman 2008, Hamilton 2009), devaluation of the US dollar (Akram 2008), 
low interest rate (Calvo 2008, Frankel 2006), and financialization of the commodities 
futures market (Mayer 2009; Robles, Torero, and Braun 2009; Gilbert 2010b; 
Singleton 2011; Hong and Yogo 2012; Mou 2011).  
In this dissertation, I study if financialization of the commodities futures market 
can explain recent developments in commodity prices. The dissertation consists of 
three inter-related parts:  
i) In this chapter, I define financialization of the commodities futures market 
and explore the theoretical channels through which financialization may lead 
to price bubbles.  
ii) In Chapter 2, I seek to understand the relationship between spot and futures 
markets, and their relative importance for price determination. This is a critical 
link in understanding how developments in the futures markets affect spot 
prices.  
iii) Finally, in the next two chapters, I examine if financialization can explain the 
recent rise in magnitude and comovement of commodity prices. In Chapter 3, I 
analyze commodity markets individually to understand the correlation between 
the inflow of money into the markets and price developments. In Chapter 4, I 
take a broader approach and examine commodity markets altogether, to 
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explore if financialization can explain common movements in commodity 
prices. 
1.2  Financialization of the Commodities Futures Markets  
Commodities futures contracts have existed in the US since 1865 in the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), providing a means for producers and consumers of 
agricultural goods to hedge (spot) price risks. A commodity futures contract is an 
agreement to buy (or sell) a specified quantity of a commodity at a future date at a 
price agreed upon when entering the contract. Unlike traditional securities such as 
stocks and bonds, commodity futures do not raise resources for the underlying firm 
and so are not claims on a company. They are derivative securities that represent bets 
on the expected future spot price of the underlying commodity.  
Traditionally, commodities were not considered good assets, as commodity 
prices were highly volatile and declining in the long-run. Commodity futures 
contracts have short maturities (3 months or so), which made investing in commodity 
futures a time consuming and expensive endeavor. This all changed in early 2000s. 
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000 effectively placed over-
the-counter (OTC)3 derivatives outside of the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC). Commodity futures were then marketed by the 
financial industry and several academic economists (some of whom were funded by 
the financial industry)4 as an “asset class.” Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) showed 
that the risk premium and returns of a weighted index of commodities are comparable 
to that of S&P500; while returns are uncorrelated with stocks and bonds, but 
correlated with inflation. Commodities were thus seen an effective way to diversify 
                                                 
3
 Contracts traded bilaterally over the counter and not listed on any exchanges 
4
 Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) was funded by AIG Financial Products, which used to partially own 
and manage the DJ-UBS commodity index, formerly known as the DJ-AIG commodity index  
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investment and hedge against inflation (Greer 2000, Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2004, 
Erb and Harvey 2006, Chong and Miffre 2008).  
After the collapse of the equity market in early-2000s; investors were looking 
for safe assets as investments. Consequently, investment in commodity derivatives 
market, through both exchanges and OTC increased rapidly. As trading in the futures 
market are restricted to members and investing in commodity futures entails timely 
“rolling” of contracts 5  which requires considerable time and trading expertise, a 
majority of investors gain exposure to commodities through managed funds that agree 
to mimic a popular commodity index benchmark such as the Standard & Poor’s 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Investment Index (S&P-GSCI) and Dow Jones–UBS 
(DJ-UBS) commodity index. 6  The index fund manager then either enters the 
commodities future market directly or sets up an over-the-counter (OTC) swap 
contract with a swap dealer. The swap dealer will then enter the futures market and 
take corresponding long positions to hedge the swap. Investors also enter into OTC 
agreements with swap dealers directly. Swap dealers are mostly affiliated with banks 
or other large financial institutions. Market participants use swap agreements instead 
of exchanges as they offer the ability to customize contracts to match particular 
hedging needs, which might not be available through standardized futures contracts.7 
Large institutional investors like pension funds and university endowments have been 
especially active in this kind of passive investment strategies. According to United 
States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the total value of various 
commodity-index-related instruments increased from $15 billion in 2003 to $200 
                                                 
5
 Commodity futures unlike stock and bonds have short maturities so they need to be periodically 
replaced or “rolled” by newer contracts to maintain the investment. 
6
 S&P-GSCI holds over 63 percent of the market while DJ holds over 32 percent of the market. More 
details on S&P-GSCI are provided in Appendix 1.1. 
7
 An example of a common OTC swap is an investor and a Wall Street Bank enter into a contract such 
that the investor agrees to pay 3-month US Treasury-bill rate plus a management fee to a Wall Street 
Bank, and the Wall Street Bank agrees to pay returns mimicking the S&P-GSCI. 
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billion in mid-2008. Institutional investors accounted for over 42% of the total 
notional value (CFTC 2008).  
Besides commodity indices, in recent years Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) 
and Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs) have gained popularity. Exchange traded funds 
(ETFs) are like mutual fund shares that trade on a stock exchange and are structured 
in such a way that the price of the shares reflects the value of the index upon which it 
is based. The first commodity-based ETF was gold ETF, introduced in 2003. 
Commodity-based exchange traded notes (ETNs) are debt securities whose price is 
linked to an underlying index. On the maturity date of the note, the issuer of the note 
promises to pay the holder of each share of the note the value of a specified 
commodity index minus a management fee. Investments through ETFs and ETNs are 
usually more active and short-term. The ETF and ETN managers then hedge their 
positions directly in the futures market or through OTC swap agreements. I will refer 
to all investments that buy futures contracts of baskets of commodities as commodity 
index investment.  
How big is commodity-based index investment? 
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to measure the exact amount of funds 
invested in commodity derivatives via these new financial instruments. The current 
CFTC data classifies data by entity and not by trading activity. Some entities, for 
example swap dealers, are used by both commercial traders who seek to hedge price 
risks and others who are in the market to gain price exposure. This makes it difficult 
to estimate the exact inflow of “speculative” funds in the market. In addition, swap 
dealers internally net long and short positions so the positions they take in the 
commodity exchange may only be a fraction of the total portfolio they are responsible 
for (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3).  
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According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the number of 
outstanding contracts or open interest in US exchange-traded commodity derivatives 
market increased from around 6 million in 2001 to 37 million in June 2008, and more 
than 50 million in 2011. Barclays Capital has estimated the size of both US and non-
US assets invested in commodity index investment which is presented in Figure 1.2 
below. Until 2004, about 50 billion was invested in commodity index products; by 
2007 it had reached more than 200 billion, and more than 400 billion in 2012. A 
majority of commodity index investment until 2008 occurred through commodity 
index swaps. In recent years exchange traded products such as ETFs and ETNs have 
gained importance.   
 
Figure 0.2: US and non-US Assets in Commodity Index Products 
 
Source: Lane (2012) based on Barclays Capital 
Characteristics of commodity index traders 
Besides this quantitative change, the inflow of index traders has changed the 
futures market qualitatively. Historically two types of traders have existed in the 
commodities futures market – “bonafide” physical hedgers and “traditional” 
speculators. Hedgers are producers and consumers of commodities like corn and 
wheat farmers, cereal and airline companies. They have commercial interest in the 
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underlying commodities and are in the futures market to hedge against spot price risks 
due to weather variability and other demand-supply shocks. Speculators are traders 
who do not have any commercial interest in the physical commodities, and they are in 
the market to profit from changes in the price of futures. Commodity index traders, 
the new financial actors in the commodities futures market, who have invested huge 
sums of money into the commodities market, also have no interest in the production, 
distribution, or consumption of the underlying commodities they are trading. Unlike 
traditional speculators, index traders’ decisions however are not based on individual 
commodity prices, but instead on prices of a broad range of commodities and other 
portfolio considerations.  
Although they are few commodity index traders (CITs), compared to hedgers 
(commercial traders) and traditional speculators (non-commercial traders), there still 
control a large share of the market (Table 1.2). This is because, average position sizes 
of CITs are much larger compared to other traders (Table 1.3). Table 1.1 below shows 
the number of reporting traders in each category. In CBOT wheat, there are only 25 
CITs compared to 93 non-commercial traders and 65 commercial in the long-side of 
the market.  Similar trends hold in all of the commodities analyzed.  
Table 0.1: Number of Reporting Traders in Each Trader Category (2006-09) 
  NC C CIT 
 All Long Short Spread Long Short Long Short 
wheat(CBOT) 363 93 121 141 65 96 25 13 
Corn 731 185 139 235 257 316 25 13 
soybeans 453 136 108 168 109 151 25 11 
Sugar 224 67 48 70 69 72 23 11 
Coffee 373 132 83 106 98 108 24 5 
live cattle 335 80 73 88 82 139 24 5 
 
Compared to commercial traders and non-commercial traders, CITs have very large 
average positions, and are mostly in the long-side of the market. Table 1.2 shows that 
CIT average long positions are close to 10 times larger than the average long position 
of non-commercial traders. Table 1.3 shows that CIT traders control between 24-42 
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percent of the long side of the market, while their short positions are comparatively 
negligible. We also observe that commercial traders are mostly in the short side of the 
market, although they also have substantial long positions, while non-commercial 
traders have strong presence on both sides of the market.  
Table 0.2: Average Position Size of Traders (2006-09) 
 NC C CIT 
 Long Short Long Short Long  Short 
wheat (CBOT) 535 562 895 2018 7775 1246 
Corn 1077 646 1473 2348 15259 1844 
soybeans 579 346 1028 1707 5889 848 
Sugar 1643 1086 3909 7852 11600 4380 
coffee 227 236 393 877 1875 288 
live cattle 581 486 434 878 4529 428 
NC: non-commercial traders, C: Commercial traders, CIT: Commodity Index Traders 
 
Table 0.3: Percent of Long and Short Positions held by Traders (2006-09) 
 NC C CIT 
Long Short Long Short Long Short 
wheat(CBOT) 38.56 42.90 12.00 40.66 41.82 3.74 
Corn 41.85 35.37 23.27 45.45 23.78 1.72 
soybeans 42.73 36.55 19.86 44.54 25.77 1.69 
Sugar 34.33 28.80 28.45 59.18 27.67 5.04 
Coffee 45.48 40.26 22.38 54.32 25.58 0.79 
live cattle 39.36 35.77 12.96 43.44 38.62 0.68 
NC: non-commercial traders, C: Commercial traders, CIT: Commodity Index Traders 
 
Some argue that since index trader positions are passive, long–only, and their 
trading decisions are not affected by short-term price changes or motivations, they 
should not be considered speculators (Stoll and Whaley 2010). It is true that index 
traders are different than traditional speculators as their trading strategies are 
transparent and mostly predictable, and they are usually not in the market to benefit 
from short-term price fluctuations. However, as showed by the sudden drop in index 
investment after the fall in prices in mid-2008, index trading is not completely 
insulated from short-term price developments. In addition, second and third 
generation8 index trading strategies and ETFs and ETNs are more active and short 
                                                 
8
 Second and third generation commodity indices called “enhanced”, “dynamic”, or “active” indices 
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term oriented. In any case, index traders are neither hedgers nor speculators in the 
traditional sense;9 therefore the classification is not accurate.  
This aspect of the financialization of the commodities market has been 
discussed widely in both academic circles and in popular media. However, there are 
other aspects of financialization that has not received as much attention. First, the 
involvement of “bona fide” hedgers in “speculative” activities -- for example big 
grain trading companies like Cargill, Bunge, Drefyus, and ADM that are involved in 
the production and distribution of food crops, have in recent years established 
financial services divisions to manage third-party assets. For example Cargill 
established Black River Asset Management, a hedge fund (Irwin and Sanders 2010, 
Murphy et al. 2012). As these traders do not report the details about the individual 
business segments, it is difficult to determine what part of their activity is “bona fide” 
hedging and what part is speculation, which further complicates the already difficult 
process of measuring the amount of funds invested through these new investment 
vehicles. In addition, other speculative traders with varied strategies have also joined 
the market to benefit from the upward price trends such as traders who front run 
commodity indices (Mou 2011).10 
                                                                                                                                            
(such as the S&P GSCI dynamic roll index) change strategies and market exposure based on state of 
the particular market and seek positive roll returns when the market is in both contango or 
backwardation. Compared to first generation indices, these trading strategies are not as predictable and 
transparent.  
9
 The economic definition of speculation is buying or storing a commodity not for current consumption 
but for future use (Kilian and Murphy 2010). In the commodities futures market, the traditional 
definition of speculation is somewhat different and is based on who is buying the commodity and for 
what purpose. Traders who have exposure to the physical commodity and seek to hedge their exposure 
in the futures market is termed (commercial) hedgers. While those who are in the futures market 
without exposure to the physical commodity are called speculators. A hedger in the commodities 
futures market might well be a speculator in the economic sense. For example an airline company that 
buys crude oil futures to hedge against future oil price fluctuations is a hedger by the commodity 
market’s definition, but a speculator by the economic definition. In this prospectus, I will use the 
traditional commodity market definition of hedgers and speculators as it is the more relevant definition. 
10
 The process of financialization has taken over not just the commodities futures market but 
agriculture production itself. There is growing involvement of financial companies such as asset 
management companies, private equity firms, and institutional investors like pension funds in 
agricultural production, processing, and distribution (Murphy et al 2012). Although important, I will 
10 
 
There is no denying that the commodities futures market underwent a 
structural transformation in the last decade. The market witnessed a vast inflow of 
money, along with the emergence of new classes of traders, trading strategies, and 
financial instruments. I will refer to this quantitative and qualitative transformation of 
the commodities futures market as financialization, such that instead of commodity-
specific demand and supply being the drivers, financial motive, financial markets, and 
financial actors take a more prominent role in the operation of the market (UNCTAD 
2011). 
The term financialization has been used in the broader economics literature 
loosely to describe a range of related developments that show the dominance of 
finance in the US economy since the 1970s.11 The rise of finance in the commodities 
market, vis-à-vis the entry of financial traders, who do not have a stake in the 
underlying commodities, fits nicely into this broad framework of financialization. In 
the next section, I will explore relevant theoretical models that may explain how this 
process of financialization may lead to price bubbles in the commodities market.  
1.3  Financialization and price bubbles, the theoretical links 
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH), the cornerstone of mainstream theory, 
argues that asset prices accurately reflect all available information and the market 
instantaneously responds to any new information reflecting them in the price. EMH is 
based on the assumption that market participants are rational and use information on 
the fundamentals of demand and supply to base their actions independently of each 
other. Under the EMH analysis, the difference in trader motivation and trading 
strategy does not matter as all traders take positions based on the fundamentals of 
                                                                                                                                            
not discuss this aspect of financialization and focus on commodities futures markets in the dissertation. 
11Krippner (2005), Crotty (2005), and Stockhammer (2004) use financialization of the US economy to 
refer to the steady rise in financial investment and financial income of non-financial corporations. 
Orhangazi (2008) provides a good survey of the various usages and definitions of financialization. 
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each specific commodity and bring the market to the equilibrium price. According to 
this view, the increasing role of finance in the economy is not a problem and should 
not affect the efficiency of the market in any way. Friedman (1953) further argues that 
speculators have a stabilizing effect on prices as they buy when prices are low and sell 
when prices are high, so they reduce volatility. It is often argued, especially in the 
case of commodities futures markets, that speculators bring much needed liquidity to 
balance the hedging needs of market participants, thus helping price discovery and 
making markets more efficient. There is no question that market liquidity is important 
to ensure that traders can quickly buy or sell commodity futures, and thus fulfill their 
hedging needs. However, the question is if there is some level of liquidity beyond 
which the benefits outweigh the costs, much in the same way that development of 
financial markets after a certain point may be a drag on economic growth (Cecchetti 
and Kharroubi 2012).  
Many criticisms have been levied against this benign view of financial 
markets, the most critical attack is perhaps by Keynes (1936). Keynes’s most 
important contribution to understanding financial markets is bringing the presence of 
uncertainty into the forefront of economic theory. Market participants do not know 
what the future holds, and they have to make economic decisions based on social and 
psychological “conventions”. Behavioral economists like Shiller (2005) and Shleifer 
(2000) have also highlighted the role of asymmetric information in their works and 
the presence of ill-informed noise traders. During times of boom, over-confidence and 
“irrational exuberance” takes over pushing prices up and up. The conventions or 
“anchors” on which trading decision are based on are fragile and are subject to 
unexpected and “violent changes” which leads to fluctuations of the financial markets 
well beyond what market fundamentals can explain.   
12 
 
A more critical point raised by Keynes is that if markets are frequently moved 
away from fundamentals, even traders who have some knowledge of demand-supply 
conditions will find it more profitable (at least in the short run) to follow the trend 
than take positions based on fundamentals. Keynes argued that similar to a ‘beauty-
pageant’, trades in the financial markets are carried out not based on fundamentals, 
but trying to “anticipate what average opinion thinks average opinion will be.” This is 
in stark contrast to the mainstream view, where traders who do not follow 
fundamentals are punished rather than rewarded.  
Especially relevant to our analysis is the notion of capital market inflation 
developed by Toporowski (2002). Toporowski argues that prices in the securities 
markets are determined by financial inflows, rather than the other way around. 
“Excess inflow” 12 of funds into the market pushes prices up and leads to capital 
market inflation. Like Keynes, he also argues that during the process of capital market 
inflation, “best returns are gained by adding to that inflation, even if prudence dictates 
that a contrarian tactic, selling while the boom is still active, is necessary to secure 
those returns” (Toporowski 2002, p. 6) Furthermore, Toporowski emphasizes the rise 
of pension funds and financial derivatives as the most distinctive feature of this era of 
finance, and he highlights their role in creating this excess inflow of liquidity that 
flood the capital market.  
There are also commodity-market specific theoretical models that show that 
relaxing the assumption of perfect information can lead to speculative bubbles. In a 
commodities market model with heterogeneous information, Stein (1987) shows that 
the introduction of speculators can lead to destabilization of prices. The model has 
                                                 
12
 Toporowski (2002) divides net inflow into securities market into two parts: the book value of the 
company and excess inflow. He argues that the excess net inflow is the one that inflates or deflates the 
actual value of securities.  
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two types of traders in the commodity futures market: spot and secondary traders. 
Spot traders can be considered bona-fide hedgers who have a stake in the underlying 
commodity; whereas secondary traders are speculators who have some knowledge 
about the fundamentals of the underlying commodity, but their knowledge is not 
perfect. Stein shows that in such a market, the informed spot traders will not be able 
to correct the “mistakes” of the ill-informed secondary traders and prices will not 
reflect supply-demand fundamentals. From Stein’s model, we can observe that if 
commodity futures markets operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty 
and presence of noise traders, it won’t be surprising to find that speculative bubbles 
appear. This will be especially true if a large portion of the market trades based not on 
fundamental supply-demand of individual commodities, but based on other portfolio 
considerations. 
Similarly, Basak and Pavlova (2012) use a multi-good extension of a standard 
asset-pricing framework with institutional investors along with traditional futures 
markets participants. The institutional investor objective function captures the notion 
that index investors are evaluated based on their performance against the index. Basak 
and Pavlova find that the presence of institutional investors leads to prices of all 
commodities go up. The price increase is higher for commodities that belong to the 
commodity index than for commodities that are not in the index as supply and 
demand shocks specific to a commodity will spillover other commodities in the index.   
One of the biggest critiques of the speculative bubble argument is that since 
financial markets are only involved in financial transactions in the futures markets (a 
majority of contracts do not end up in physical delivery), they cannot impact spot 
prices. Lack of inventory build-up is presented as evidence for the argument that rises 
in energy and food prices are not due to speculation (Krugman 2008, Irwin and 
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Sanders 2010). The no-inventory argument makes several assumptions about 
commodities futures market. First, even if we take the argument at face-value, the 
global inventory data for commodities, including oil, are known to be very poor, so it 
is difficult to estimate the real build-up of inventories (IMF 2008). Second, 
speculation by producers may lead inventories to be left underground, this will not be 
reflected in the (above ground) inventory data. Third, there is actually some evidence 
of stockpiling of industrial metals – according to media reports, Goldman Sachs owns 
a network of aluminum warehouses, and in 2009 Morgan Stanley hired more tankers 
than Chevron, and JP Morgan hired a supertanker to store heating oil off the coast of 
Malta.13 
Furthermore, the relation between inventory and prices is not very stable. 
Hamilton (2009) shows that speculation could result in a surge in the real price of oil 
without any additional oil inventory accumulation, if the short-run price elasticity of 
gasoline demand is zero. Similarly, Kilian and Murphy (2010) show that different oil 
shocks often offset changes in oil inventories, but reinforce changes in prices in the 
same direction. This implies that the price-inventory relationship is not a good 
indicator for speculation (Pirrong 2008).  
More importantly, the no-inventory argument makes the assumption that 
speculators operate in a different market from physical hedgers-- that the bets they 
make in the futures market have no effect on “real” prices. However, this is not true. 
Speculators trade in the same futures market as physical hedgers, and therefore bets 
made by speculators can have an impact on spot prices. This is especially true in 
                                                 
13
 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_31/b4189050970461.htm#p4 and 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/goldman-sachs-reportedly-manipulating-
commodities_n_880379.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000008 
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recent years, where speculators have in fact outnumbered physical hedgers in the 
futures markets.  
Finally, and most importantly, the no-inventory argument is based on the 
assumption that futures prices are determined by spot prices – that is futures prices 
should be equal to current spot price and the cost of storing the commodity until the 
delivery date. If futures prices are higher than given by this equality, we should see 
inventory build-up. However, most papers that study the relationship between spot 
and futures prices show that futures prices are actually more important for price 
determination. Furthermore, futures prices act as a benchmark not only for future spot 
prices but also current spot prices. This implies that besides affecting future spot 
prices through the inventory link, changes in the futures markets can have a direct 
impact on current spot prices (Silvapulle and Moosa 1999, UNCTAD 2009a). A more 
detailed exploration of the relationship between spot and futures prices is provided in 
section 2 of this prospectus.  
The argument is not that there are no demand- or supply-side pressures, but 
that the futures markets have exaggerated these pressures such that prices can no 
longer be explained by these shocks alone. To be sure, speculative traders operated in 
the commodities futures market before 2000s, but their numbers were limited. With 
the influx of this new type of traders whose motivations and strategies are different 
from that of traditional hedgers and speculators, it will not be surprising to find that 
the commodities futures market has fundamentally changed. As money flows into the 
market, as with any other commodity, the rise in demand will bid prices up. 
Toporowski (2005) calls this rise in prices in the context of capital market capital 
market inflation. For example the mechanical rolling from an expiring futures contract 
to another by a huge index fund might lead to upward price pressures due to the sheer 
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size of the demand as there may not be enough arbitragers to absorb the impact of 
these traders.  
Moreover, in an environment of uncertainty, other traders might interpret the 
large inflow of index funds into the long side of the commodity market as a reflection 
of valuable private information about commodity fundamentals. This is especially 
true if index traders control a large part of the market. 
Similarly, if commodity futures are traded not based on demand-supply of 
each commodity but traded as a group based on the performance of stocks and bonds 
then i) prices of a broad range of commodities will move together and ii) commodity 
and financial markets will become increasingly inter-related, with shocks from 
financial markets getting transmitted to the commodities market. There is evidence 
that in recent years correlation between prices of unrelated commodities have 
increased. Similarly, the correlation between commodity prices and stocks (S&P 500) 
have also gone up substantially (Tang and Xiong 2010; Buyuksahin, Haigh and Robe 
2010; Silvennoinen and Thorp 2010; Hong and Yogo 2009; Buyuksahin and Robe 
2011).  
1.4  Motivation 
My motivation for this research is two-fold. First, as international commodity prices 
rose, they were quickly transmitted to domestic markets, however when international 
prices fell in mid-2008, they continued at their higher levels. (Ghosh 2010) This has 
had serious consequences on food security and development. It reversed measured 
achievements in poverty reduction and slowed down the global progress in reducing 
hunger (FAO 2012). This is especially true for Africa, where the number of 
undernourished actually increased between 2007 and 2008. The 2008 price 
developments was responsible for increasing the number of malnourished people by 
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80 million (USDA 2009), and even leading to food riots in many parts of the world.14 
Most of the countries that were affected by the 2008 food crisis were poor, food-
importing countries that neither had the budgetary means nor the option to restrict 
exports and shield their population from high prices. At the household level, the 
poorest of the population were the major victims, because they spend a higher 
proportion of their income on food and are unable to smooth consumption (Robles, 
Torero and Cuesta 2010; FAO 2011).15  
There are other dimensions of the impact of food prices that are related to 
existing inequalities of the society. A majority of negatively impacted were women-
headed households who had limited access to land and other resources. Impact also 
depended on access to land; a case in point is the substantially different impact on 
rural welfare in Vietnam and Bangladesh. Rice is the stable food in both countries 
which is mainly grown by small farmers. Vietnam has a fairly egalitarian distribution 
of land, whereas land distribution in Bangladesh is highly unequal and most farmers 
have only limited access to land. In Vietnam even poor households benefitted from 
rising prices, whereas in Bangladesh the impact was negative and large, especially for 
the poorest households (Zezza et al. 2008).  
Second, this research is being carried out in an environment where both the 
United States and the European Union are debating if more stringent rules should be 
implemented to regulate financial markets. After the 2008 collapse of the housing 
bubble and the subsequent meltdown of the US and global economy, there is a general 
acceptance that stricter regulations are needed to rein in Wall Street interests. The US 
                                                 
14
 For example Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam (2011) show that violent protests in North Africa and the 
Middle East in 2008 and 2011 coincided with large peaks in global food prices.  
 
15
 Some have argued that higher food prices may be beneficial in the long run to households that are 
net sellers of food. (Rodrik 2007, Headey 2014) Much work needs to be done to understand the impact 
of higher commodity prices on poverty in the long run, especially if higher prices are transferred to 
small farmers or are captured by middle men.  
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Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has released several reports that 
examine the role of speculation in the commodities market including oil, wheat, and 
natural gas. In July 2010, the US passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, the most comprehensive measure since the Glass-Steagall 
Act implemented in the 1930s. One of the purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act is to 
regulate the derivatives markets and opaque financial instruments like credit default 
swaps whose risks were neither understood by the “financial engineers” that 
developed them nor the regulators. The Act leaves a majority of the implementation 
details to the regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the CFTC. The regulatory agencies, including CFTC, have been debating 
and hammering out the definitions, while also including exemptions that may 
undermine the Act. From a policy stand point, economic analysis such as this will be 
important to determine the effects of financialization and the policy initiatives 
required to ensure markets are transparent and are guided by fundamentals, instead of 
being taken over by financial motives and interests.   
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Appendix 1 
Appendix 0.1: Standard and Poor- Goldman Sachs Commodity Index 
Commodity indices attempt to replicate the returns to holding long positions in 
agricultural, metal, energy, and/or livestock investment. There are quite a few 
commodities indices these days that differ in terms of index composition, commodity 
selection criteria, rolling mechanism, and weighting scheme. The S&P-GSCI and the 
DJ-UBS Commodity Index are the two most popular commodity indices. The 
S&PGSCI holds approximately 63 percent market share and the DJ-USB holds 32 
percent of the market share. 
Goldman Sachs was launched in 1991, although Goldman Sachs has 
calculated historic index starting from 1970 (based on methodology of 1991). Futures 
contracts on the Goldman Sachs Futures Price Index (GSFPI) began trading on the 
CME in July 1992. S&P acquired the index in February 2007.  
The S&P-GSCI comprises of important physical commodities that are traded 
in liquid futures markets. Currently the GSCI include six energy commodities, five 
industrial metals, eight agricultural commodities, three livestock products, and two 
precious metals. The weight of each commodity is determined by average world 
production quantity in the last five years. The S&P GSCI is dominated by the energy 
sectors accounting for over 75 percent of its weight.  
The S&P-GSCI uses nearby futures, and when these contracts are near to 
expiration they are “rolled over” and replaced by second nearby futures. Because 
rolling of positions might be difficult to implement in a single day, the rolling takes 
place over a period of several days. The “Goldman Roll” takes place within five days 
starting from the 5th business day and ending on the 9th business day. Each day of the 
roll period, 20 percent of contracts are replaced by second-nearby futures contracts.  
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Table 1A: S&P GSCI components weights 
Trading 
facility 
Commodity Ticker 2010 2011 Delivery Months used (2007) 
Agriculture 17.4   
CBT Chicago Wheat W 3.8 3.00 Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
KBT Kansas City 
Wheat 
KW 0.8 0.69 Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
CBT Corn C 4.3 3.37 Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
CBT Soybeans S 2.7 2.36 Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Nov 
ICE-US Coffee KC 1.0 0.76 Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
ICE-US Sugar #11 SB 2.8 2.25 Mar, May, Jul, Oct 
ICE-US Cocoa CC 0.3 0.39 Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
ICE-US Cotton #2 CT 1.8 1.24 Mar, May, Jul, Dec 
Livestock 4.3   
CME Lean Hogs LH 1.4 1.59 Feb, Mar, Jun, Jul, Aug, Oct, Dec 
CME Live Cattle LC 2.5 2.59 Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Oct, Dec 
CME Feeder Cattle FC 0.4 0.44 Jan, Mar, Apr, May, Aug, Sep, 
Oct, Nov 
Energy 66.5   
NYM/ICE Crude Oil  CL 34.6 34.71 All 
NYM Heating Oil  HO 4.5 4.66 All 
NYM RBOB Gasoline RB 4.3 4.67 All 
ICE-UK Brent Crude Oil LCO 14.3 15.22 All 
ICE-UK Gasoil LGO 5.5 6.30 All 
NYM/ICE Natural Gas NG 3.2 4.20 All 
Industrial Metals 8.3   
LME Aluminum MAL 2.4 2.70 All 
LME Copper MCU 4.0 3.66 All 
LME Lead MPB 0.5 0.51 All 
LME Nickel MNI 0.8 0.82 All 
LME Zinc MZN 0.6 0.72 All 
Precious Metals 3.4   
CMX Gold GC 2.9 2.80 Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Dec 
CMX Silver SI 0.5 0.36 Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
Source: S&P GSCI Index Methodology, Standard and Poor (March 2011) 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/securities/products-and-business-
groups/products/gsci/index.html 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRICE DETERMINATION IN THE COMMODITIES 
MARKETS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPOT AND FUTURES 
PRICES 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between futures and spot markets, 
in particular their relative importance for price determination. Understanding how 
prices are formed and what the role of futures market is in the process, is key to 
understanding how developments in futures markets, including financialization, may 
affect spot prices. The theoretical literature suggests an inter-temporal relationship 
between spot and futures prices, but it does not discern their comparative importance 
for price determination. Low transaction costs and high liquidity levels in the futures 
market may be the channels through which the dominant causal influence runs from 
the futures to the spot market in setting commodities prices. Results of previous 
empirical studies also vary according to the commodities and time period analyzed; 
although futures markets seem to be important, especially for energy commodities.  
An important limitation of the existing literature is that most of the empirical 
analyses do not take into account the possibility of structural breaks in the data, even 
though a visual inspection shows potential breaks. This may cause a number of 
problems -- first conventional unit-root tests lack the power to reject the false null 
hypothesis of unit-root in the presence of structural breaks. Second, structural break 
may lead to changes in the cointegration vector and affect the power of the 
cointegration test.   
In this chapter, I seek to understand the long-run relations between commodity 
spot and futures prices, in particular the nature of lead-lag dynamics between the two 
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markets that may explain the process of price determination. In the empirical analysis, 
I allow for structural breaks into account that have been mostly ignored in the 
previous literature. The empirical analysis covers a 20 year period (1991-2012) for a 
wide range of commodities including agriculture, energy, livestock, and metals that 
have not been covered in previous studies.  
The results show a long-run relation between spot and futures prices for 
almost all of the commodities, with futures markets leading price determination in 
most cases. These results suggest that market participants perceive futures prices as 
containing valuable information regarding supply-demand fundamentals, and look to 
the futures market to form expectations regarding spot prices. This has two major 
implications for the discussion of market efficiency and the role of financialization in 
the 2008 commodity price spike. First, lack of inventory build-up has been used as 
evidence of no speculation in the commodities market in 2008 (Krugman 2008, Irwin 
and Sanders 2010). Given the central role of futures prices in forming spot market 
expectations, my research suggests that lack of inventory build-up is not sufficient to 
discount financialization as a cause of the 2008 price spike. Second, previous studies 
have argued that if prices are “discovered” in the futures market, then it is a validation 
of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). I argue in this chapter that commodity 
markets can be (in)efficient no matter where prices are determined, the spot or the 
futures market. However, given the critical role of futures markets in price 
determination, my research suggests that if futures market experience speculative 
bubbles, it will most likely be transmitted to the spot market. These results lend 
support to the call for strict regulation in the commodity futures markets.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief 
background on financialization, and reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to 
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examine if there are any reasons to believe that either the spot market or the futures 
market is more important for price determination. Section 2.3 provides an overview of 
the data and the empirical strategy. In Section 2.4, I summarize the results of the 
empirical exercise, and conclude in Section 2.5. 
2.2  Literature Review 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
The starting point in thinking about the relationship between spot and futures 
prices is based on the notion that if both markets reflect underlying demand-supply 
conditions, then the two prices should move together and converge at the delivery 
date. A futures contract traded at a given price reflects current expectations of the 
(spot) price of the commodity at the future delivery date. As new information about 
the commodity emerges, futures price should adjust to reflect this new information 
such that when we finally reach the delivery date, we expect the price of the futures 
contract to be equal to the spot price. 
In reality, we do not know what market participants’ expected future spot 
price is, not to mention there is no reason for expectation to be identical across market 
participants and across time. So what determines the inter-temporal relation between 
spot and futures prices? There are two main theories that explain the relation between 
spot and futures prices based on risk premium and storage costs. 
Keynes (1930) was one of the first to contribute towards the theoretical 
literature on the relationship between commodity spot and futures prices. He argued 
that to protect themselves from price-fluctuations, commodity producers will be 
willing to pay a risk premium to speculators to take the long-side16 of the market. 
During normal conditions (no excess inventory), producers will sell the futures 
                                                 
16
 buy futures contract 
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contract at a lower price than the expected future spot price.  “Backwardation” is the 
term used to describe this relation between futures contracts and future spot prices. 
Keynes theory of “normal backwardation” only holds if producers are more risk-
averse than consumers, or if short hedgers outnumber the long hedgers. In a market, 
where a majority of hedgers are consumers (for example airlines in the crude oil 
market or cereal companies in the grains market), the situation may be reversed. 
Hedgers will be in the long side of the market and they will be willing to pay a risk 
premium to speculators to take the short side of the market, and the market will be in 
contango17 (Cootner 1960).18 
Working (1948) criticized Keynes’s argument that commodities futures 
market exist for the sole purpose of transferring risk from hedgers to speculators, and 
put forth the idea that inter-temporal price relationships are determined by the cost of 
carrying or storing stock of commodities between two time periods. If market 
participants need a certain commodity in the future, they can either buy the 
commodity now in the spot market and store it or buy the commodity in the futures 
market (take a long position) for delivery in time-period t. If they buy the commodity 
at the spot market, they have to incur storage costs and opportunity costs. Having 
stocks also provides the ability to use the commodity when needed without any 
supply disruptions; this benefit is termed the convenience yield (Kaldor 1939). The 
futures price is thus given by:  
 
       	 
                                      0.1 
where, 
 = current price of futures contract deliverable at time t,   = current spot price 	 = cost of storing inventory through time 0 to t  
                                                 
17
 futures contract will be sold at a higher prices than the expected future spot price 
18
 see Carter 1999, Gray and Rutledge 1971 for a detailed literature review on the theory of normal 
backwardation 
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C = convenience yield  
 
The theory of storage indirectly suggests that the relationship between spot and 
futures prices, which are ultimately based on expectations, work through the 
inventory channel. If market participants expect (spot) prices in the future to be higher 
than can be accounted by storage costs, i.e.         	 
  then there is an 
incentive to hold-off the commodity from the market and store it for future sale or 
consumption. This speculative inventory build-up decreases the amount of 
commodity available for consumption now and increase the amount of commodity 
available in the future. The change will be reflected through an increase in the current 
spot price and decrease in future spot price, until the equation is maintained.  
Based on this analysis, lack of inventory build-up is presented as evidence for 
the argument that the rise in commodity prices in 2008 was not due to speculation 
(Krugman 2008, Irwin and Sanders 2010). There are two important weaknesses with 
this argument that are directly related to the relationship between spot and futures 
prices. First, the supply-demand response to an expected price increase in the future 
may or may not lead to an increase in inventory. Expectation of higher prices in the 
future, may lead commodity producers and suppliers to hold-off commodities from 
the market and save it for future sale, thus leading to an increase in current price and 
inventory. However, this expectation of future price increases may also lead 
consumers to demand more of the commodity now to save for future consumption. 
The producers/suppliers will be willing to sell more commodities at this new higher 
price, leading to no inventory changes but higher prices due to speculative 
consumption. In fact, the price-inventory relationship is not a good indicator for 
speculation (Pirrong 2008). It depends on a range of factors including the elasticity of 
the demand and supply curves. Hamilton (2009) shows that speculation could result in 
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a surge in the real price of crude oil without any additional oil inventory accumulation, 
if the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand is zero. Similarly, Kilian and 
Murphy (2010) show that different oil shocks often offset changes in oil inventories, 
but reinforce changes in prices in the same direction.  
The second and more crucial part of the contention is that the inventory 
argument is based on the assumption that futures prices are determined by spot prices 
– that futures price will be equal to current spot price plus the cost of storing the 
commodity until the future delivery date. However, futures prices may actually affect 
spot prices directly through expectations. In a market characterized by uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, the futures market may be seen as embodying market 
information which may not be incorporated into spot markets. There are in fact 
several reasons why information may be expected to first be available in futures 
markets. First, there are no centralized commodity spot markets around the world 
where market participants can gauge information regarding supply and demand 
fundamentals. Also, unlike futures markets, where developments in prices are 
reported immediately, prices are not transparent in spot markets. Futures markets are 
also more liquid, do not require delivery of the commodity, and can be implemented 
immediately with little up-front cash, so they have lower transaction costs and 
generally react to new information more quickly than spot markets (Silvapulle and 
Moosa 1999). This lead-lag relationship between spot and futures markets is the basis 
for the so called “price discovery” function of the futures market. In fact there is a 
widespread view that futures prices (in particular for crude oil) are better predictors of 
future spot prices than econometric forecasts. This is the reason why institutions like 
the United States Department of Agriculture, International Monetary Fund, and 
European Central Bank use NYMEX oil futures prices as a proxy for market 
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expectation of spot price of crude oil (Alquist, Kilian and Vigfusson 2012). Whether 
or not futures prices actually contain valuable information about future prices is 
subject to debate; but the important point is that if they are perceived to contain 
information, they will affect spot markets directly (Silvapulle and Moosa 1999, 
UNCTAD 2009). 
In this sub-section, I have explored the theoretical relationship between spot 
and futures prices based on risk premium, storage costs, and convenience yield. 
However, neither the Theory of Normal Backwardation nor the Theory of Storage 
provide any theoretical reason to expect any one market to be more important that the 
other. The theoretical literature review suggests that this is an empirical question. 
Low transaction costs, high liquidity, transparent prices, and fast implementation may 
be the channels through which the dominant causal influence runs from the futures to 
the spot market in setting commodities prices. 
Empirical Literature 
Many empirical studies have been carried out to understand the role of spot 
and futures markets in price determination. Unfortunately, there is no clear answer; 
results vary according to commodities and time period analyzed. For energy 
commodities, a majority of the studies find that prices are determined in the futures 
market and transmitted to the spot market. For metals and agricultural commodities, 
results are mixed. This is not surprising, as commodities are a very heterogeneous 
group, and there is no reason to expect agriculture, energy, livestock commodities to 
all behave in a similar fashion. Differences in commodity price behavior may reflect 
differences in the structure of the market, nature of the commodity (storable non-
storable), hedging needs of market participants, and liquidity in the futures market.   
Another important point is that many empirical papers that study the 
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relationship between spot and futures prices do so in the context of the EMH. The 
lead-lag dynamics between futures and spot prices is assumed to indicate where new 
information regarding commodity fundamentals is first reflected. If prices are 
“discovered” in the futures market, it is often seen as a validation of the EMH. The 
argument is that if futures prices contain all relevant information, then futures prices 
should be an unbiased predictor of future spot price. However, this is true only if we 
believe that financial markets, commodity futures markets in this case, are efficient 
and reflect demand-supply fundamentals. In fact the term “price discovery” itself 
presupposes efficiency; it assumes that there is some equilibrium price given by 
demand and supply fundamentals that the market will “discover”.  
But if futures market is under the influence of speculative traders, and spot 
market participants (under uncertainty) look to the futures prices for market 
information, then it would be a mistake to view spot prices following futures prices as 
a fulfillment of the EMH. On the contrary, it only means that spot prices can be 
influenced by speculative dynamics in the futures market. Commodity markets can be 
(in)efficient no matter where prices are determined, the spot or the futures market. 
Spot markets following futures market does not imply markets are efficient, nor does 
it reflect the existence of speculation.19  
Garbade and Silber (1983) were one of the first to empirically study the 
relationship between spot and futures prices. They use a variant of Granger causality 
test to analyze the lag-lead dynamics between futures and spot prices. For wheat, 
corn, orange juice, and gold they find that new information is first incorporated in the 
futures prices then transferred to the spot market. For oats, copper, and silver price 
determination is split between futures and spot markets. Garbade and Silber’s paper 
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 In the full dissertation presentation I will explore if futures prices for various commodities can be 
explained by speculation.   
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inspired a wave of research on the relationship between spot and futures prices. A 
majority of the literature find that futures markets are more influential than spot 
markets for price determination (Bopp and Sitzer 1987; Schwartz and Szakmary 
1994; Crowder and Hamed 1993; Walls 1995; Silvapulle and Moosa 1999; Brorsen, 
Bailey and Richardson 1984; Oellermann, Brorsen, and Ferris 1989; Schroeder and 
Goodwin 1991; Crain and Lee 1996). Although there are also some papers like Quan 
(1992) and Mohan and Love (2004) that show the dominant role of spot market in 
price determination.  
Following the rapid rise in commodity prices in 2008, interest in the price 
determination mechanism of commodities reemerged. A number of studies have been 
carried out. Kaufmann and Ullman (2009) study 10 major spot and futures markets 
for crude oil to investigate where price innovations first appear and how they spread. 
Their results suggest that some innovations first appear in Dubai-Fateh and spread to 
other spot and futures markets, while other innovations first appear in West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) and spread to other exchange and contracts. Alquist and Kilian 
(2010) compare if futures prices of crude oil are a good predictor of future spot prices, 
and conclude that futures prices are not significantly better than other forecasting 
techniques. Chinn and Coibion (2013) show that for energy markets, futures prices 
seem to be an unbiased predictor of spot prices while in the case of precious metals, 
base metals and agriculture commodities results are not as strong. Hernandez and 
Torero (2010) examine spot and futures prices of four agricultural commodities: hard 
and soft wheat, corn, and soybeans. Results indicate that for corn and hard wheat, 
prices are generally determined in the futures markets, while for soybeans and soft 
wheat the results are not that strong.20 
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 A summary of the empirical literature is provided in table format in Appendix 2.1 
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A major weakness of previous studies is that they do not accommodate for 
structural breaks in the data, even though visual inspection shows potential breaks. 
This may cause a number of problems; first conventional unit-root test lack the power 
to reject the false null hypothesis of unit-root in the presence of structural breaks. 
Second, structural break may lead to changes in the cointegration vector and affect the 
power of the cointegration test.21  I have identified 2 empirical studies that have 
refined the cointegration methodology, and have sought to include structural breaks in 
the model. Maslyuk and Smyth (2009) explore cointegrating relationships between 
futures and spot prices of the same and different grades of crude oil using Gregory-
Hansen residual based cointegration allowing for one structural break. Results show 
that spot and futures prices of different grades of crude oil are cointegrated with a 
structural break in 2003. An important limitation of this study is that the time period 
analyzed in Maslyuk and Smyth (2009) excludes the 2008 price bubble, our period of 
interest. Another limitation is that they only allow for one structural break, when there 
is no reason to believe only one break exists. Similarly, Baldi, Peri, and Vandone 
(2011) study the cointegration relationship between spot and futures prices of corn 
and soybeans. They use Kejriwal and Perron’s (2010) method to test for multiple 
structural breaks in the cointegration vector. For corn they find three breaks (January 
2005, December 2006, and October 2008), and for soybeans they find two breaks 
(February 2007 and August 2008). Baldi, Peri, and Vandone then carry out Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) causality tests for each sub-period, and find that the direction of 
causality between spot and futures prices change with the sub-periods analyzed.  
The empirical strategy in this chapter will closely follow Maslyuk and Smyth 
(2009) and Baldi, Peri and Vandone (2011). I will take up to 2 structural breaks into 
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 See Perron (2005) for more details. 
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account in the cointegration framework using the adjusted Johansen’s cointegration 
method. I will also extend the analysis to 19 different commodities ranging from 
agriculture, energy, livestock, and metals, for a 20 year period including the 2008 
price spike. 
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
I use weekly futures and spot prices of 19 commodities from Pinnacle Data22 
and Bloomberg,23 for a 20 year period (1991-2012). These include 11 agriculture 
commodities (CBOT 24  corn, wheat, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, oats; 
KCBOT25 wheat; ICE26 cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar), 2 livestock (CME27 feeder cattle 
and lean hogs), 4 energy commodities (NYMEX28 crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, and 
natural gas), and 2 metals (LME29 copper and aluminum). Besides soybean meal, 
soybean oil, and oats all other commodities are part of the S&P-GSCI.30 I extract end-
of-day futures prices from nearby futures31 contract and take the weekly mean. For 
more details on the data and sources refer to Appendix 2.3.  
The empirical analysis consists of three major steps. The first step determines 
the stationarity properties of the individual price series. I carry out both conventional 
unit root tests and those that take structural breaks into account. After establishing 
that most of the prices series are integrated of order 1, I carry out cointegration tests 
that take structural breaks into account, to understand the long-run relations between 
                                                 
22
 https://www.pinnacledata.com/ 
23
 Data for copper and aluminum are from Bloomberg. All other data are from Pinnacle Data 
24
 CBOT: Chicago Board of Trade 
25
 KCBOT: Kansas City Board of Trade 
26
 ICE: Intercontinental Exchange 
27
 CME: Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
28
 NYMEX: New York Mercantile Exchange 
29
 LME: London Metals Exchange 
30
 Other commodities that are part of the S&P-GSCI but not included in this paper are: 3 industrial 
metals (lead, nickel, zinc), 2 precious metals (gold and silver), and two energy commodities (crude oil-
Brent, and gasoil). 
31
 Nearby futures contact is the contract with the closest settlement date, and it is by far the most 
heavily traded contract, so it is considered most important for price determination. 
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spot and futures prices. Finally, I use vector error correction model (VECM) and 
Toda-Yamamoto (1995) causality tests to understand the lead-lag dynamics between 
spot and futures prices. These steps are discussed below in more detail.  
Structural breaks have been mostly ignored in the previous literature, although 
a visual inspection points to possible breaks. In the presence of structural breaks, 
traditional Dickey-Fuller-type unit-root tests lack the power to reject the (false) null 
hypothesis of unit-root (Perron 1989). 32  To correct for this problem,  I use Clemente-
Montanes-Reyes (1998) unit root test, which is an extension of the Perron and 
Vogelsang (1992) test for 2 unknown structural breaks. The test assumes the 
following equation for innovative outlier model (IO)33: 
                 ∆
 !        0. Error!  Bookmark not de0ined. 2 
 
 
DTBit is a pulse variable which is equal to 1 if t = TBi + 1 (i=1, 2), 0 otherwise. DUit 
=1 if t > TBi (i =1, 2) and 0 otherwise. TB1 and TB2 are the break dates. The null 
hypothesis is that the series has a unit root with structural break(s) against the 
alternative hypothesis that they are stationary with break(s): 
  3:            5 
 
36:            ! 
 
The test is carried out for each possible break date, choosing the date with strongest 
evidence against the null hypothesis of unit root, i.e. where the t-stat from the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test is at the minimum. If Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit 
root test suggests less than two breaks in the series, results from Perron–Vogelsang 
unit root tests with 1 break are considered. If there is no evidence of structural breaks 
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 See Perron (2005) for an exhaustive literature review on unit root tests and structural breaks.  
33
 The test allows for both Additive outlier model: change to the trend function occurs instantaneously; 
and Innovative outlier model: change to the new trend function is gradual.  
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in the data, results of traditional Dickey-Fuller tests with the null hypothesis of unit 
root, are considered. I also carry out the KPSS34 test with the null hypothesis of 
stationarity, as a robustness check. 
Results of unit-root tests show that almost all the series are I(1), accounting 
for 2 structural breaks. Faced with non-stationary series, the next step is to test for 
cointegrating relationships between individual spot and futures prices. However, as 
the price series consist of structural breaks, we need to take these breaks into account 
when we carry out test for cointegration, because structural breaks may lead to 
changes in the cointegration vector and the cointegration test will no longer be 
appropriate (Perron 2005). Fortunately, Johansen, Mosconi, and Nielsen (2000) have 
generalized the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) likelihood-based 
cointegration analysis to account for up to 2 structural breaks, and provided new 
asymptotic tables.  
∆7   ∏∏ 9:;<=>;<?@   ∏∆7  A                             0.2 
where,  
 
Dt = 1,…., Dq,t    where (q-1) are the breaks present 
 
Dj,t = B 1        DEF    1 G H G I 0                                EHJ!FKLM! 
N
 
 
∏  OPQ  and ∏  ORQ      
 
It can also be written as: ∆7  O 9 ST @
Q  9:;<=>;<?@   ∏∆7  A 
 
This method uses the fact that if futures prices and spot prices are cointegrated, the 
rank of matrix ∏ will be (n-r) where n is the number of variables and r is the number 
of cointegrating vectors. (n-r) has be greater than 0 (otherwise there is no 
cointegrating relation) but less than full rank (implies all vectors are stationary). I use 
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 KPSS: Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin  
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the trace statistic to the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less 
than or equal to r against a general alternative.  
After establishing that a cointegrating vector exists (after accounting for 
structural breaks), I will estimate the error correction model, along with the 
cointegrating vector (β) and speed of adjustment parameters (αs and αf). The 
cointegrating vector (β) establishes the long-run relationship between the two 
variables while α tells us about the direction of causality. For example if αs > 0 and αf 
= 0 indicates that in the short-run spot prices adjust to maintain the long-run 
relationship given by the cointegrating vector.35 This empirical analysis will allow us 
to examine both the long term relationship between spot and futures prices and the 
short-run adjustments that take place to maintain this relationship.  
Finally, in the last step of the empirical analysis I seek to understand the 
causality relations between spot and futures prices during the identified time periods. 
However, Granger causality test based on the Wald principal is not valid for I(1) 
series due to nonstandard asymptotic properties. To correct for this, I use Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) causality tests by adding extra lag (dmax), based on the maximum 
order of integration, to the VAR(k) model then carry out the Wald test which will 
have an asymptotic chi-square distribution.  
 
SV  γ   ΣYZ  γYSV   Σ[Z\Z\]^_` γ[SV[  δ[FV  Σ[Z\Z\]^_` δ[FV[ γεV 
 
FV  α   ΣYZ  αYFV   Σ[Z\Z\]^_` α[FV[   β[SV  Σ[Z\Z\]^_` β[SV[ γεV 
 
The null hypothesis is that futures do not Granger cause spot prices (    0), 
and spot prices do not Granger cause futures prices (P  P  0). The benefit of 
this approach is that cointegration between the two price-series is not necessary to 
                                                 
35
 See Joyuex (2007) for more details on the implementation of cointegration tests accounting for 
structural breaks. 
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carry out causality tests, which means we can carry out these tests also for 
commodities that are not cointegrated. While for cointegrated commodities, Toda-
Yamamoto test will serve as a robustness check of the VEC methodology, as 
cointegration implies Granger causality in at least one direction.  
2.4 Empirical Results    
Key results of the empirical analysis are: i) all commodities are I(1) after 
accounting for up to two structural breaks; ii) for most commodities the identified 
breaks correspond to the 2008 rise and fall in prices, thus highlighting the 
extraordinary scale of the event; iii) spot and futures prices of 16 of the 19 
commodities share a long-run cointegrating relationship; and iv) although there are 
bidirectional information flows, for a majority of commodities, futures prices lead 
spot prices. This implies that future prices are more influential than spot prices for 
price determination. These results are discussed in more detail below.  
Traditional Dickey-Fuller based tests and Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit root 
tests show that spot and futures price series of all 19 commodities are integrated of 
order 1 or I(1), after accounting for up to 2 structural breaks. Table 2.1 below 
summarizes the number of identified structural breaks for each commodity. Table 2A 
and 2B in Appendix 2.4 have the detailed unit-root test results. 
Table 0.1: Number of Identified Structural Breaks 
No. of breaks Commodities 
2 CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, corn, soybeans, soybean oil, cocoa, 
coffee, sugar, crude oil, heating oil, RBOB gasoline, natural gas, 
aluminum 
1 soybean meal, oats, and copper 
0 lean hogs, feeder cattle, and cotton 
 
The Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit root test is carried out with a trim of 0.15, 
meaning 15% of the data are trimmed on each side. This implies that for most 
commodities, the test takes into account data between 1993 and mid-2009 and ignores 
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the spike in price in early 2011. Appendix 2.2 plots spot and futures prices of each 
commodity, along with the identified breaks. The shaded regions in the graphs are the 
trimmed areas of the test.  
The results, overall, are clear. We see that the identified breaks for most 
commodities correspond to the rise and subsequent fall of prices in 2008. For CBOT 
and KCBOT wheat the identified break dates are identical, the first one is identified in 
May 2007 as the price bubble grows, and the second one in early March 2008 as the 
bubble finally bursts. Corn closely follows trends in wheat, although with a lag. For 
oats one break is identified in August 2006. Soybeans and soybean oil follow similar 
trends, and their break dates match exactly. While soybean meal does not follow 
trends in soybeans/oil, and only one break is identified in July 2007. For the four soft 
commodities (cotton, sugar, coffee, cocoa) the price rise in 2011 was more important 
in scale than the one in 2008. However, this part of the data is in the trimmed region, 
and is not taken into account by the test. For cocoa two breaks are identified in 
October 2001 and November 2007. Coffee also has two breaks in May 1997 and 
October 2004. No breaks are identified for cotton, while for sugar two breaks are 
identified in May 2005 and March 2009. Among energy commodities, crude oil, 
heating oil and RBOB gasoline witness similar price trends. Crude oil witnessed two 
significant breaks in December 2004 and September 2008; heating oil followed crude 
oil with a lag. For RBOB gasoline, due to lack of data, one break is identified as the 
bubble burst in August 2008 and the second one in 2010 as prices rose again. Finally, 
trends in natural gas seem to be disconnected from other energy commodities with 
two breaks identified in November 2003 and June 2008. Livestock (feeder cattle and 
lean hogs) prices have been quite stable and did not witness the 2008 price bubble, no 
breaks were identified for these two commodities. The two metals (copper and 
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aluminum) witnessed similar price trends, although only one break is significant for 
copper (September 2005) while two breaks are significant for aluminum (September 
2005 and June 2008). 
Table 2.2 summarizes the results of adjusted Johansen’s cointegration test. 
Except for soybean oil, coffee, and aluminum the null hypothesis of cointegration 
(with rank=1) cannot be rejected for all other commodities. Table 2C in Appendix 2.4 
has the detailed results. 
Table 0.2: Summary of Adjusted Johansen’s Cointegration Test (Trace Test) 
 Commodities 
Rank = 1 CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, corn, oats, soybeans, soybean meal, 
cocoa, sugar, crude oil, heating oil, RBOB gasoline, natural gas, lean 
hogs, feeder cattle, and copper 
Rank = 0 soybean oil, coffee, and aluminum 
 
VECM for these 16 cointegrated commodities to understand the long run 
relationship and short run adjustment mechanisms. As expected, the cointegrating 
vector is close to -1 and significant for all 16 commodities, which implies that spot 
and futures prices share a long-run relationship. In terms of the adjustment 
mechanism, for most commodities the speed of adjustment parameter for spot price 
(αs) is significant. This implies that if there is a deviation from the long-run 
relationship, spot prices will adjust to maintain the long-run relationship. In the 
literature, this has been interpreted as futures prices leading in price determination, 
with spot prices following. For cocoa and natural gas, price determination occurs 
simultaneously in both the markets while for CBOT wheat, cotton, and sugar, the spot 
market is more important for price determination. Table 2D in Appendix 2.4 has the 
detailed results. 
Table 0.3: Summary of VECM Results 
Result Commodities  
αs is significant  KCBOT wheat, corn, oats, soybeans, soybean meal, 
feeder cattle, lean hogs, crude oil, heating oil, 
RBOB gasoline, and copper 
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αf is significant  CBOT wheat, cotton, and sugar 
Both αs and αf are significant  cocoa and natural gas 
Toda-Yamamoto causality tests do not require cointegration between the 
variables which means we can apply it to soybean oil, coffee, and aluminum, the three 
commodities that showed no cointegration. For soybean oil, results show there is no 
causality between spot and futures prices at any of the time periods, there are 
bidirectional flows for coffee, while for aluminum there are bidirectional flows only 
in recent years. As expected all commodities that are cointegrated show causality in at 
least one direction, thus reinforcing our results. For most cases where VECM was 
able to identify lead-lag relations, Toda-Yamamoto causality test shows that there are 
bi-directional flows between the two markets. For example for KCBOT wheat, corn, 
oats, soybeans, soybean meal, feeder cattle, crude oil, heating oil, RBOB gasoline the 
coefficient of adjustment for spot prices were significant in VECM. However, Toda-
Yamamoto test shows bidirectional causality between the prices, although in most 
cases causality is stronger from futures to spot prices. For CBOT wheat, cotton, sugar 
VECM showed spot prices lead, again Toda-Yamamoto test suggests bidirectional 
causality between the two prices. For cocoa, natural gas both VECM and Toda-
Yamamoto tests show bidirectional flow of information and imply that both markets 
are equally important for price determination. Table 2E in Appendix 2.4 has the 
detailed results.  
Although these results may seem contradictory or inconsistent, we have to 
keep in mind that cointegration is a long-run relationship and causality in the short-
run might change. In addition, cointegration and Granger causality are different ways 
of analyzing the data, and causality has a power problem of not being able to reject 
the null hypothesis. It is thus reasonable to expect different results from the two tests, 
with cointegration giving stronger results. (Lütkepohl 2004, p. 150) 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I studied the relationship between spot and futures prices of 19 
commodities, consisting of agriculture, energy, livestock, and metals from 1991-2012. 
The empirical analysis accounted for up to two structural breaks that have been 
ignored in most of the previous work. The results are clear. For most commodities 
structural breaks are identified that correspond to the 2008 rise and fall in prices, thus 
highlighting the extraordinary scale of the event. I also find that besides soybean oil, 
coffee, and aluminum, spot and futures prices for all other commodities are 
cointegrated. For KCBOT wheat, corn, oats, soybeans, soybean meal, feeder cattle, 
lean hogs, crude oil, heating oil, RBOB gasoline, and copper futures markets are more 
influential than spot markets for price determination. In the case of cocoa and natural 
gas, price determination occurs simultaneously in both markets. With 3 commodities 
— CBOT wheat, cotton, and sugar — spot markets are more influential than futures 
markets. From these results, I conclude that for a majority of commodities, spot and 
futures prices share a long-run equilibrium. In terms of price determination, although 
there are bidirectional information flows, futures markets are more influential in most 
cases.  
These results suggest market participants perceive futures prices to contain 
valuable information regarding supply-demand fundamentals. This “price discovery” 
contribution implies that if there are speculative dynamics in the futures market, it 
will most likely be transmitted to the spot market.   
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 0.1: Empirical Literature Summary 
 Authors Markets Methodology Findings 
1 Garbade and Silber (1983) 7 commodities variant of Granger causality  wheat, corn, orange juice, and gold: futures 
Granger causes spot prices. oat, copper, and 
silver: bidirectional causality 
2 Brorsen, Bailey, 
and Richardson (1984)  
Cotton Granger causality tests futures Granger causes spot prices 
3 Bopp and Sitzer (1987) heating oil  futures has predictive information on future 
spot price 
4 Oellermann, Brorsen, and 
Ferris (1989)  
feeder cattle Granger causality and 
Garbade and Silber method 
futures Granger causes spot prices 
5 Schroeder and Goodwin 
(1991) 
live hogs Garbade and Silber method & 
Engel and Granger 
cointegration 
no cointegration, futures Granger causes 
spot prices 
6 Quan (1992) crude oil  Engle-Granger cointegration cointegrated, spot leads  
7 Crowder and Hamed (1993) crude oil cointegration  cointegrated, futures leads 
8 Schwartz and Szakmary 
(1994) 
crude oil, 
heating oil,  
gasoline 
Engle-Granger cointegration cointegrated, futures leads 
9 Walls (1995) natural gas cointegration cointegrated, futures leads 
10 Crain and Lee (1996) CBOT wheat Granger causality futures Granger causes spot prices 
11 Silvapulle and Moosa 
(1999) 
crude oil cointegration, linear and non-
linear causality tests 
cointegrated. linear causality: futures 
Granger causes spot prices. non-linear 
causality: bidirectional flows 
12 Mohan and Love (2004) Coffee residual based cointegration spot prices lead 
13 Wu and McCallum (2005) crude oil 4 prediction models for prices futures-spot spread model has the best 
prediction 
14 Kaufmann and Ullman 
(2009) 
crude oil cointegration Dubai-Fateh (spot) and WTI (futures) are 
market leaders 
15 Maslyuk and Smyth (2009) crude oil Gregory-Hansen 
cointegration  
cointegration with one structural break 
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16 Alquist and Kilian (2010)  crude oil  compare different models of 
forecasting 
futures prices are not significantly better 
than simple no-change forecasts. 
17 Hernandez and Torero 
(2010)  
wheat, corn, 
soybeans 
Granger-causality tests  Futures prices Granger cause spot prices 
18 Baldi, Peri and Vandone 
(2011) 
corn & 
soybeans 
cointegration with multiple 
breaks and Toda- Yamamoto 
causality tests 
cointegration with breaks. causality depends 
on the sub-period. 
19 Chinn and Coibion (2013)  14 
commodities 
basis as a predictor of spot 
prices, OLS 
futures prices unbiased predictor of spot 
prices for energy commodities only. 
 Appendix 
Break1: 2 week, May 2007; Break 2: 1 week, March 2008
Break 1: 1 week, August 2006; Break 2: 4 week June 2008
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0.2: Trends in Commodity Spot and Futures Prices: Grains
 
 Break1: 2 week, May 2007; Break 2: 1 week, March 2008
 
 Break 1: 2 week August 2006
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Trends in Commodity Spot and Futures Prices: Soybeans and 
Break 1: 2 week, Aug 2007; Break 2: 3 week, June 2008
Break1: 3 week, July 2007
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products
 
 Break 1: 2 week Aug 2007; Break 2: 3 week June 2008
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Trends in Commodity Spot and Futures Prices: soft commodities
Break 1: 2 week, Oct 2001; Break  2: 
No breaks 
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1 week, Nov 2007 Break 1: 3 week, May 1997; Break 2: 4 week, October 2004
 
Break 1:１ week, May 2005; Break 2: 5 week, March 2009
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Trends in Commodity Spot and Futures Prices: energy commodities
Break1: 5 week,  Dec 2004; Break 2: 2 week, 
Break 1: 3 week, Aug 2008; Break 2: 2 week, September 2010
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Sept 2008 Break 1: 1 week, Sept 2005, Break 2: 4 week, Dec 2008
 
 Break 1: 1 week, Nov 2003; Break 2: 3 week, June 2008
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Trends in Commodity Spot and Futures Prices: livestock
No breaks 
Trends in Commodity Spot and Futures Prices: metals
1 break: 1 week, September 2005
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No breaks
 
 
 1 break: 2 week, September 2005; 2 break: 5
 
 
 
 
 
 week, June 2008 
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Appendix 0.3: Data details 
 Spot prices Futures prices Exchange  contract months contract size 
1 Wheat, # 2 Soft red winter, St. Louis, Bushel CBOT  H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
2 Wheat, # 2, Hard red winter, Kansas City, Bushel KCBOT H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
3 Corn, # 2 Yellow, Central Illinois, Bushel CBOT H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
4 Oats, # 2 Milling, Mpls, Bushel CBOT H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
5 Soybeans, #1 Yellow, Central Illinois, Bushel CBOT F, H, K, N Q, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
6 Soybean oil, Crd., Decatur, Illinois, Lb. CBOT F, H, K, N Q, U, V, Z 60,000 pounds 
7 Soybean meal, Central Illinois, 48% Protein, Ton CBOT F, H, K, N Q, U, V, Z 100 short tons 
8 Cocoa, Ivory Coast, $/Metric Ton ICE  H, K, N, U, Z 10 metric tons 
9 Coffee, Colombian, New York, Lb. ICE  H, K, N, U, Z 37,500 pounds 
10 Cotton, 1 1/16 Str. Lw. Medium, Memphis, Lb. ICE  H, K, N, V, Z 50,000 pounds  
11 Sugar, raw cane sugar 11, New York, Lb. ICE  H, K, N, V 112,000 pounds 
12 Crude oil, West Texas Intermediate, Texas-Okl., Ch Avt Crush NYMEX  all months 1,000 barrels 
13 Heating oil, fuel oil # 2, New York, Gal. NYMEX  all months 42,000 gallons 
14 Unleaded Regular, New York, Gal. RBOB gasoline  NYMEX all months 42,000 gallons 
15 Natural gas, Henry Hub, $ Per Mmbtu. NYMEX  all months 10,000 million British 
thermal units  
16 Feeder cattle index, 650-849 pound steers, medium-large #1 and #1-2 CME  F, H, J, K, Q, U, V, Z 50,000 pounds 
17 Lean hog index, (barrow and gilt) carcasses CME  G, J, K, M, N, Q, V, Z 40,000 pounds 
18 Copper, Grade A LME All months 25 tonnes 
19 Aluminum, high grade primary LME All months 25 tonnes 
January (F), February (G), March (H), April (J), May (K), June (M), July (N), August (Q), September (U), October (V), November (X), December (Z)
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Appendix 0.4: Results 
 
Table 2A: Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit-root test with double mean shifts, IO model 
  Break 1 Break1 
coeff. 
Break1 test Break 2 Break 2 
coeff. 
Break 2 test Unit-root 
test 
Optimal 
lag 
Result 
CBOT 
wheat 
Futures 2w May 07 29.8060 7.2673** 1w March 08 -19.6084 -5.4569** -5.5693** 22 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 2w May 07 20.8983 5.6969** 1w March 08 -14.8126 -4.3185** -4.8302 20 
KCBOT 
wheat 
Futures 2w May 07 26.7435 7.1138** 1w March 08 -18.4872 -5.5007** -4.9687 18 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 2w July 07 29.8195 6.7388** 1w March 08 -23.1144 -5.7403** -5.1231 20 
corn Futures 3w Nov 07 12.6863 4.7042** 3w June 08 -9.14959 -3.4756** -2.6331 22 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 1w Aug 96 -1.5351 -1.6034 1w Aug 06 5.31664 -3.9246** -3.5700 22 
oats Futures 2w Aug 06 5.7788 4.8553** 4w June 08 -1.7811 -1.6860 -4.8171 17 UR, 1 
break Spot 2w Aug 06 4.4745 3.7945** 4w Oct. 08 -2.3153 -2.1908* -3.9556 13 
soybeans Futures 2w Aug 07 24.4716 4.9843** 4w June 08 -12.8701 -3.0411** -3.8213 13 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 2w Aug 07 23.5445 5.1001** 4w June 08 -10.7801 -2.5126* -4.1289 19 
soybean oil Futures 2w Aug 07 1.0182 5.3840** 4w June 08 -0.5608 -3.4542** -4.4244 22 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 2w Aug 07 0.9217 5.0649** 4w June 08 -0.5611 -3.4284** -4.1999 22 
soybean 
meal 
Futures 2w June 04 -1.0486 -0.9125 4w July 07 5.7154 3.5426** -3.7306 7 UR, 1 
break Spot 4w June 04 -1.4962 -1.1744 2w Aug 07 7.7990 4.2446** -4.4143 14 
cocoa Futures 2w Oct 01 15.4053 2.9180**  1w Nov 07 31.4436 3.3500** -4.2169 22 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 2w Oct 01 16.2332 2.8059** 1w Nov 07 32.9860 3.1953** -4.0687 21 
coffee Futures 2w May 97 -1.3578 -2.7019** 3w Oct 04 1.5973 3.0905** -3.6698 20 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 4w Jan 97 9.3813 5.5401** 3w May 97 -9.6508 -5.7736** -2.7958 21 
cotton Futures 2w Nov 94 1.3433 2.1900* 3w June 95 -1.2682 -2.1952* -3.6522 20 UR, no 
breaks Spot 2w May 95 -0.0097 -0.0348 3w June 98 -0.0677 -0.2885 -3.2853 20 
sugar Futures 1w May 05 0.12345 2.6550** 1w June 09 0.3918 4.2130** -5.2380 21 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 2w May 05 0.11185 2.4420** 4w March 09 0.3332 4.0950** -5.2030 21 
feeder 
cattle 
Futures 2w Apr. 96 0.1996 1.4790 1way 99 0.3130 1.1913 -1.9700 21 UR, no 
breaks Spot 1w May 99 0.1759 1.0140 3w June 99 0.3662 1.7360 -2.0460 21 
lean hogs Futures 4wNov 98 -0.0938 -0.3460 4 Jan 04 0.5948 2.4040 -3.9980 19 UR, no 
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Spot 4w Dec 98 0.0014 0.0060 3w Dec 03 0.3078 1.6310 -3.3660 5 breaks 
crude oil Futures 4w Dec 04 1.3267 4.5960** 2w Sept 08 0.1384 0.6660** -4.9390 20 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 4w Dec 04 1.4030 4.8550** 2w Sept 08 0.1634 0.7810** -5.3730 17 
heating oil Futures 1w Sep 05 152.2434 42.8700** 4w Dec 08 24.6236 5.6777** -4.2227 18 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 1w Sep 05 150.0928 41.8790** 4w Dec 08 25.2809 5.7761** -4.2256 18 
RBOB 
gasoline 
Futures 3w Aug 08 -4.9628 -3.2660** 2w Sept 10 6.8165 4.1010** -4.9240 6 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 5w Aug 08 -5.3693 -3.4120** 3w Nov 11 8.0321 4.4610** -5.1860 8 
natural gas Futures 5w Aug 04 0.19756 4.8313** 4w June 08 -0.1929 -4.9470** -5.4360 14 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 1w Nov 03 0.24439 4.5369** 4w June 08 -0.2307 -4.5334** -5.2226 11 
copper Futures 1w Sept 05 100.3344 4.4165** 2w Aug 2008 -1.0680 -0.0726 -4.5492 20 UR, 1 
break Spot 1w Sept 05 101.0795 4.3510** 2w Aug 2008 -2.3450 -0.1568 -4.5127 20 
aluminum  Futures 2w Sep 05 39.1734 5.6591** 5w June 2008 -22.0909 -4.3465** -5.9127 21 UR, 2 
breaks Spot 2w Sep 05 39.3377 5.5544** 5w June 2008 -22.4668 -4.2833** -5.8427 21 
** 1% significance level, * 5% significance level. Critical value: -5.49, max-lag given by Ng-Perron, trim: 0.15, UR: unit root, #w: week 
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Table 2B: DFGLS, Dickey-Fuller and KPSS unit root tests 
 
 Lags DFGLS test Dfuller w/ constant Dfuller w/o constant Dfuller w/ trend KPSS Result 
CBOT 
wheat 
Future (L) 22 -2.7599 -1.8610 (0.3506) -0.0928 -2.764 (0.2103) 0.6410** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 21 -5.4968** -6.609 (0.0000)** -6.5826** -6.6202 (0.0000)** 0.0310 
Spot (L) 20 -2.7679 -1.8874 (0.3380) -0.0781 -2.7743 (0.2065) 0.5920** 
Spot (diff) 22 -4.9244** -6.242 (0.0000)** -6.2203** -6.2619 (0.0000)** 0.0286 
KCBOT 
wheat 
Future (L) 20 -2.8159 -1.7752 (0.3928) -0.0191 -2.822 (0.1887) 0.6120** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 17 -7.5624** -7.739 (0.0000)** -7.7103** -7.7503 (0.0000)** 0.0288 
Spot (L) 22 -3.2919 -2.3470 (0.1572) -0.2907 -3.2878 (0.0683) 0.4910** 
Spot (diff) 22 -6.8392** -7.0769 (0.0000)** -7.0583** -7.0776 (0.0000)** 0.0283 
corn 
Future (L) 22 -1.9971 -1.01164 (0.7490) 0.3710 -2.1333 (0.5274) 0.7930** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 21 -7.2634** -7.21746(0.0000)** -7.1696** -7.2837 (0.0000)** 0.0276 
Spot (L) 22 -1.8891 -0.96307 (0.7665) 0.3657 -1.9854 (0.6094) 0.7800** 
Spot (diff) 21 -6.7657 -7.2888 (0.0000)** -7.2414** -7.3618 (0.0000)** 0.0298 
oats 
Future (L) 18 -3.5587** -2.1503 (0.2248) -0.3063 -3.6869 (0.0232)* 0.6840** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 17 -5.5204** -6.4419 (0.0000)** -6.4220** -6.4515 (0.0000)** 0.0233 
Spot (L) 18 -3.5587** -2.1503 (0.2248) -0.3063 -3.6869 (0.0232)* 0.4330** 
Spot (diff) 17 -5.5204** -6.4419 (0.0000)** -6.4220** -6.4515 (0.0000)** 0.0282 
soybeans 
Future (L) 13 -2.04945 -1.08381 (0.72148) 0.36442 
-2.30758 (0.4297) 0.8860** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 12 -9.60110** -9.79421 (0.0000)** -9.76316** -9.83175 (0.0000)** 0.0234 
Spot (L) 20 -2.50274 -1.54535 (0.51097) 0.10228 
-2.75291(0.2148) 0.8730** 
Spot (diff) 18 -7.24630** -7.22829 (0.0000)** -7.19298** 
-7.26121 (0.0000)** 0.0238 
soybean 
oil 
Future (L) 22 -2.5353 -1.7111 (0.4254) -0.0831 -2.7680 (0.2089) 0.7980** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 21 -6.3130** -6.4962 (0.0000)** -6.4695** -6.5032 (0.0000)** 0.0283 
Spot (L) 22 -2.6766 -1.9001 (0.3320) -0.1937 -2.8937 (0.1643) 0.7370** 
Spot (diff) 21 -6.2497** -6.3807 (0.0000)** -6.3592** -6.3834 (0.0000)** 0.0283 
soybean 
meal 
Future (L) 18 -3.1502 -1.4416 (0.5622) 0.3799 -3.3747 (0.0549) 0.1810 
I(1) Futures (diff) 17 -4.6821** -5.757 (0.0000)** -5.6953** -5.7521 (0.0000)** 0.0242 
Spot (L) 14 -3.2704 -1.6435 (0.4604) 0.1763 -3.5310 (0.0362)* 0.1940 
Spot (diff) 13 -5.3034** -6.156 (0.0000)** -6.1148** -6.1568 (0.0000)** 0.0242 
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cocoa 
Future (L) 22 -2.0440 -1.3710 (0.5959) 0.1470 -2.2700 (0.4507) 0.556** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 22 -7.2260** -8.473 (0.0000)** -26.6270** -8.4640 (0.0000)** 0.0492 
Spot (L) 21 -2.013 -1.3230 (0.6185) 0.2150 -2.092 (0.5508) 0.5800** 
Spot (diff) 20 -6.314** -8.017 (0.0000)** -7.9820** -8.007 (0.0000)** 0.0554 
coffee 
Future (L) 21 -2.4562 -2.2706 (0.1816) -0.6480 -2.4592 (0.3486) 0.5730** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 
20 -6.9573** -7.4729 (0.0000)** -7.4719** -7.4676 (0.0000)** 0.0423 
Spot (L) 21 -2.1698 -1.9762 (0.2971) -0.5045 -2.1671 (0.5084) 0.6270** 
Spot (diff) 20 -7.3577** -7.7997 (0.0000)** -7.7965** -7.7955 (0.0000)** 0.0514 
cotton 
Future (L) 20 -3.1178 -3.3251 (0.0138) -1.1331 -3.4483 (0.0453)* 0.4920** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 22 -6.3526 -6.6164 (0.0000)** -6.6191** -6.6204 (0.0000)** 0.0259 
Spot (L) 20 -3.1176 -3.2144 (0.0192) -1.1509 -3.3090 (0.0648) 0.4780** 
Spot (diff) 19 -6.9469 -7.1426 (0.0000)** -7.1449** -7.1503 (0.0000)** 0.0282 
sugar 
Future (L) 21 -2.26383 -1.7864 (0.3872) -0.29558 -2.40604 (0.3764) 0.8700** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 
21 -7.87113** -8.0003 (0.0000)** -7.98670** -8.00632 (0.00000)** 0.0298 
Spot (L) 21 -2.45856 -1.9452 (0.3111) -0.42019 -2.56025 (0.2985) 0.8050** 
Spot (diff) 20 -6.36272** -6.7768 (0.0000)** -6.76377** -6.77380 (0.0000)** 0.0416 
feeder 
cattle 
Future (L) 21 -1.0504 0.0847 (0.9650) 1.1703 -2.0416 (0.5786) 0.5250** 
I(1) 
Futures (diff) 20 -7.5558** -8.6183 (0.0000)** -8.5361** -8.7612 (0.0000)** 0.0283 
Spot (L) 21 -1.1418 -0.0869 (0.9507) 1.0494 -2.1738 (0.5046) 0.5760** 
Spot (diff) 20 -8.0903** -9.7566 (0.0000)** -9.6938** -9.8678 (0.0000)** 0.0190 
lean hogs 
Future (L) 19 -3.5891** -2.9404 (0.0409)* -0.0604 -3.8677 (0.0134)* 0.2360** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 
18 -5.8587** -7.1893 (0.0000)** -7.1761** -7.1840 (0.0000)** 0.0229 
Spot (L) 6 -3.3629* -2.9755 (0.0372)* -0.4390 -3.3476 (0.0588) 0.2990** 
Spot (diff) 5 -12.1502** -12.6302 (0.0000)** -12.6365** -12.6259 (0.0000)** 0.0205 
crude oil 
Future (L) 20 -2.5869 -1.3808 (0.5914) -0.1776 -3.8119 (0.0160)* 0.6610** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 
17 -4.3448** -6.9221 (0.0000)** -6.8941** -6.9343 (0.0000)** 0.0194 
Spot (L) 17 -2.7428 -1.5119 (0.5276) -0.2903 -3.9722 (0.0096)** 0.6590** 
Spot (diff) 22 -4.4260** -7.5368 (0.0000)** -7.4956** -7.5507 (0.0000)** 0.0192 
heating Future (L) 21 -2.1897 -0.9795 (0.7607) 0.1602 -3.2387 (0.0770) 0.7400** I(1) 
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oil Futures (diff) 17 -3.9171** -6.9114 (0.0000)** -6.8619** -6.9411 (0.0000)** 0.0177 
Spot (L) 18 -2.3828 -1.1839 (0.6805) -0.0051 -3.4386 (0.0464)* 0.7290** 
Spot (diff) 17 -4.3489** -6.9420 (0.0000)** -6.8928** -6.9688 (0.0000)** 0.0175 
RBOB 
gasoline 
Future (L) 6 -2.6935 -2.6127 (0.0904) -0.1904 -2.8806 (0.1689) 0.3540** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 
5 -4.8416** -5.4165 (0.0000)** -5.4078** -5.4069 (0.0000)** 0.0627 
Spot (L) 8 -2.8810* -2.5309 (0.1081) -0.3303 -3.0024 (0.1314) 0.3190** 
Spot (diff) 7 -3.8639** -4.8172 (0.0001)** -4.8233** -4.7985 (0.0005)** 0.0567 
natural 
gas 
Future (L) 21 -2.5990 -2.4389 (0.1310)  -1.0281 -2.5476 (0.3046) 0.5650** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 13 -7.2719** -8.3256 (0.0000)** -8.3294** -8.3336 (0.0000)** 0.0297 
Spot (L) 11 -2.9011 -2.6940 (0.0751) -1.2260 -2.892 (0.1647) 0.5430** 
Spot (diff) 21 -7.3581** -7.4985 (0.0000)** -7.5015** -7.5125 (0.0000)** 0.0261 
copper 
Future (L) 20 -1.9112 -1.1083 0.0213 -2.5548 0.9210** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 19 -6.6065** -6.9314 (0.0000)** -6.8907** -6.9552 (0.0000)** 0.0333 
Spot (L) 20 -1.9353 -1.1435 -0.0027 -2.5670 0.9090** 
Spot (diff) 19 -6.3521** -7.0274 (0.0000)** -6.9882** -7.0479(0.0000)** 0.0328 
aluminum  
Future (L) 21 -3.3340 -2.4703 -0.2800 -3.3307 0.2610** 
I(1) Futures (diff) 20 -4.4470** -6.3974(0.0000)** -6.3904** -6.3971(0.0000)** 0.0345 
Spot (L) 21 -3.3654 -2.4959 -0.2958 -3.3607 0.2510** 
Spot (diff) 20 -4.5813** -6.4260(0.0000)** -6.4194** -6.4261(0.0000)** 0.0337 
** 1% significance level, * 5% significance level. 
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Table 2C: Johansen’s Cointegration test (trace test) 
 Rank Johansen’s test result Adj. Johansen’s 
test 
result 
CBOT wheat r = 0 22.94 (0.0191)* cointegration 50.34 (0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 3.95 (0.4309) 14.79 (0.0429) 
KCBOT wheat r = 0 13.44 (0.3371) no 
cointegration 
48.66 (0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 1.68 (0.8318) 16.36 (0.0241) 
corn r = 0 26.31 (0.0054)** cointegration 58.52 (0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 2.18 (0.7413) 11.83 (0.1367) 
oats r = 0 28.66 (0.0021)** cointegration 45.14 ( 0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 3.71 (0.4689) 14.06 (0.0282) 
soybeans r = 0 65.78 (0.0000)** cointegration 80.73 (0.0000)**  cointegration 
r = 1 10.71(0.0240) 14.43 (0.0487) 
soybean oil r = 0 23.94 (0.0132)    no 
cointegration 
33.74 ( 0.0103) no 
cointegration r = 1 4.11 (0.4081) 12.23 (0.1033) 
soybean meal r = 0 26.27 (0.0055)** cointegration 35.65 (0.0001)** cointegration 
r = 1 2.89 (0.6099) 15.50 (0.0166) 
cocoa r = 0 22.28 (0.0242)** cointegration 36.88 (0.0081)** cointegration 
r = 1 2.39 (0.7022) 13.99 (0.1041) 
coffee r = 0 24.74 (0.0098)** no 
cointegration 
30.31 (0.0635) no 
cointegration r = 1 5.59  (0.2327) 8.56 (0.4966) 
cotton r = 0 48.76 (0.0000)** cointegration  
No breaks r = 1 10.33 (0.0287)* 
sugar r = 0 20.45 ( 0.0454)* no 
cointegration 
41.06 (0.0017)** cointegration 
r = 1 4.31(0.3795) 17.48 (0.0236) 
feeder cattle r = 0 44.14 (0.0000)** cointegration 
No breaks r = 1 1.29 (0.8957) lean hogs r = 0 33.64 (0.0003)** cointegration 
r = 1 7.79 (0.0922) 
crude oil r = 0 57.75 (0.0000)** cointegration 95.32 (0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 2.34 (0.7117) 18.66 (0.0159) 
heating oil r = 0 51.95 (0.0000)** cointegration 67.75(0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 1.98 (0.7778  ) 11.27 (0.1827) 
RBOB gasoline r = 0   27.95 (0.0028)** cointegration 52.35(0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 5.71(0.2223) 13.56 (0.1276) 
natural gas r = 0 93.02 (0.0000)**   cointegration 107.62(0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 8.12 (0.0793) 19.12 (0.0160)* 
copper r = 0 36.76 (0.0001)** cointegration 62.71 (0.0000)** cointegration 
r = 1 6.49 (0.161) 20.75 (0.0238)* 
aluminum r = 0 35.76 (0.0001)** cointegration 55.96 (0.0000)** no 
cointegration r = 1 6.49 (0.1611) 20.07 (0.0088)** 
** 1% significance level, * 5% significance level. 
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Table 2D: VECM 
 Lags Β α spot α futures trend constant Result 
CBOT  wheat 14 -1.1738 (0.000)** 0.0020 (0.870) -0.026 (0.035)*  31.3825 Spot leads 
-1.1775 (0.000)** 0.0021 (0.865) -0.026 (0.036)* -.02626 47.6641 
KCBOT wheat 11 -1.1338 (0.000)** 0.054 (0.003)** 0.0316 (0.059)  83.9692 Bi-directional,  
spot adjusts 
-1.1578 (0.000)** 0.054 (0.002)** 0.034(0.034)* 0.0302 78.0107 
Corn 11 -0.9828 (0.000)** .0528 (0.068) -.0009(0.974)  -14.130 weak cointegration 
-0.9438 (0.000)** .0264 (0.432) -0.0460(0.174) -.0327 -14.532 
Oats 9 -1.1040 (0.000)** .0368 (0.000)**   .0074 (0.336)  39.2535 Futures leads 
-0.9519 (0.000)** .0387 (0.000)** .0013 (0.880) -0.0328 26.1611 
Soybeans 11 -1.0048 (0.000)** 0.139 (0.000)** .0319 0.0364)  -4.0089 Futures lead 
-0.9947 (0.000)** 0.1322(0.000)** .0204 (0.569) .00003 -11.364 
Soybean meal 8 -.9479 (0.000)** .1255 (0.000)** 0.066(0.042)*  -6.6395 Futures leads 
-.8267 (0.000)** .0768 (0.033)* 0.0072 (0.825) -0.0493 -22.514   
Cocoa 8 -0.897 (0.000)** 0.0519 (0.158) -0.0571 (0.121)  72.564 Spot leads 
-.8755 (0.000)** 0.0362 (0.328) -0.075(0.043)* -.0559 58.5706 
Cotton  21 -0.9872 (0.000)** -0.0150 (0.722) -0.17 (0.000)**  -3.495 Spot leads 
-0.980 (0.000)** -0.0392 (0.394) -0.222(0.000)** -.002768 -2.4065 
Sugar 21 -0.9293 (0.000)** -0.0258 (0.109) -0.051(0.002)**  -.12667 Spot leads 
-0.9669 (0.000)** -0.0191 (0.247) -0.047(0.006)** .00077 -.09241 
Crude oil 17 -1.0013 (0.000)** 2.124 (0.001)** 1.4580 (0.027)*  0.0642 Futures lead 
-1.0019 (0.000)** 2.293(0.000)** 1.6504 (0.011)* 0.0001 0.0332 
Heating oil 9 -1.0066 (0.000)** 0.1707 (0.033)* 0.0018 (0.981)  1.1543 cointegration 
-1.0032 (0.000)** 0.1497 (0.065) -0.0213 (0.783) 0.00089 0.1903 
RBOB gasoline 5 -1.0046 (0.000)** 0.1855 (0.010)** 0.0347  (0.625)  1.2155   Futures lead 
-1.0291 (0.000)** 0.223(0.003)** 0.0661 (0.372) 0.0192 3.7134 
Natural gas 5 -1.0265 (0.000)** 0.3877 (0.000)** 0.1050 (0.008)**  0.0602 Bidirectional, futures leads 
-1.0192 (0.000)** 0.392(0.000)** 0.1022 (0.012)* -0.0001 0.1055 
Feeder cattle 21 -0.917 (0.000)** 0.100(0.000)** -0.0485 (0.013)  -6.2538    Futures lead 
-0.9097 (0.000)** 0.102(0.000)** -0.049 (0.0130) -0.0000 -6.8936 
Lean hogs 19 -1.0783 (0.000)** 0.05027 (0.000)** -0.0013 (0.931)  4.4052 Futures leads 
-0.8745 (0.000)** 0.059(0.000)** -0.0348 (0.088) -0.0104 -4.1933 
copper 14 -1.0027 (0.000)** 0.1268 (0.076) 0.0907 (0.196)  55.144 Futures leads 
-1.012 (0.000)** 0.1579 (0.017)* 0.1252 (0.053) 0.1359 9.0518 
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Table 2E: Toda-Yamamoto Granger Causality Tests 
 Time period Futures  Spot Spot  Futures Result 
χ
2
 
p-value χ2 p-value 
CBOT  
wheat 
1 period 31.5 0.0047** 43.7 6.7e-05**  
Bidirectional, spot 
leading stronger 
2 period 1.2 0.54 1.3 0.52 
3 period 16.5 0.29 28.3 0.013* 
Full 40.1 0.00025** 69.5 2.9e-10** 
KCBOT wheat 1 period 31.2 0.071 32.9 0.047* Bi-directional 
causality 2 period  64.2 2.9e-06** 87.6 4.3e-10** 
3 period 63.8 3.4e-06** 87.0 5.3e-10** 
Full 64.2 2.9e-06** 87.8 3.9e-10** 
Corn  1 period 120.6 0.0** 41.7 1.8e-05** Bi-directional 
causality 2 period  13.8 0.24 9.7 0.56 
3 period 9.6 0.57 13.3 0.27 
Full 26.9 0.0048** 31.5 0.00093** 
Oats 1 period 27.9 0.00049** 26.7 0.00079** Bidirectional, futures 
leading stronger 2 period  12.1 0.21 7.8 0.55 
Full 24.6 0.0018** 18.5 0.018* 
Soybeans 1 period 70.5 1e-10** 22.3 0.022*  Bidirectional, futures 
leading stronger 2 period  28.3 0.0029**  29.3 0.002**  
3 period 6.9 0.81 21.8 0.026*  
Full 31.4 0.00095** 31.1 0.001** 
Soybean oil 1 period 20.0 0.52 23.5 0.32 No causality 
2 period  28.5 0.13 25.7 0.22 
3 period 14.3 0.86 13.3 0.9 
Full  38.1 0.013* 35.9 0.022* 
Soybean meal 1 period 53.6 8.3 e-09** 38.5 6.1e-06** Futures leads 
2 period  10.1 0.26 6.0 0.65 
Full 26.6 0.00084** 16.4 0.037* 
Cocoa  1 period 299.5 0.0** 43.5 7.2e-07** Bidirectional causality  
2 period  299.0 0.0** 43.4 7.3e-07** 
3 period 299.6 0.0** 43.5 7.2e-07** 
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Full 299.7 0.0** 43.6 6.7e-07** 
Coffee  1 period 46.4 0.00015** 25.3 0.089 Bidirectional causality 
2 period  48.5 7.3e-05** 33.4 0.01* 
3 period 32.4 0.013* 47.7 9.5e-05** 
Full 44.5 0.00028** 67.1 6.8e-08** 
Cotton Full 58.8 1.9e-05** 168.8 0.0** Bidirectional causality 
Crude oil 1 period 67.1 6.7 e-08** 35.4 0.0055** Bidirectional, futures 
leading stronger 2 period  28.4 0.04* 24.3 0.11 
3 period 26.7 0.062 20.3 0.26 
Full 155.8 0.0** 88.2 1.3e-11** 
Heating oil 1 period 64.1 2.1e-10** 26.0 0.002** Futures leads 
2 period  9.6 0.38 10.8 0.29 
3 period 9.1 0.42 15.1 0.089 
Full  27.1 0.0013** 12.4 0.19 
RBOB gasoline 1 period 4.0 0.6 3.2 0.66 Bidirectional causality  
2 period  8.3 0.14 13.3 0.021* 
3 period 12.1 0.031* 6.8 0.23 
Full  15.4 0.0087** 15.8 0.0075** 
Natural gas 1 period 82.1 3.33e-16** 16.6 0.0053** Bidirectional, futures 
leading stronger 2 period  21.4 0.00069** 12.0 0.035* 
3 period 34.3 2.1e-06** 6.7 0.24 
Full 151.8 0.0** 17.7 0.0034** 
Feeder cattle Full 318.4 0.0** 62.7 5e-06** Bidirectional causality 
Lean hogs Full 202.1 0.0** 30.9  0.042*  Futures leads 
Copper 1 period 22.9 0.062 6.6 0.95 No causality.  Futures 
leads very weakly in 
first period. 
2 period 17.6 0.23 16.3 0.3 
Full 13.8 0.46 11.6 0.63 
Aluminum  1 period 22.9 0.062 6.6 0.95 No causality, 
bidirectional in the 
last period 
2 period  12.1 0.6 10.8 0.71 
3 period 31.8 0.0043** 32.1 0.0039** 
Full 13.8 0.46 11.6 0.63 
** 1% significance level, * 5% significance level. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIQUIDITY AND PRICES IN COMMODITY FUTURES 
MARKETS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters of this dissertation, I established that: i) commodities 
futures market witnessed a vast inflow of money, along with the emergence of new 
classes of traders and financial instruments. I refer to this phenomenon as 
financialization. ii) Commodities futures markets play a crucial role in price 
determination, so developments in the futures markets have implications for spot 
prices. In this chapter, I will attempt to answer the central question that motivated this 
dissertation: if financialization of the commodities futures market can explain the 
tremendous rise in the magnitude of commodity prices in 2008.  
There have been a plethora of recent empirical studies (Irwin and Sanders 
2010, Kilian and Murphy 2010, Stoll and Whaley 2011, Mayer 2009) that seek to 
understand the role of financialization on recent commodity prices. Results are mixed, 
depending on the data, methodology, and commodities analyzed. A majority of papers, 
study the correlation between trading positions of different categories of traders and 
prices to understand how the activity of traders may affect commodity prices. 
However, these empirical studies suffer from an important problem; they use the 
publicly available CFTC net positions data that cannot accurately identify between 
different trading positions. This makes it almost impossible to isolate the effects of 
different groups of traders or trading strategies on prices. In this chapter, I will take a 
different approach: I will focus on the general inflow of liquidity into each 
commodity futures market by studying developments in total open interest instead of 
trying to divide open interest among trader categories.  
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Besides data issues there are two more reasons why I use open interest 
instead of traders’ net positions of data. First, although the rise of institutional 
investors is an important aspect of financialization, other aspects that were discussed 
in Chapter 1 such as the changing role of “bonafide hedgers” and the entry of money 
managers and hedge funds into the market, are just as important. Taking the entire 
open interest into consideration enables me to explore the implication of 
financialization in this broader sense instead of focusing just on the activities of index 
traders. Second, as discussed in Chapter 1, Keynesian and Post-Keynesian schools of 
thought point to the possibility of self-fulfilling asset bubbles during times of 
exuberance. Studying developments in open interest and prices allows me examine if 
the rapid inflow of liquidity into commodity markets lead to price bubbles.   
For the empirical analysis, I use the cointegration framework to understand the 
relations between open interest and prices for 16 commodities for a time period of 15 
years (1995-2012). An important limitation of the existing literature is that most 
papers do not take into account the possibility of structural breaks in the data. This 
may cause a number of problems -- first conventional unit-root tests lack the power to 
reject the (false) null hypothesis of unit-root in the presence of structural breaks. 
Second, structural break may lead to changes in the cointegration vector and affect the 
power of the cointegration test. In the empirical analysis I allow for up to two 
structural breaks in the unit-root tests and cointegration tests. 
Results show that for a majority of commodities analyzed, prices and open 
interest share a long-run cointegrating relationship. More importantly for most 
commodities, if there is a deviation from the long run relationship, prices adjust to 
maintain the relationship. These results imply that the overall increase in liquidity in 
recent years increased demand for long positions more than could have been met by 
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demand for short positions, creating an upward pressure on prices. The initial increase 
in liquidity could have been motivated by an increase in prices or an expectation of an 
increase in prices in the future, due to some fundamental changes in demand or supply. 
However, this increase in liquidity pushed prices up and leading to a bubble-like 
feedback mechanism between liquidity and prices. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 explores data 
issues related to CFTC net positions data. In Section 3.3, I survey the literature 
highlighting different approaches, data, and methodologies used. Section 3.4 and 3.5 
detail the empirical strategy and data respectively. Finally in Section 3.6, I summarize 
the results of the empirical analysis, before concluding in section 3.7.  
3.2 Weaknesses of the CFTC Net Positions Data 
The CFTC publishes three major weekly reports on trader positions: 
Commitments of Traders (COT) reports, Supplementary Commodity Index Trader 
(CIT) reports, and Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) reports. All three 
reports are based on the large trader reporting system (LTRS), where CFTC collects 
daily information from reporting firms, clearing members, futures commission 
merchants, and foreign brokers, which covers between 70-90% of any market.36  
COT reports divide traders into two categories: commercial traders (hedgers) 
and non-commercial traders37 (speculators). Traditionally, the commercial category 
consisted of “bonafide hedgers”, producers and consumers of commodities who have 
commercial interest in the underlying commodities. The non-commercial category 
consisted of speculators, who do not have any commercial interest in the physical 
commodity, and are in the market to profit from changes in the prices. However, after 
                                                 
36
 the rest is covered by small traders called non-reporting traders.  
37
 CFTC classifies merchants, manufacturers, producers, and commodity swaps and derivative dealers 
as commercial, and all other traders including hedge funds, floor brokers and traders as non-
commercial. 
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index traders entered the commodities futures market in 2001/02, the boundary 
between hedgers and speculators was blurred and trader designations of the COT 
reports were no longer a good representation of the activities of traders in the market. 
For example, swap dealers were classified as commercial traders although they were 
hedging risks associated with OTC derivative positions, and did not really fit the 
“bonafide hedgers” description.  
Responding to complaints about inaccurate trader designations, in 2007 
CFTC started to publish CIT reports for 12 agriculture markets.38 CIT reports classify 
traders into three categories: index traders, commercial traders excluding index 
traders, and non-commercial traders excluding index traders. The CIT category 
includes pension funds, previously classified as non-commercial traders and swap 
dealers previously classified as commercial traders. CIT reports are available from 
2006. Although the CIT category is an improvement over the previous disaggregation 
of commercial and non-commercial traders, there are still major flaws with the data. 
CFTC itself admits that traders assigned to the category of index traders are engaged 
in other futures activity that cannot be disaggregated, and CIT will not include many 
other traders who are engaged in index trading activity. Another important weakness 
is that CIT reports are only available from 2006 onwards, but the rapid inflow of 
money into the commodities market started in 2001/2002. This implies that the data 
are truncated and provide us with biased view of the causal links between index 
trading and prices. Finally, CIT data are only available for 12 agriculture commodities 
and not for other important commodity markets like energy and precious metals.  
                                                 
38
 Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) corn, CBOT soybeans, CBOT soybean oil, CBOT wheat, Kansas 
City Board of Trade (KCBOT) wheat, New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) cotton, Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) live cattle, CME feeder cattle, CME lean hogs, NYBOT coffee, NYBOT 
sugar, and NYBOT cocoa. 
  
61 
 
CFTC also started publishing DCOT reports from September 2009, providing 
data from 2006. The DCOT data are available for the 12 agriculture markets covered 
by CIT reports plus some energy and metal markets. DCOT report classifies traders 
into swap dealers, managed money processors, merchants, and other reporting traders. 
Although the DCOT and CIT reports have been helpful in estimating the magnitude 
and nature of financial investment in the commodities market, these data sets are still 
highly aggregate. The major weakness of all three net-position datasets that CFTC 
reports -- COT, CIT, and DCOT -- is their inability to accurately identify trader 
positions into different categories. The datasets also do not distinguish between 
positions of traders for futures contracts of different maturities. As nearby futures are 
more important for price determination, not knowing the positions of traders for 
nearby futures, is an important weakness.  
Some papers resolve this weakness to some extent by using CFTC 
proprietary data that identifies positions of each trader category in each futures 
contract for every contract maturity on each day (Brunetti, Buyuksahin, and Harris 
2010 and Buyuksahin and Harris 2011). These papers are a marked improvement over 
papers that use the aggregate public data. However, the fundamental data problems 
remain – positions are still classified based on entity and not on trading strategies. If a 
trader takes positions on behalf of both traditional hedgers and index traders, CFTC 
will allocate all of its positions to one of the trader categories depending on whether 
CFTC decides the trader is primarily a hedger, a swap dealer, or belongs to some 
other trade category. It is impossible to differentiate between positions of a particular 
trader at the aggregate level. For example in 2003 Cargill -- a major grain trading 
company, established Black River Asset Management, a hedge fund (Oxfam 2012). 
Black River Asset Management provides external investors a range of financial and 
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asset management services. CFTC categories Cargill as a hedger and allocates all of 
its trading positions, including through its hedge fund, to the commercial trader 
category.  
The problem with internal netting of positions by swap dealers also persists 
with the proprietary data. In addition, the CFTC dataset are limited to the US futures 
market, which is just one venue for speculators to be involved in the commodities 
market. OTC derivatives contracts and foreign boards of trade are other activities that 
may impact futures trading and commodity prices in the US, which are outside of the 
purview of the CFTC. This limitation is especially important for some markets like 
crude oil and industrial metals— a majority of financial investment is known to take 
place through OTC trades for crude oil, while London Metals Exchange is the major 
market for industrial metals.  
Figure 3A (appendix 3.2) illustrates this data weakness. The first graph 
shows the net long positions in CBOT wheat futures for CIT and Swap Dealers. The 
third line in the graph represents data from the CFTC “Special Call” request that 
includes net positions of 43 entities. 39  These entities were requested to provide 
information on the total notional value and the equivalent number of futures contract 
for their entire OTC commodity index business, not just the netted amount that may 
ultimately be managed in the futures market. Unfortunately this data are only 
available from December 2007 on quarterly basis, and on a monthly basis from June 
2010. For the CBOT wheat market, comparison of CIT, DCOT and the Special Call 
data reveals that the CIT and DCOT datasets underestimate the total index related 
investment in the market, although the CIT net positions data are quite close to the 
                                                 
39
 16 of these entities are large swap dealers who are known to the CFTC to have a significant 
commodity index swap business, 14 are known commodity index funds while 13 others are large swap 
dealers who are not known to engage in significant commodity index swap business 
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Special Call data. However, in the crude oil market the difference between the swap 
dealers positions and special call data is quite stark and reveals that the DCOT data 
are simply inadequate in trying to estimate the level of index investment in the market. 
The difference between the Special Call data and DCOT also reveals the fact that the 
OTC market for crude oil is very large and that only a small fraction the OTC 
contracts end up in the futures exchange market.  
In the next section, I provide a brief literature review of major papers in this 
area. Although, my focus is on papers that study correlation between positions of 
traders and prices, I also discuss papers that use other approaches.  
3.3 Literature Review  
There has been a flurry of research on the links between financialization and 
commodity prices since the 2008 price developments. The field has been fast evolving, 
with papers using different methodologies, data, and arguing on both sides of the 
debate. For example, Einloth (2009); Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2009); Gilbert (2010a) 
look for evidence of trend-following behavior in the price process. In contrast, Kilian 
and Murphy (2010), Lombardi and Robays (2011), and Juvenal and Petrella (2011) 
use structural VAR models to detangle effects of various demand and supply shocks 
on oil prices. While, Buyuksahin, Haigh, and Robe (2010); Silvennoinen and Thorp 
(2010); Hong and Yogo (2012) study the rise in correlation between commodity and 
financial markets as they become increasingly inter-related. Some other papers study 
the rise in correlation between commodity prices themselves (Ai, Chatrath, and Song 
2006; Lescaroux 2009; Frankel and Rose 2009; Lombardi, Osbat, and Schnatz 2010; 
Tang and Xiong 2010).40 Finally, another strand of the literature examines if there are 
                                                 
40
 I use this approach in chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
  
64 
 
price pressure during the so called “Goldman Roll”41 (Stoll and Whaley 2010; Irwin, 
Garcia, Good, and Kunda 2009; Hamilton and Wu 2012; Mou 2011).  
A majority of papers have tried to determine if the inflow of investment into 
the commodities futures markets through commodity indices have impact on prices by 
checking for Granger causality between the net positions of different categories of 
traders and futures prices. Most of the papers in this category utilize COT, CIT, or 
DCOT data published by the CFTC and are subject to data issues discussed in the 
previous section.  
The OECD working paper by Irwin and Sanders (2010) is one of the first 
empirical papers that uses this approach. Using CIT data for 12 commodities, they 
show that only for corn and cotton, the activity of index traders Granger causes 
futures returns.42 Although the paper acknowledges that increased flow of index fund 
investment represents a structural change of the commodities market, they argue that 
it did not lead to a price bubble. This paper has been cited widely as evidence of lack 
of a bubble in the futures market and has fueled the argument that prices in 2008 can 
be explained by supply and demand fundamentals. In a series of papers, Irwin and 
Sander have continued their analysis using different data-sets and empirical 
methodologies and have reinforced their argument that positions of traders do not lead 
to changes in futures returns.43 
A number of papers have followed this methodology of looking at the 
correlation between trader positions and change in prices. Stoll and Whaley (2011) 
                                                 
41
 Goldman Roll is the period during which index funds replicating the S&P-GSCI must replace 
expiring futures contracts with new contracts, following the rolling strategy of the GSCI which is 
public. For example, under the Goldman Roll, if March contracts are being replaced by April contracts, 
all index traders will seek to sell March contracts and buy April contracts. 
42
 Returns in period t (R)t= log(Pt) – log(Pt-1), where Pt: price in period t 
43
 Sanders and Irwin (2011a), Irwin (2013), and Sanders and Irwin (2011b) are some other papers. 
They use cross-sectional regression on CIT and quarterly index investment data in Sanders and Irwin 
(2011a) and Irwin (2013) respectively. Sanders and Irwin (2011b) use the same CIT data, but extended 
from 2004-2009 for CBOT corn, wheat, and soybeans. 
  
65 
 
use CIT data and conclude that index fund trading does not cause increase in futures 
prices. Out of the 12 commodities, they find evidence only for cotton that net 
positions of traders Granger-cause futures returns; while for KCBOT wheat, the 
causality is reversed. In contrast other papers, that use similar methodology, have 
found that net position changes of traders does lead to future price changes. In a 
UNCTAD discussion paper, Mayer (2009) finds significant impact of financial traders 
on prices of both agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. Similarly, Robles, 
Torero, and Braun (2009) use four indicators: volume, open interest, ratio of monthly 
volume to open interest, and positions of non-commercial traders and conclude that 
speculative activities seem to have been influential, but accept that the evidence is far 
from conclusive.  
Other papers use the net position of trader data along with other predictors of 
futures prices to check if net positions are correlated to price changes. Gilbert (2010b) 
carries out OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS estimation of change in the agricultural food price 
index vs. changes in the oil price, the exchange rate, and the futures investment index. 
He arrives at similar conclusions from all three regressions – estimates show a 
statistically significant impact of index investment on both the food price index and 
oil price. Singleton (2011) computes excess returns from holding positions in futures 
at different maturity points along the yield curve and includes a range of predictor 
variables: returns on the S&P500 and MSCI emerging market indices, change in 
overnight repo positions of treasury bonds, 13-week change in open interest, change 
in average basis, 13-week changes in the imputed positions of index traders and 
money managers. Results show that correlation between changes in oil futures prices 
and both index and money manager net positions are positive. Finally, Hamilton and 
Wu (2012) follow Singleton’s use of holdings, which are in essence notional positions 
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of index investors rather than net positions, to explain returns of commodity futures. 
They carry out the analysis for the 12 commodities covered by CIT data and find that 
there are no relations between notional positions and returns. However, using a 
similar technique to Masters (2008) to estimate notional positions of index traders in 
crude oil shows that notional positions can predict returns for crude oil during 2006-
2009.  
As we can see, results of papers that use net positions data are mixed. Some 
like Irwin and Sanders (2010) and Stoll and Whaley (2011) show no evidence of 
causality between net positions and futures prices, while others like Mayer (2009), 
Robles, Torero, and Braun (2009), Gilbert (2010b), and Singleton (2011) show 
causality running from net positions to prices, for at least some commodities. The 
major weakness of studies that use this methodology is the net positions data itself.  
Brunetti, Buyuksahin, and Harris (2010) use CFTC proprietary data for crude 
oil, natural gas, and corn44 that identifies positions of each trader category in each 
futures contract for every contract maturity on each day. They carry out Granger 
causality in the context of VAR from Jan 2005 to March 2009 using returns, positions, 
and realized volatility data. The paper concludes that speculative activity does not 
affect prices, and further that swap dealers and hedge funds reduce volatility. 
Similarly, Buyuksahin and Harris (2011) use the same daily trader level position data 
and conduct Granger causality tests at daily and multiple day intervals for crude oil. 
They carry out tests in two sub-periods: 2000-2004 and 2004-2009, and the entire 
sample. Results indicate that there is no evidence that hedge funds and other non-
commercial position changes Granger-cause prices, instead they find that price 
changes precede position changes. As discussed before, although these papers are an 
                                                 
44
 They also include Eurodollar and mini-DOW in their analysis. 
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improvement over papers that use the aggregate public data, the fundamental data 
problems still remain – positions are still classified based on entity and not on trading 
strategies.  
Given the data limitation, another strategy would be to give up on trying to 
divide open interest among different types of traders, and use total open interest itself 
as a determinant of futures prices for the commodities market. Hong and Yogo (2012) 
argue that open interest contains information about future economic activity that is not 
fully revealed by net supply-demand imbalances among hedgers in the futures market. 
Their thesis is based on the assumption of limited risk absorption capacity by 
speculators, in other words that there are limits to arbitrage. Using data for 30 
commodities from 1964, they show that movements in open interest predict 
movements in prices even after controlling for other know predictors of returns such 
as short rate, yield spread, and basis. In this chapter, I will follow Hong and Yogo’s 
(2012) approach and use total open interest as a measure of total inflow of liquidity 
into the market, instead of trying to divide the open interest among different types of 
traders.  
3.4 Empirical Strategy  
In this chapter, I seek to understand the impact of financialization of the 
commodities market on explaining the 2008 price developments. My approach 
follows previous literature, in trying to understand the lead-lag dynamics between 
prices and positions of traders, the major difference being that instead of examining 
the correlation between positions of different groups of traders and price, I focus on 
the general inflow of money by using the open interest in each commodity market. 
Open interest measures the total number of futures contracts, long or short, that have 
been entered into and that have not yet been liquidated by an offsetting transaction or 
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fulfilled by delivery. There are three reasons why I have decided to take this approach 
instead of following previous studies and attempt to decompose open interest into 
position of traders.  
First, as mentioned before three are several issues with the CFTC net 
positions data which makes it almost impossible to accurately differentiate between 
positions of different groups of traders and their trading strategies. Without knowing 
accurately the long and short positions of the traders, it would be almost impossible to 
determine their impact on prices. 
  The second reason is somewhat related to the first point. Most of the literature 
in this field has tried to understand the implication of the inflow of institutional 
investors on prices. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, financialization is a 
much broader development and represents a general increase in influence of the 
financial sector in the commodity markets. The rise of institutional investors is 
certainly an important part of the story; however other aspects of financialization such 
as the changing role of “bonafide hedgers” and other traders such as money managers 
and hedge funds are just as important. Taking the entire open interest instead of 
decomposing it into net long or short positions of a particular group of traders will 
enable me to examine the implication of financialization in this broader sense.  
The third reason is more theoretical. As discussed in Chapter 1, unlike the 
mainstream theory of efficient financial markets, the Keynesian and Post-Keynesian 
school of thought hold a more critical view of finance. They highlight the role of 
uncertainty and the possibility of price bubbles during times of exuberance. Especially 
relevant to our analysis is the notion of capital market inflation of Toporowski (2002). 
Toporowski argues that prices in the securities markets are determined by financial 
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inflows, rather than the other way around. Excess inflow of funds into the market, 
driven by pension funds, pushes prices up leading to capital market inflation.  
In the case of the commodities futures market, an increase in open interest 
does not automatically represent financialization. Open interest may increase due to 
an increase in production of commodities, leading to higher activity by producers and 
consumers. It may also simply represent an increase in popularity of the futures 
market for hedging needs of commodity producers and consumers. However, the 
recent increase in market liquidity across many commodity futures markets,45 make it 
difficult to argue that commodity specific factors are behind it. Financialization is a 
more plausible argument. The initial price development of 2008 may have been 
grounded in fundamentals -- demand from emerging market, bio-fuel, supply 
problems. Whatever the reason the initial increase in prices attracted more money into 
the market. The collapse of the housing market and the promotion of commodities as 
a safe asset by the financial sector further meant that new classes of traders such as 
institutional traders and hedge funds also became interested in commodities, leading 
to higher liquidity in the futures market.   
This increase in market liquidity doesn’t necessarily lead to an increase (or 
decrease) in prices. Toporowski developed his theory of capital market inflation 
primarily for the equities market. Futures contracts unlike stocks and bonds are not 
debt securities; they do not represent ownership of an underlying asset. A futures 
contract represents positions of two sides, the buyer side or the long position and the 
seller side or the short position. The impact of higher trading activity on prices, if any, 
depends on the balance between the demand for long and short positions. We can 
                                                 
45
 see Figure 3B (appendix 3.2) and Table 3.1 for a general trend in open interest across various 
commodity futures markets. 
  
70 
 
represent the relationship between prices and market liquidity by the following 
equation: 
fg   O hij k, fm

 njk, fmo                                      0. Error!  Bookmark not de0ined. 1 
where, jfm represents futures prices and (fg ) is the change in futures price over time. 
jim and jnm represent demand for long and short positions respectively, and k is a 
measure for trading activity in the market. If the demand for long positions is higher 
than the demand for short positions, prices will rise. While, a higher demand for short 
positions relative to long positions leads to a fall in prices. The impact of higher 
trading activity on futures prices depends on how it affects this balance between long 
or short positions. If financialization leads to a higher demand for long positions 
(perhaps due to the activity of index investors, who are concentrated in the long side 
of the market), then it will lead to an upward pressure on prices. However, if 
financialization leads to a higher demand for short positions, then we may witness a 
decrease in commodity prices. 
 Given this formulation, it seems more logical to test for correlation between 
the inflow of money in the commodities market and the corresponding price 
developments rather than trying to focus on the actions of a particular group of traders. 
It would not be surprising to find correlation between open interest and prices – if 
price of an asset goes up, more liquidity might flow into the market to profit from the 
rise in prices. However, our interest is in reverse causality- does the rapid inflow of 
liquidity in the market cause prices to rise? Hong and Yogo (2012) is the only paper 
of which I am aware that shows that movements in open interest predict movements 
in commodity prices even after controlling for other know predictors of returns such 
as short rate, yield spread, and basis. Caballerao, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2011) also 
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argue that the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008 led to a rapid influx of money 
into the commodities market which led to a speculative bubble.  
 The empirical analysis consists of three major steps. The first step determines 
the stationarity properties of the individual price series. I carry out both conventional 
unit root tests and those that take structural breaks into account. After establishing that 
most of the prices series are integrated of order 1, I carry out cointegration tests that 
take structural breaks into account, to understand the long-run relations between open 
interest and futures prices. Finally, I use vector error correction model (VECM) and 
Toda-Yamamoto (1995) causality tests to understand the direction of causality 
between open interest and futures prices. These steps are discussed below in more 
detail.  
Structural breaks have been mostly ignored in the previous literature, 
although a visual inspection points to possible breaks. In the presence of structural 
breaks, traditional Dickey-Fuller-type unit-root tests lack the power to reject the 
(false) null hypothesis of unit-root (Perron 1989).46 To correct this problem,  I use 
Clemente-Montanes- Reyes (1998) unit root test, which is an extension of the Perron 
and Vogelsang (1992) test for 2 unknown structural breaks. The test assumes the 
following equation for innovative outlier model (IO)47: 
                ∆  
 !        0. Error!  Bookmark not de0ined. 2 
DTBit is a pulse variable which is equal to 1 if t = TBi + 1 (i=1, 2), 0 otherwise. DUit 
=1 if t > TBi (i =1, 2) and 0 otherwise. TB1 and TB2 are the break dates. The null 
hypothesis is that the series has a unit root with structural break(s) against the 
                                                 
46
 See Perron (2005) for an exhaustive literature review on unit root tests and structural breaks.  
47
 The test allows for both Additive outlier model: change to the trend function occurs instantaneously; 
and Innovative outlier model: change to the new trend function is gradual.  
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alternative hypothesis that they are stationary with break(s): 
  3:            5 
36:          ! 
The test is carried out for each possible break date, choosing the date with strongest 
evidence against the null hypothesis of unit root, i.e. where the t-stat from the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test is at the minimum. If Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit 
root test suggests less than two breaks in the series, results from Perron–Vogelsang 
unit root tests with 1 break are considered. If there is no evidence of structural breaks 
in the data, results of traditional Dickey-Fuller tests with the null hypothesis of unit 
root, are considered. I also carry out the KPSS48 test with the null hypothesis of 
stationarity, as a robustness check. 
Results of unit-root tests show that almost all the series except feeder cattle 
open interest and MGEX wheat price are I(1), after accounting for 2 structural breaks. 
I drop these two commodities from the rest of the analysis as cointegration requires 
variables to be integrated of the same order. The next step in the analysis is to test for 
cointegrating relationships between individual futures prices and open interest. 
However, as the series consist of structural breaks, we need to take these breaks into 
account when we carry out test for cointegration, because structural breaks may lead 
to changes in the cointegration vector and the cointegration test will no longer be 
appropriate (Perron 2005). Fortunately, Johansen, Mosconi, and Nielsen (2000) have 
generalized the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) likelihood-based 
cointegration analysis to account for up to 2 structural breaks, and provided new 
asymptotic tables.  
                                                 
48
 KPSS: Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin  
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∆7   ∏∏ p7q  
∏∆7
 A                               0. Error!  Bookmark not de0ined. 3 
where,  
 
Dt = 1,…., Dq,t    where (q-1) are the breaks present 
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It can also be written as: ∆7  O 9 ST @
Q  9:;<=>;<?@   ∏∆7  A     0.1 
This method uses the fact that if prices and open interest are cointegrated, the rank of 
matrix ∏ will be (n-r) where n is the number of variables and r is the number of 
cointegrating vectors. (n-r) has be greater than 0 (otherwise there is no cointegrating 
relation) but less than full rank (implies all vectors are stationary). I use the trace 
statistic to the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or 
equal to r against a general alternative.  
After establishing that a cointegrating vector exists (after accounting for 
breaks), I estimate the error correction model, along with the cointegrating vector (β) 
and speed of adjustment parameters (αs and αf). The cointegrating vector (β) 
establishes the long-run relationship between the two variables while α tells us about 
the direction of causality. For example if αoi > 0 and αf = 0 indicates that if there is a 
short-run deviation from the cointegrating relationship, only open interest adjusts to 
maintain the relationship. This implies that there is no feedback mechanism between 
liquidity and prices that may lead to asset price bubbles. However, αoi > 0 and αf > 0 
implies that both open interest and futures prices adjust to maintain the long-run 
cointegrating relationship.49 This result points to the existence of bubble-like feedback 
                                                 
49
 See Joyuex (2007) for more details on the implementation of cointegration tests accounting for 
structural breaks. 
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mechanism between open interest and prices. 
Finally, in the last step of the empirical analysis I seek to understand the 
causality relations between open interest and futures prices during the identified time 
periods. However, Granger causality test based on the Wald principal is not valid for 
I(1) series due to nonstandard asymptotic properties. To correct for this, I use Toda 
and Yamamoto (1995) causality tests by adding extra lag (dmax), based on the 
maximum order of integration, to the VAR(k) model then carry out the Wald test 
which will have an asymptotic chi-s 
OIV  γ   ΣYZ  γYOIV  Σ[Z\Z\]^_` γ[OIV[  δ[FV  Σ[Z\Z\]^_` δ[FV[ γεV 
FV  α   ΣYZ  αYFV   Σ[Z\Z\]^_` α[FV[   β[OIV  Σ[Z\Z\]^_` β[SV[ γεV 
The null hypothesis is that futures prices do not Granger cause open interest ( 
  0), and open interest do not Granger cause futures prices (P  P  0). The 
benefit of this approach is that cointegration between the two series is not necessary to 
carry out causality tests, which means we can carry out these tests also for 
commodities that are not cointegrated. While for cointegrated commodities, Toda-
Yamamoto test will serve as a robustness check of the VEC methodology, as 
cointegration implies Granger causality in at least one direction. 
3.5 Data Sources 
Futures prices: I use weekly prices of 16 commodities from Pinnacle Data50, for a 15 
year period (1995-2012). These includes 12 agricultural commodities (CBOT51 corn, 
wheat, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, oats; KCBOT52 wheat; MGEX53 wheat; 
ICE54 cocoa, coffee, sugar, cotton), 1 livestock (CME55 feeder cattle), and 3 energy 
                                                 
50
 https://www.pinnacledata.com/ 
51
 CBOT: Chicago Board of Trade 
52
 KCBOT: Kansas City Board of Trade 
53
 MGEX: Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
54
 ICE: Intercontinental Exchange 
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commodities (NYMEX56 crude oil, heating oil, and natural gas). Besides oats and 
MGEX wheat all other commodities are part of S&P-GSCI and/or DJ-UBS 
commodity index and thus have witnessed rapid inflow of investment through index 
funds into their futures markets. I extract end-of-day prices from nearby futures57 
contract and take the weekly mean. For more details on the data and sources, refer to 
Appendix 3.1.  
Measure of liquidity: Since I am not working with trader positions and I am only 
interested in the total inflow of money into the commodities futures markets, CFTC 
COT options and futures report, that are available from 1995, provide the longest and 
broadest dataset. Figure 3B (appendix 3.2) shows the overall trend in open interest in 
select commodities. Starting from 2004 open interest of commodities rose at a scale 
unseen in the past, this process accelerated between 2006 and 2008. After the peaking 
in 2008, it fell for a short time only to rise again in early 2011. Table 3.1 below, 
provides a more quantitative measure of the increase in open interest over the years. 
Open interest in sugar rose by more than 600 percent between January 2001 and the 
peak in 2008. Similar trends can be seen in other commodities that include grains, 
livestock, and energy.  
 
Table 0.1: Percent Increase in the Open Interest of Select Commodities 
Wheat  Corn Soybeans Sugar Coffee Crude oil 
% increase between Jan 
2001 and peak in 2008 
269 303 349 648 389 465 
% increase between Jan 
2006 and peak in 2008 
80 129 141 100 151 129 
** corn, wheat, and soybeans peak was in 2011.  
                                                                                                                                            
55
 CME: Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
56
 NYMEX: New York Mercantile Exchange 
57
 Nearby futures contract is the contract with the closest settlement date, and it is by far the most 
heavily traded contract, so it is considered most important for price determination. I switch to the next-
to-nearby contract as the delivery dates comes close, as open interest falls rapidly as the date of 
delivery nears. 
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3.6 Empirical Results  
Key results of the empirical analysis are: i) both futures prices and open 
interest are I(1) after accounting for up to two structural breaks for 14 of the 1658 
commodities analyzed; ii) for most commodities the identified breaks correspond to 
the 2008 rise and fall in prices, thus highlighting the extraordinary scale of the event; 
iii) prices and open interest for all commodities share a long-run cointegrating 
relationship; and iv) most importantly for a majority of commodities (12/14), prices 
adjust to maintain the long run relationship. This provides support to the thesis that a 
process of capital market inflation took place in the commodities market, where the 
inflow of liquidity created an upward pressure on prices. 
To understand the stationarity properties of the price series and open interest, 
I carry out Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit root test that allows for up to two 
structural breaks. I set a trim of 0.15, meaning 15% of the data are trimmed on each 
side. This implies that for most commodities, the test takes into account data between 
November 1997 and April 2010 and ignores the spike in price in early 2011. Figure 
3C (appendix 3.2) plots spot and futures prices of each commodity, along with the 
identified breaks. The shaded regions in the graphs are the trimmed areas of the test. 
Results are detailed in Table 3A (appendix 3.3). 
For most commodities, the identified breaks in the price series correspond to 
the rise and subsequent fall of prices in 2008, while the breaks in open interest usually 
lead the ones in prices. For example for the CBOT and KCBOT wheat prices, the 
identified break dates are identical, the first one is identified in May 2007 as the price 
bubble grows, and the second one in early March 2008 as the bubble finally bursts. 
While, the breaks in open interest for CBOT wheat are in December 2004 and January 
                                                 
58MGEX wheat and feeder cattle are stationary after accounting for two structural breaks.   
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2006, and for KCBOT wheat it is in June 2005. Breaks in corn and MGEX wheat 
prices, are close to those in K/CBOT wheat, but with a lag. For oats one break is 
identified in August 2006. Prices of soybeans and soybean oil follow similar trends, 
and share the exact break dates. While soybean meal does not follow trends in 
soybeans/oil, and only one break is identified in July 2007. Breaks in open interest for 
soybeans and soybean oil are identified in August 2003, July 2006 and March 2006, 
November 2008 respectively. Again, most of these dates correspond to the 2008 price 
boom. For the four soft commodities (cotton, sugar, coffee, cocoa) the price rise in 
2011 was more important in scale than the one in 2008. However, this part of the data 
is in the trimmed region, and is not taken into account by the test. A majority of soft 
commodities (cocoa, coffee, cotton) also had price hikes between 1997 and 2001, 
these are identified as breaks. For cocoa breaks are identified in October 2001 and 
November 2007 in prices, and October 1999 and February 2005 in open interest. 
Coffee prices have two breaks in May 1997 and October 2004; while breaks in open 
interest are in August 2003 and September 2006. Cotton prices and open interest have 
two breaks each on June 1998, August 2009 and November 2006, September 2008 
respectively. For sugar, there are no breaks in the price series, but two in open 
interest: March 2004 and October 2006. Feeder cattle prices have been quite stable 
and did not witness the 2008 price bubble, no breaks were identified in the price series, 
while open interest is stationary after accounting for 2 breaks. Among energy 
commodities, crude oil, heating oil and RBOB gasoline witness similar price trends. 
Crude oil witnessed two significant breaks in December 2004 and September 2008; 
heating oil closely followed trends in crude oil. Open interest in crude oil: January 
2005 and September 2008; heating oil: June 2006 and May 2009. Finally, trends in 
natural gas seem to be disconnected from other energy commodities with two breaks 
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identified in August 2004 and June 2008; and for open interest January 2000 and 
February 2005.  
Traditional Dickey-Fuller based tests and KPSS (Table 3B in appendix 3.3) 
confirm the results that prices and open interest both are I(1) for 14 of the 16 
commodities analyzed. Open interest of MGEX wheat and price series of feeder cattle 
are stationary after accounting for up to 2 structural breaks. These two commodities 
are excluded from the rest of the empirical analysis.  
In the next step, I use the Johansen’s cointegration test, adjusted to take up to 
2 structural breaks in account, to check if open interest and prices series of individual 
commodities are cointegrated. Results show open interest and futures prices of all 14 
commodities examined are cointegrated. Table 3C in Appendix 3.3 has the detailed 
results for both Johansen’s test and Adjusted Johansen’s test.  
After establishing that a cointegrating vector exists, in the second step I 
estimate the error correction model, along with the cointegrating vector (β) and speed 
of adjustment parameters (αs and αf). The cointegrating vector (β) establishes the long-
run relationship between the two variables while α tell us about the direction of 
causality. I carry out Johansen’s maximum likelihood VEC model, with rank =1 and 
the same lag lengths as before given by AIC, HQIC, and SBIC. 
Results of the VEC model are summarized in Table 3D in Appendix 3.3. The 
cointegrating vector is significant and has a negative sign for all 14 commodities 
examined. This implies that open interest and futures prices share a long-run 
relationship and they move in the same direction. As expected for most of the cases 
(8/14) the speed of adjustment parameter for open interest (αoi) is significant. This 
implies that for these 8 commodities, open interest adjusts in the short-run to maintain 
the long-run relationship. If prices move up, traders enter the market to gain from the 
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rise in prices, so the overall liquidity in the market rises. Surprisingly, our variable of 
interest, the speed of adjustment parameter for prices (αprice) is also significant for a 
majority of the cases (12 out of 14). This implies that for these 12 commodities, if 
there is a deviation from the long run relationship between liquidity and prices, prices 
respond and adjust to maintain the relationship. For cocoa and oats, there seems to be 
no price adjustment. Oats is the only commodity among the 14 analyzed that is not 
part of the GSCI or the DJ-UBSCI, while cocoa is included in the GSCI but not in the 
DJ-UBSCI. Among the 12 commodities that show price adjustment, all except 
soybean oil and soybean meal are included in both the GSCI and the DJ-UBSCI. 
Soybean meal and soybean oil are in included in the DJ-UBSCI, but not in the GSCI.  
 I also carry out the Toda-Yamamoto causality tests on the entire sample 
period, and various sub-periods identified by structural breaks. The overall results are 
consistent with VECM results; Toda-Yamamoto tests show causality running at least 
in one direction for all the commodities that are cointegrated, thus reinforcing our 
results. For most of the commodities (cotton, coffee, corn, sugar, CBOT wheat, 
soybeans, soybean oil, crude oil), results show bidirectional causality between prices 
and open interest. While for some commodities (cocoa, oats, KCBOT wheat, soybean 
meal, heating oil, natural gas) causality only runs from prices to open interest. 
Although these results may seem contradictory or inconsistent, we have to keep in 
mind that cointegration is a long-run relationship and causality in the short-run might 
change. In addition, cointegration and Granger causality are different ways of 
analyzing the data, and causality has a power problem of not being able to reject the 
null hypothesis. It is thus reasonable to expect different results from the two tests, 
with cointegration giving stronger results. (Lütkepohl 2004, p. 150) Table 3E in 
Appendix 3.3 has the detailed results. 
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In summary, the results of this chapter suggest that the overall increase in 
liquidity in recent year, has led to disequilibrium between demand for long and short 
positions in the commodities futures market. Going back to equation 3.1, as market 
liquidity rose, it increased demand for long positions more than could have been met 
by demand for short positions, creating an upward pressure on prices. The initial 
increase in liquidity could have been motivated by an increase in prices or an 
expectation of an increase in prices in the future, due to some fundamental changes in 
demand or supply. However, this increase in liquidity pushed prices up and leading to 
a bubble-like feedback mechanism between liquidity and prices. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In recent years, the commodities futures markets have undergone a 
phenomenal increase in liquidity, along with the emergence of new classes of traders 
and trading strategies. During the same time, a range of commodities witnessed a 
rapid rise in prices, peaking in mid-2008 before dropping precipitously. In this chapter 
of the dissertation, I sought to understand the relationship between these two 
developments.   
Most previous studies use the publicly available CFTC data on net positions 
of traders, which suffers from a very important data flaw: it cannot accurately identify 
between different trading positions. This makes it almost impossible to isolate the 
effects of different groups of traders or trading strategies on prices. In this chapter, I 
take a different approach. I focus on the general inflow of money in each commodity 
futures market by studying developments in total open interest. Using total open 
interest also allows me to explore the implication of financialization in a broader 
context instead of focusing just on index traders.  
I use the cointegration framework to understand the relation between open 
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interest and prices for 16 commodities for a time period of 15 years (1995-2012). 
Results show that prices and open interest for 14 commodities analyzed, share a long-
run cointegrating relationship. More importantly for most commodities, if there is a 
deviation from the long run relationship, prices adjust to maintain the relationship. 
This implies is that an initial rise in prices, perhaps due to a demand or supply shock, 
led to an increase in the overall liquidity in the market as more traders enter the 
market to gain from the rise in prices. This rise in liquidity increased demand for long 
positions more than could have been met by demand for short positions, creating an 
upward pressure on prices. As futures prices act as a benchmark for spot prices 
(established in Chapter 2), this development in the futures market is transmitted to the 
spot market, leading to a rise in spot prices. In conclusion, this paper provides strong 
empirical evidence to support the thesis that the 2008 rise in commodity prices were 
partly driven by the financialization of the commodities futures market.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Appendix 3.1: Data details 
 
Futures contract 
specification Exchange  contract months contract size 
1 Wheat, # 2 Soft red winter CBOT  H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
2 Wheat, # 2, Hard red 
winter KCBOT H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
3 Wheat, #2 Hard red spring  MGEX H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
4 Corn, # 2 Yellow CBOT H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
5 Oats, # 2 Milling CBOT H, K, N, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
6 Soybeans, #1 Yellow CBOT F, H, K, N Q, U, Z 5,000 bushels 
7 Soybean oil CBOT F, H, K, N Q, U, V, Z 60,000 pounds 
8 Soybean mea CBOT F, H, K, N Q, U, V, Z 100 short tons 
9 Cocoa ICE  H, K, N, U, Z 10 metric tons 
10 Coffee, Colombian ICE  H, K, N, U, Z 37,500 pounds 
11 Cotton, 1 1/16 Str. Lw. Medium ICE  H, K, N, V, Z 
50,000 
pounds  
12 Sugar, raw cane sugar 11 ICE  H, K, N, V 112,000 pounds 
13 Crude oil, WTI NYMEX  all months 1,000 barrels 
14 Heating oil NYMEX  all months 42,000 gallons 
15 Natural gas NYMEX  all months 
10,000 
million British 
thermal units  
16 
Feeder cattle index, 650-
849 pound steers, 
medium-large #1 and #1-2 
CME  F, H, J, K, Q, U, V, Z 50,000 pounds 
January (F), February (G), March (H), April (J), May (K), June (M), July (N), August (Q), September 
(U), October (V), November (X), December (Z)
 Figure 3A: Net Long Positions of Traders 
Figure 3B: Open Interes of select commodities
Standardized: demean and divided by standard deviation
Source: CFTC COT reports, all: sums up OI across the 6 
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in CBOT Wheat and NYMEX Crude Oil
 
 
 
commodities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3C: Trends in Commodity Spot and Futures Prices
Break1: 2006 w48; Break 2: 2009 w36
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 Break1: 2003 w35; Break 2: 2006 w38
 
 
 
  
Break 1:2006w1; Break 2:2007w9 
Break1: 2005 w1; Break 2: 2010 w8
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Break 1: 2005 w8; Break 2: 2007 w48
 
Break1:2005w40; Break 2: 2008w6
 
 
 
 
  
Break 1: 2002 w46; Break 2: 2006 w3
Break1:2004w50; Break 2:2008w12 
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Break 1: 2004 w11; Break 2: 2006 w42
 
 Break1: 2005 w27 ; Break 2: 2007 w22
 
 
 
 
 
  
Break 1: 2003 w33; Break 2:2006 w31
Break1: 2006 w10; Break 2: 2007 w32
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Break 1: 2005 w2; Break 2: 2009 w24 
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Appendix 3.3: Results 
Table 3A: Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit-root test with double mean shifts, IO model 
  Break 1 Break1 
coeff. 
Break1 
test 
Break 2 Break 2 
coeff. 
Break 2 
test 
Unit-root 
test stat 
Lag Result 
Cotton  Price 2000/ 1998w25 -0.7352 -2.4079* 2583/ 2009w36 1.4238 3.8377** -4.9747 16 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2439/ 2006w48 11989.6 4.3695** 2536/ 2008w41 -6870.98 -3.6717** -4.3445 15 
Coffee  
Price 2075/ 1999w48 -1.3907 -2.0063* 2330/ 2004w43 1.8381 2.7524** -3.4387 18 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2270/ 2003w35 2985.9 3.2011** 2429/ 2006w38 2377.1 2.5658** -3.9188 17 
Corn  
Price 2492/ 2007w9 12.7204 4.2707** 2523/ 2008w28 -8.7094 -3.0124** -2.8419 20 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2392/ 2006w1 42679.5 4.5639** 2521/ 2008w26 -10856.9 -1.9487* -4.2574 19 
Cocoa  
Price 2174/ 2001w43 15.3584 2.5449* 2491/ 2007w48 32.6551 3.2139** -4.01563 15 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2069/ 1999w42 968.34 1.6858 2347/ 2005w8 1437.8 2.3586* -3.22563 13 UR, 1 break 
Feeder 
cattle 
Price 2043/ 1999w16 0.1868 1.0448 2302/ 2004w15 0.3501 1.8008 -2.106 18 UR, no breaks 
OI 2340/ 2005w1 813.1 4.545** 2607/ 2010w8 943.6 4.0181** -5.805** 18 Stationary 
MGEX 
wheat 
Price 2491/ 2007w48 119.2 12.3139 2505/ 2008w10 -107.2 -11.936 -6.1204** 17 Stationary 
OI 2379/ 2005w40 1108.1 4.1093** 2501/ 2008w6 -525.5 -2.5079* -4.205 17 UR, 2 breaks 
Oats 
Price 2426/ 2006w35 5.6698 4.3889** 2523/ 2008w28 -1.7108 -1.4933 -4.426 17 UR, 1 break 
OI 2229/ 2002w46 -389.08 -3.7516** 2394/ 2006w3 370.92 3.6527** -4.823 19 UR, 2 breaks 
Sugar 
Price 2360/ 2005w21 0.141852 2.653308 2563/ 2009w16 0.405934 4.21124 -5.03816 19 UR, no breaks 
OI 2298/ 2004w11 13699.18 3.6641** 2433/ 2006w42 13751.67 3.2319** -4.69411 15 UR, 2 breaks 
CBOT 
wheat 
Price 2465/ 2007w22 30.625 6.780** 2507/2008w12 -22.297 -5.878** -4.59897 11 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2337/ 2004w50 7981.489 3.204** 2392/ 2006w1 7510.973 2.315* -4.25504 17 
KCBOT 
wheat 
Price 2465/2007w22 27.065 6.5353** 2507/2008w12 -18.8752 -5.168** -4.63597 13 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2366/2005w27 2014.24 3.2589** 2481/2007w38 -337.582 -0.6568 -3.96811 17 UR, 1 break 
Soybeans 
Price 2478/ 2007w35 24.030 4.4810** 2523/ 2008w28 -12.785 -2.7827** -3.42237 13 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2268/ 2003w33 5469.272 2.2447** 2422/ 2006w31 11935.31 3.5028** -4.90649 18 
Soybean oil 
Price 2478/ 2007w35 1.04961 5.08395** 2523/ 2008w28 -0.5152 -2.9795** -4.62832 19 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2406/ 2006w15 5556.4 3.2517** 2542/ 2008w47 141.2521 0.1125 -3.46711 15 UR, 1 break 
Soybean Price 2313/ 2004w26 -1.048 -0.9125 2475/ 2007w32 5.7154 3.5426** -3.7306 7 UR, 1 break 
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meal OI 2401/ 2006w10 3239.5 2.8362** 2521/ 2008w26 -1014.81 -1.1004 -3.8276 4 
Crude oil 
Price 2340/ 2005w1 1.3739 4.3682** 2535/ 2008w40 0.16834 0.7391 -4.9381 17 UR, 1 break 
OI 2344/ 2005w5 38702.39 3.5605** 2444/ 2007w1 23590.59 1.6726 -3.0544 20 
Heating oil 
Price 2341/ 2005w2 2.9298 3.5725** 2535/ 2008w40 0.5712 0.9017 -4.0206 18 UR, 1 break 
OI 2419/ 2006w28 4123.54 3.6485** 2571/ 2009w24 5054.5 3.0950** -4.5153 19 UR, 2 breaks 
Natural gas 
Price 2324/2004w37 0.2013 4.7469** 2523/2008w28 -0.20289 -4.9707** -5.5015 14 UR, 2 breaks 
OI 2080/2000w1 7982.64 2.6378** 2349/2005w10 8679.314 2.8712** -3.7376 16 
** 1% significance level, * 5% significance level. Critical value: -5.49, max-lag given by Ng-Perron, trim: 0.15, UR: unit root 
 
 
Table 3B: DFGLS, Dickey-Fuller and KPSS unit root tests 
 
 Lags DFGLS test Dfuller w/ constant Dfuller w/o 
constant Dfuller w/ trend 
KPSS Result 
Cotton  
Price (L) 20 -2.1388 -2.7925 (0.0593) -0.8746 -2.9351 (0.1511) 0.518 
I(1) Price (diff) 15 -1.9849 -6.2327 (0.0000)** -6.2406** -6.2223 (0.0000)** 
0.0386** 
OI (L) 19 -1.9475 -1.6095 (0.4788) -0.4162 -2.4694 (0.3434) 0.269 
OI (diff) 20 -5.1042** -6.8971 (0.0000)** -6.8906** -6.8892(0.0000)** 0.0495** 
Coffee  
Price (L) 20 -1.7784 -2.1184 (0.2372) -0.8065 -2.4112 (0.3737) 0.78 
I(1) Price (diff) 19 -4.8337** -5.9474 (0.0000)** -5.9507** -5.9415 (0.0000)** 
0.0564** 
OI (L) 17 -2.6897 -1.080 (0.7228) 0.3999 -3.4229 (0.0484) 0.256 
OI (diff) 16 -7.1737** -8.2239 (0.0000)** -8.1591** -8.2215 (0.0000)** 0.0277** 
Corn  
Price (L) 20 -2.2817 -1.3603 (0.6012) 0.0658 -2.5505 (0.3032) 0.749 
I(1) Price (diff) 19 -5.5990** -5.9396 (0.0000)** -5.9036** -5.9947 (0.0000)** 0.0244** OI (L) 19 -2.4768 -1.3759 (0.5937) -0.1816 -2.8175 (0.1906) 0.381 
OI (diff) 20 -5.6611** -5.9558 (0.0000)** -5.9366** -5.9470 (0.0000)** 0.0534** 
Cocoa  
Price (L) 15 -2.0265 -1.4466 (0.5597) -0.027 -2.2974 (0.4354) 0.609 
I(1) Price (diff) 17 -6.4158** -7.1324 (0.0000)** -7.1164** -7.1247 (0.0000)** 
0.0635** 
OI (L) 15 -2.9192 -1.1010 (0.7147) 0.7842 -2.9819 (0.1372) 0.167 
OI (diff) 14 -8.983** -9.2882 (0.0000)** -9.2212** -9.3031 (0.0000)** 0.0231** 
Oats Price (L) 18 -3.3607* -2.0670 (0.2579) -0.3633 -3.6036 (0.0295) 0.517 I(1) 
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Price (diff) 17 -4.7685** -5.7615 (0.0000)** -5.7516 -5.781 (0.0000)** 0.0266** 
OI (L) 19 -2.9526* -2.9375 (0.0412)* -0.7657 -2.9462 (0.1477) 0.275 
OI (diff) 18 -8.3620** -8.4367 (0.0000)** -8.4407** -8.4356 (0.0000)** 0.026** 
Sugar 
Price (L) 19 -1.6307 -1.4849 (0.5409) -0.2982 -2.4878 (0.3341) 0.785 
I(1) Price (diff) 20 -5.8161** -6.8453 (0.0000)** -6.8386** -6.8596 (0.0000)** 
0.0352** 
OI (L) 15 -2.2405 -1.3316 (0.6146) -0.0716 -2.5195 (0.3183) 0.557 
OI (diff) 20 -6.5226** -6.7423 (0.0000)** -6.6925** -6.7389 (0.0000)** 0.0557** 
CBOT 
wheat 
Price (L) 13 -2.1868 -1.4418 (0.5621) -0.0459 -2.5117 (0.3221) 0.759 
I(1) Price (diff) 19 -5.7423** -6.7041 (0.0000)** -6.6892** -6.7479 (0.0000)** 
0.032** 
OI (L) 17 -2.1316 -0.7127 (0.8434)  0.5958 -2.3833 (0.38854) 0.524 
OI (diff) 20 -4.9554** -6.0341 (0.0000)** -5.9523** -6.0393 (0.0000)** 0.0506** 
KCBOT 
wheat 
Price (L) 20 -2.5145 -1.5874 (0.4899) -0.1304 -2.8301 (0.1861) 0.525 
I(1) Price (diff) 19 -6.1362** -6.4252 (0.0000)** -6.4112** -6.4654 (0.0000)** 
0.0292** 
OI (L) 17 -4.1401** -2.04645 (0.2666) -0.3296 -4.1789 (0.0048)** 0.108 
OI (diff) 16 -3.7239** -5.4511 (0.0000)** -5.4224** -5.4467 (0.0000)** 0.0304** 
Soybeans 
Price (L) 13 -2.0471 -1.0647 (0.7289) 0.3587 -2.3569 (0.4027) 1.09 
I(1) Price (diff) 12 -8.3605** -8.7785 (0.0000)** -8.7442** -8.8112 (0.0000)** 0.0236** OI (L) 18 -3.5968** -1.8879 (0.3377) -0.4693 -4.1374 (0.0055)** 0.643 
OI (diff) 20 -5.0125 -6.1030 (0.0000)** -6.0578** -6.0766 (0.0000)** 0.0241** 
Soybean 
oil 
Price (L) 19 -2.4633 -1.8546(0.3537) -0.3424 -3.3369 (0.0604) 0.679 
I(1) 
Price (diff) 18 -4.3333** -5.3112 (0.0000)** -5.2980** -5.3254 (0.0000)** 0.0336** 
OI (L) 19 -3.0931* -1.3019 (0.6283) 0.4268 -3.316(0.064) 0.345 
OI (diff) 16 -6.2640** -8.0985 (0.0000)** -8.0396** -8.0914 (0.0000)** 0.0254**  
Soybean 
meal 
Price (L) 18 -3.150* -1.442 (0.5622) 0.380 -3.375 (0.0549)* 0.168 
I(1) Price (diff) 17 -4.682** -5.757 (0.0000)** -5.695** -5.752 (0.0000)** 
0.0241** 
OI (L) 6 -3.417* -2.237 (0.1931) -0.013 -3.202 (0.0840) 0.242 
OI (diff) 16 -3.328 * -5.929 (0.0000)** -5.902** -5.914 (0.0000)** 0.0278** 
Crude oil 
Price (L) 17 -3.585** -1.652 (0.4559) -0.2361 -4.3304 (0.0028)** 0.324 
I(1) 
Price (diff) 15 -6.7940** -7.1025 (0.0000)** -7.064** -7.1017 (0.0000)** 0.023** 
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OI (L) 20 -0.9549 -0.7429 (0.8353) 1.2039 -0.9076 (0.9553) 0.588 
OI (diff) 17 -5.4369** -8.3194 (0.0000)** -8.1481** -8.3186 (0.0000)** 0.16 
Heating 
oil 
Price (L) 18 -3.2111* -1.3038 (0.6274) 0.0193 -3.8889(0.0125)* 0.364 
I(1) Price (diff) 
20 -6.1335** -6.2775 (0.0000)** -6.2099** -6.2909 (0.0000)** 0.0215** 
OI (L) 19 -2.7045 -1.5478 (0.5097) 0.1285 -2.7426 (0.2188) 0.632 
OI (diff) 20 -3.0119* -7.8591 (0.0000)** -7.8361** -7.8526 (0.0000)** 0.042** 
Natural 
gas 
Price (L) 14 -2.6275 -2.7691 (0.0628) -1.1168 -2.7954 (0.1986) 0.82 
I(1) Price (diff) 13 -7.2871** -7.9997 (0.0000)** -8.0026** -8.0188 (0.0000)** 0.0237** 
OI (L) 19 -2.2154 -1.3831 (0.59036) 0.5319 -2.2104 (0.4840) 0.356 
OI (diff) 20 -4.5644** -8.2605 (0.0000)** -8.1214** -8.2687 (0.0000)** 0.0416** 
OI: open interest.  ** 1% significance level, * 5% significance level. 
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Table 3C: Johansen’s Cointegration test (trace test) 
 rank Johansen’s test result Adj. Johansen’s test result 
Cotton 
 
r = 0 16.27 no 
cointegration 
30.94** 
cointegration 
r = 1 5.73 14.52 
Coffee 
 
r = 0 11.07 no 
cointegration 
34.22**     
cointegration 
r = 1 3.75 9.98 
Corn r = 0 7.46 no 
cointegration 
37.30** 
cointegration 
r = 1 2.28 0.2274 
Cocoa 
 
r = 0 10.44   no 
cointegration 
33.28** 
cointegration 
r = 1 2.58 14.18 
Oats 
 
r = 0 16.76 no 
cointegration 
32.68** 
cointegration 
r = 1 3.98 10.48 
Sugar 
 
r = 0 16.76 no 
cointegration 
40.91** 
cointegration 
r = 1 3.98 13.02 
CBOT wheat r = 0 7.46 no 
cointegration 
47.40*** 
cointegration 
r = 1   2.28 11.90 
KCBOT 
wheat 
r = 0 16.76 no 
cointegration 
46.14*** 
cointegration 
r = 1 3.98 18.58 
Soybeans 
 
r = 0 15.19 no 
cointegration 
37.19* 
cointegration 
r = 1 4.23 13.34   
Soybean oil 
 
r = 0   16.76 no 
cointegration 
36.58*** 
cointegration 
r = 1 3.98 16.84 
Soybean meal r = 0 16.76 no 
cointegration 
37.33*** 
cointegration 
r = 1 3.98      13.16 
Crude oil 
 
r = 0 27.66*** 
cointegration 38.24*** cointegration 
r = 1 4.72 14.50 
Heating oil 
 
r = 0 7.46   no 
cointegration 
44.00*** 
cointegration 
r = 1 2.28 10.61 
Natural gas 
 
r = 0 20.05 no 
cointegration 
28.84 (0.0880)* Weak 
cointegration  r = 1 5.23 10.75 
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level. 
Lags base don HQIC, but results are consistent with lags based on AIC and SBIC,  except for coffee 
and cocoa. For corn, no cointegration if we take different structural breaks.  
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Table 3D: VECM Results 
 β αoi αprices constant result 
Cocoa  -42.6959 (0.008)*** -.01461** .0000885 -61809.28 OI → prices 
Oats .27323 (0.000)*** -.0951 *** -.0004825 -3987.126 OI → prices 
Cotton  -5248.64 (0.001)*** -.00023 2.54e-06*** 49.66395 prices → OI 
Coffee  -1443.63 (0.016)** -.00148 6.46e-06** -54200.39 prices → OI 
KCBOT Wheat -219.1871(0.000)*** -.00150 .0000688*** -75932.7 prices → OI 
Soybeans -751.884 (0.000)*** -.00891 .0000339*** 111518.9 prices → OI 
Sugar -53627.41(0.001)*** -.00073 1.79e-07*** -679426.5 prices → OI 
Natural gas -274500 (0.000)*** -.00056 6.61e-08*** -1106086 prices → OI 
Corn  -9360.1 (0.000)*** .00509*** 9.12e-07** 2188855 OI ↔ prices 
CBOT Wheat -1264.79 (0.000)*** .00915** .0000169*** 334157.2   OI ↔ prices 
Soybean oil -6868.08 (0.000)*** -.0187*** 1.83e-06*** -27775.58 OI ↔ prices 
Soybean meal -364.309 (0.000)*** -.0276*** .0000274** -109192.5 OI ↔ prices 
Crude oil -32344.9 (0.000)*** -.0144*** 7.35e-07*** -62856.46   OI ↔ prices 
Heating oil -757.236 (0.000)*** -.01299** .0000101** -138702.2 OI ↔ prices 
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level. Lags based on HQIC 
  
Table 3E: Toda-Yamamoto Granger Causality Tests 
 Time period χ2   OI  prices χ2    Prices  OI Result 
Cotton  all 19.8 (0.0006)*** 2.2 (0.7)  
Prices ↔ OI  
 
1995-2006w48 16.4 (0.0025)** 13.5 (0.0092)*** 
2006w48-2009w36 10.6 (0.032)** 15.4 (0.0039)*** 
2009w36-2012 17.6 (0.0015)*** 1.2 (0.88) 
Coffee all 5.8 (0.054)** 3.6 (0.17) Prices ↔ OI  
weak 1995-2003w35 0.17 (0.92) 1.3 (0.52) 
2003w35-2006w38 3.5 (0.17) 9.5 (0.0087)*** 
2006w38-2012 4.9 (0.085)* 1.2 (0.54) 
Corn  
 
All  34.9 (0.0008)** 64.6 (0.0000)**  
Prices ↔ OI  
 
1995-2006w1 20.1 (0.093)* 19.8 (0.14) 
2006w1-2007w9 14.2(0.36) 13.2 (0.51) 
2007w9-2012 14.8 (0.32) 24.9 (0.035)* 
Cocoa All 3.1 (0.54) 19.2 (0.0007)***  
Prices  OI 1995-2005w8 6.1 (0.19) 4.1 (0.39) 
2005w8-2007w48 3.3 (0.5) 10.9 (0.027)** 
2007w48-2012 3.9 (0.42) 7.9 (0.094)* 
Oats All 3.2 (0.2) 21.7 (0.0000)**  
Prices  OI 1995-2002w46 2.7 (0.26) 15.6 (0.0004)** 
2002w46-2006w3 1.2 (0.55) 0.52 (0.77) 
2006w3-2012 2.0 (0.36) 6.3 (0.044)** 
Sugar all 9.1 (0.01)** 13.6 (0.0011)**  
Prices ↔ OI  
 
1995-2004w11 3.3 (0.19) 7.3 (0.026)** 
2004w11-2006w42 1.9 (0.38) 19.9 (0.0000)*** 
2006w42-2012 4.6 (0.098)* 4.1 (0.13) 
CBOT wheat All  37.4 (0.0003)*** 34.2 (0.0019)**  
Prices ↔ OI  
 
1995-2004w50 7.2 (0.89) 49.1 (0.0000)*** 
2004w50-2007w22 7.6 (0.87) 17.8 (0.21) 
2007w22-2012 16.3 (0.23) 12.6 (0.55) 
KCBOT 
wheat 
All 3.0 (0.22) 4.8(0.09)*  
Prices  OI 
weak  
1995-2005w27 0.56(0.76) 0.15 (0.93) 
2005w27-2007w22 0.78 (0.68) 0.65 (0.72) 
2007w22-2012 2.5(0.28) 2.1 (0.35) 
Soybeans All 65.9 (0.0000)*** 115.3 (0.0000)***  
Prices ↔ OI  1995-2003w33 29.1 (0.086)* 63.7(0.0000)*** 
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2003w33-2006w31 31.7 (0.047)** 28.6(0.096)*  
2006w31-2012 36.9 (0.012)** 50.3 (0.0000)*** 
Soybean oil all 7.4 (0.024)** 12.3(0.0021)**  
Prices ↔ OI  
 
1995-2006w15 2.6 (0.27) 3.2 (0.2) 
2006w15-2008w28 1.9 (0.39) 8.5 (0.014)** 
2008w28-2012 0.91 (0.63) 4.4 (0.11) 
Soybean meal  all 1.2 (0.55) 15.1 (0.0005)***  
Prices  OI 2001-2006w10 0.36 (0.84) 8.4 (0.015)** 
2006w10-2007w32 3.6 (0.16) 0.83 (0.66) 
2007w32-2012 4.7 (0.097)* 8.5 (0.014)** 
Crude oil All 49.7 (0.0000)** 36.9 (0.0035)**  
Prices ↔ OI  
 
1995-2005w1 11.6 (0.82) 44.9 (0.0002)** 
2005w1-2012 32.3 (0.014)** 22.0 (0.18) 
Heating oil All  4.5 (0.99) 31.5 (0.0047)**  
Prices  OI  1995-2005w2 11.1 (0.6) 30.9 (0.0056)** 
2005w2-2009w24 7.1 (0.89) 9.9 (0.77) 
2009w24-2012 7.1 (0.9) 20.9 (0.11) 
Natural gas all 18 (0.21) 13.6 (0.55) Price  OI 
until 2005 1995-2005w2 17.2 (0.24) 36.4 (0.0015)** 
2005w2-2009w24 19.0 (0.17) 16.7 (0.34) 
2009w24-2012 6.5 (0.95) 21.3 (0.13) 
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level. Lags based on HQIC, 
but results are consistent with lags based on AIC and SBIC. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINANCIALIZATION AND CO-MOVEMENT OF 
COMMODITY PRICES 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
One of the distinctive features of the 2008 commodity boom is that it covered 
a broad range of unrelated commodities. Prices of commodities ranging from 
agriculture (wheat, soybeans, coffee), energy (crude oil), and metals (copper) all rose 
and fell together (see figure 4A, Appendix 4.2). In this chapter, I seek to explore the 
links between financialization and the comovement of commodity prices. Unlike the 
previous chapter, where I analyzed commodity markets individually, in this chapter I 
take a broader approach and examine developments across commodity markets. 
Prices of two commodities may move together, if they are related -- they are 
either substitutes or complements in production or consumption. Idiosyncratic 
demand or supply shocks in a particular commodity may be transmitted to other 
related commodities. For example, prices of certain industrial metals may move 
together if they are jointly used to produce alloys. Similarly, prices of grains such as 
corn, wheat, rice, and barley may move together if they are substitutes in consumption. 
However, these commodity-specific shocks cannot explain recently observed broad 
co-movements across unrelated commodities. Drought in Australia, use of corn and 
oil-seeds to produce biofuels and several other commodity-specific shocks that were 
initially provided as explanation for the 2008 rise in commodity prices, have now 
been questioned, as they are unable to explain this synchronized behavior across 
commodity prices (Gilbert 2010b, Frankel and Rose 2009). Instead, economists have 
emphasized the importance of factors that affect many commodity markets 
simultaneously such as: rise in demand from emerging economies, devaluation of the 
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USD, and the focus of this dissertation: financialization of the commodities futures 
market. 
I have identified three ways in which behavior of commodity futures traders’ 
may cause co-movement between commodity prices. First, if commodity futures are 
bought and sold not based on commodity-specific demand and supply fundamentals, 
but based on other portfolio considerations or due to herd behavior, then prices of 
commodities may co-move. This is especially true for index traders who buy and sell 
commodity derivatives not individually but as a group of securities based on pre-set 
weights of one of the popular commodity indices like the S&P GSCI and DJ-UBS 
commodity index. This implies that commodity derivatives are traded based on 
expectations for the entire index of commodities. If a large portion of “investment” in 
the commodities derivatives market are controlled by such passive index trading (like 
they did in 2008), then it is likely that prices of commodities will move together. This 
phenomenon is also called the weight-of-money effects. Second, if commodity 
speculators trade in two or more commodity markets, a fall in the price of one 
commodity may cause the price of other commodity to also fall due to liquidity 
effects. For example, if price of commodity A rises, speculators might have to sell 
commodity B to cover margin calls in commodity A in which they are long, thus 
leading B to move with A. Third, as the weight of energy commodities like crude oil 
is high in commodity indices,59  shocks (supply or speculative bubbles) in energy 
markets might be transmitted to other commodity markets, even if there are no 
changes in the fundamentals of those specific commodities (UNCTAD 2009a). 60 
Furthermore, if commodity derivatives are traded based on other 
considerations like performance of traditional asset class, it is likely that correlation 
                                                 
59
 Brent and NYMEX crude oil made up more than 50% of S&P GSCI returns in 2008 
60
 Note that this transmission of oil shocks to other commodities is different from the real transmission 
of oil shocks through cost of production.  
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between commodity and other assets will increase. As commodity and financial 
markets become increasingly inter-related, shocks from financial markets get 
transmitted to the commodities market. There is evidence that in recent years 
correlation between commodity prices and stocks (S&P 500) have increased 
substantially.61 Buyuksahin and Robe (2011) take a step further and show that energy-
equity comovements are positively related to greater market participation by 
speculators in general, and hedge funds in particular that trade in both equity and 
commodity markets.  
In this chapter, I examine if financialization of the commodity futures market 
can explain the recent rise in comovement in commodity prices. Following recent 
developments in the literature, I extract common factors from prices of 41 
commodities using the Panel Analysis of Nonstationary and Idiosyncratic 
Components (PANIC) method of Bai and Ng (2004). The extracted factor is then 
included in a factor-augmented VEC (FAVEC) model along with macroeconomic 
variables. Instead of assuming the excess comovement that is unexplained by 
macroeconomic factors is due to speculation, like previous studies, I also add a 
measure of financialization in the FAVEC model. This will be a stronger and more 
direct piece of evidence of the role of financialization in explaining comovement of 
commodity prices, than previously provided in the literature.   
Results are robust for the common factor (Factor 1) extracted using all 41 
commodities; both proxies of financialization are significant and have the expected 
negative sign. This result provide strong evidence to support the thesis that 
financialization of the commodities futures market led to increasing comovement 
between unrelated commodity prices. However, results for the group-specific factors 
                                                 
61
 Buyuksahin, Haigh and Robe (2009); Silvennoinen and Thorp (2010); Hong and Yogo (2012) 
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are not as strong. The proxies of financialization are significant with the expected sign 
only for 10 of the 16 cases. One reason for the inconsistent results for group-specific 
factors may be that as commodities included in the groups are related, commodity 
specific factors may be more important in explaining comovement between these 
commodities rather than macroeconomic factors.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a brief 
review of the relevant literature. Section 4.3 and 4.4 contain details on data and 
empirical strategy respectively. In Section 4.5, I summarize the results of the 
empirical exercise, and conclude in Section 4.6. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) were one of the first to contribute towards the 
literature on co-movement of commodity prices. They regress monthly commodity 
prices of 7 commodities (wheat, cotton, copper, gold, crude oil, lumber, and cocoa) on 
macroeconomic variables such as the consumer price index, industrial production, 
interest rate, money supply, and S&P stock index and observe that pair-wise 
correlations between the residuals of the regression are statistically significant. 
Pindyck and Rotemberg term this tendency of unrelated commodities 62  to move 
together, even after accounting for macroeconomic variables, “excess” co-movement. 
They suggest this may be because “traders are alternatively bullish or bearish on all 
commodities for no plausible reason,” (p.1173).  
Pindyck and Rotemberg’s paper inspired a wave of research on co-movement 
of commodities. However subsequent research in this area has weakened the thesis of 
excess co-movement. Palaskas and Varangis (1991) use cointegration and error 
correction model and find that the amount of co-movement attributed to 
                                                 
62
 For Pindyck and Rotemberg unrelated commodities meant cross-price elasticities of demand and 
supply are close to zero.  
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macroeconomic variables increases and excess co-movement decreases when moving 
from high frequency (monthly) to low frequency (annual) data. Similarly, Deb, 
Trivedi, and Varangis (1996) argue that Pindyck and Rotemberg’s approach is not 
suitable for commodity price data that have heteroskedastic and non-normal errors. 
Instead Deb et al. use a multivariate GARCH approach and conclude that there is only 
weak evidence for excess co-movement. Cashin, McDermott, and Scott (1999) take a 
step further and claim that there is no co-movement between unrelated commodities, 
let alone excess co-movement. They use Bry-Boschan procedure, a business cycle 
dating technique, to identify turning points in price series. Using “concordance,” 
which measures the proportion of time that prices of commodities are concurrently in 
the same boom or slump period, they conclude that commodity price series do not co-
move. Cashin et al. argue that concordance is a better measure of co-movement than 
correlation because a one-time shift in level of two series due to a shock can induce 
significant correlation in an otherwise unrelated series. In the case of concordance, the 
one-time shift will be only important to the extent that the commodities are in the 
same phase for a lengthy period of time. It may be true that correlation may over-
estimate co-movement because of a one-time shock, but it may also not be wise to 
completely ignore the changes in levels. This is especially true for the recent rise in 
prices that reached levels unseen in three decades, across most commodities. 
Furthermore, if the purpose of our research is to unveil the effects of shocks in the 
system, for example the demand shock due to financialization of commodities, 
concordance is not a suitable tool.  
A strand of literature that uses similar business cycle dating methodology 
argues that a range of industrial metals move together through “super” cycles (20-70 
year cycles). For example, Cuddington and Jerrett (2008) use a BP filtering technique 
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on prices of 6 base metals traded at the London Metal Exchange (LME) to decompose 
prices into different frequency components. They then analyze the super-cycle 
component using Principle Component Analysis (PCA) and find one common factor 
that explains over 60 percent of variance. The paper concludes that there have been 3 
metal super cycles in the past 150 years that have coincided with demand-side shocks: 
economic growth of the US, reconstruction of Europe and Japanese expansion, and 
the current- rapid growth of China.  
Recent developments in commodity prices have rekindled interest in 
understanding the determinants of commodity prices. Some have tried to account for 
co-movement by controlling for both macro variables and micro-level inventory and 
harvest data (Ai, Chatrath, and Song 2006; Lescaroux 2009; Frankel and Rose 2009). 
Ai, Chatrath, and Song (2006) use inventory and harvest data in addition to 
macroeconomic variables for five commodities: wheat, corn, oats, soybeans, and 
barley. They claim that macroeconomic variables alone fail to explain these 
correlations, while supply factors in conjunction with macroeconomic variables 
capture a majority of co-movement between commodities. Using monthly data for 51 
commodities, Lescaroux (2009) explores if there is excess co-movement between oil 
and other commodity prices. Lescaroux observes very high correlation between 
commodities and oil, especially metals and agriculture raw materials. Correlation is 
not as strong for sugar, meat, and seafood prices, and it is consistently weak for cereal 
prices. However, after taking into account stock level data, correlation is significantly 
reduced. Both these papers conclude that co-movement between commodities is due 
to common demand and supply shocks. However, a closer look reveals that the 
commodities included in the analysis may have consumption and production 
complementarity/substitutability and may not be “unrelated.” Four out of five 
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commodities used in the analysis of Ai et al. (2006) belong to the grains category, and 
Lesacroux (2009) paper includes stock level data for industrial metals only. If 
commodities are related, it is not surprising to find that common demand/supply 
shocks can explain a majority of their co-movement. The more interesting question is 
if macro and micro factors can explain co-movement between seemingly unrelated 
commodities.  
Frankel and Rose (2010) use both macro (global GDP, interest rate) and micro 
(inventory levels, measures of uncertainty, spot-forward spread) determinants of 
prices for 11 commodities. They run regression using different statistical techniques 
and specifications (bivariate regression, panel regression, vector error correction 
model, with log and first-difference specification). Although macro factors like global 
demand are significant, they find that micro factors are more important. Furthermore, 
by adding into the model rate of change of spot price in the previous period, as a 
measure of bandwagon effects, they also find evidence of speculation. 
Another approach that has been common in recent years is to use factor 
analysis to separate out common factors and idiosyncratic trends between prices of a 
large number of commodities. This methodology makes it possible to assess the 
importance of common factors in explaining commodity prices and how it has 
evolved over time. The extracted factors are then included in a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model to examine if they can be explained by macroeconomic variables. 
Lombardi, Osbat, and Schnatz (2010) use principal component analysis to identify 
common factors that account for developments in 15 non-energy commodity prices 
from 1975-2008. They find that two factors are important in explaining a majority of 
price developments in the metals and food category. Factor augmented VAR 
(FAVAR) models that include these factors reveal, among other things, that shock to 
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global economic activity increases the price of oil and metals factor; but there is less 
evidence of its impact on the food factor. Surprisingly they find no evidence of impact 
of oil-shocks on non-energy commodity prices. Byrne, Fazio, and Fiess (2011) use 
Panel Analysis of Nonstationary Idiosyncratic Components (PANIC), a method 
developed by Bai and Ng (2004) that allows for non-stationarity in time-series data, 
on annual historical prices of more than 100 years: 1900-2008. The extracted common 
factor is then included in a FAVAR model along with macroeconomic variables 
(interest rate, demand-supply shocks). Impulse response functions from the FAVAR 
model reveal that interest rate and uncertainty have significant effects on prices.  
Vansteenkiste (2009) uses dynamic factor analysis on monthly price data for 
32 non-oil commodities for a period 1957-2008. The 32 commodities are first divided 
into 4 sub-groups63 that are formed exogenously by pooling together commodities 
which are known to be related. The idea is that the common factor affects all 
commodities, while there might also be other shocks that are transmitted within a 
subgroup. Vansteenkiste claims that the common factor is more important than the 
sub-group-specific factors, although variance decomposition shows that the common 
factor is only important for 9 of the 32 commodities. The common factor was very 
important during the 70s-80s, and in recent years it has become increasingly 
important in driving non-fuel commodity prices. FAVAR reveals that macroeconomic 
variables explain about 70 percent of the variance in the common factor. The paper 
concludes that co-movement is due to macroeconomic fundamentals and there is no 
“excess” co-movement due to speculation.  
Criticizing Vansteenkiste’s exogenous clustering method, Savascin (2011) 
argues that if subgroup-specific factors are not taken into account, then the 
                                                 
63
 coffee-cocoa, cotton-maize-sugar-wheat, palm oil-soybean oil, copper-zinc-lead 
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importance of common factor in explaining cross-commodity co-movements is 
overestimated. Savascin uses an endogenous clustering method first used by Francis, 
Owyang, and Savascin (2011) on 42 non-energy commodity prices for 1980-2011 and 
finds four clusters: (1) timber (logs and wood), (2) grains and vegetables, (3) food, 
metals and agricultural materials (except iron); (4) coffee and iron. This clustering 
method reveals that the sub-groups formed are quite different from that of an 
exogenous clustering method, as it includes seemingly unrelated products into the 
same group. Variance decomposition shows that the sub-group-specific factors are 
more important than the common factor in explaining commodity price developments. 
Based on this result, Savascin claims that explanations for the 2008 price rise based 
on world demand are invalidated as the world factor does have a strong effect on corn, 
rice, wheat, meat, soybeans, soybean meal.  
Tang and Xiong (2010) is one of the few papers that seek to determine the role 
of speculation in the commodity prices by studying the differences in co-movements 
between commodities that are on or off the S&P-GSCI. They carry out panel 
regression of returns of commodities on returns of crude oil, along with a set of 
macroeconomic variables: emerging market equity index, S&P500 equity index, bond 
index, US dollar index. Results show that before 2004, most non-energy commodities 
had a small and positive correlation with oil, while some soft and livestock 
commodities even had a small negative correlation. After 2004 there was a significant 
increase in correlation of non-energy commodities with oil, a trend which is more 
pronounced for index commodities than for non-indexed. Tang and Xiong thus 
conclude that financialization led to higher correlation between commodities. 
Although there have been many studies on understanding commodity price co-
movements, the focus in recent years has been on identifying macroeconomic 
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determinants of commodity prices. The discussion of excess co-movement that had 
initially begun the debate on co-movement has taken a back seat. The aim of this 
chapter of the dissertation will be to bring excess co-movement back into the picture. I 
will do so by adding a measure of financialization into the empirical analysis, this will 
provide us a more direct way to examine the role of financialization in the recent rise 
in comovement of commodity prices.   
4.3 Data Sources 
I use the following datasets for the empirical analysis: 
1. Commodity spot prices: monthly prices for 42 commodities that include 
energy, metals, livestock, and agricultural commodities. The dataset is available 
through International Financial Statistics, IMF. Detailed description of the data is 
provided in Appendix 4.1.64  
2. Measures of financialization: ideally we want a measure to quantify the 
process of financialization of the commodity futures market. However, due to the lack 
of good data we cannot accurately differentiate positions of different kinds of trader 
positions (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Instead I use Total Open Interest as a 
proxy of financialization of the commodities market. Open interest is the total number 
of contracts that are open, and is a measure of the inflow of money into the futures 
market. To get an estimate of the total inflow of money into the futures market, I add 
up open interest across 23 commodities65 and take the monthly average.  
However, open interest across commodities is not of the same scale, futures 
contract represent different dollar values across commodities. To solve this weakness, 
I sum up the dollar values of open interest across the 23 commodity markets.  
                                                 
64
 A majority of the variables are spot prices, except for soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, and 
sugar. However, this should not be problematic as spot and futures prices are known to move together, 
with the futures prices leading spot prices (see Chapter 1 for more detailed discussion).  
65
 CBOT, KCBOT, and MW wheat, corn, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, oats, cotton, cocoa, 
sugar, coffee, live cattle, feeder cattle, crude oil, heating oil, natural gas. 
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Where, u  is the total open interest in terms of dollars in the commodities futures 
market at time t 
u,  is the open interest of commodity i at time period t;  
f, is the closing price of nearby futures contract66 of commodity i at time period t;  
This will provide us with an additional measure of financialization: Open Interest in 
Dollars. The futures price data is from Pinnacle Data.67   
3. Macroeconomic variables: as discussed before comovement of commodity 
prices may be due to common shocks from macroeconomics factors. To account for 
these, I include the following macroeconomic variables in the model.  
Industrial Production Index for OECD and emerging markets, IFS, IMF: Demand 
side pressures from emerging markets have been identified as a factor that has led to 
recent rise in commodity prices. To account for this, I include the industrial 
production index (IP) of the following emerging markets: India, China, Russia, and 
Brazil. The 2008 commodity price spike also coincided with the collapse of the US 
sub-prime market and the global economic downturn that followed. I include IP of 
OECD countries in the model to account for the overall decrease in demand from 
OECD countries.  
Federal Funds Rate, US Federal Reserve: There are three ways in which interest rates 
are expected impact commodity prices. First, low real interest rate lowers the cost of 
holding inventories. A high demand for inventories implies high total demand for 
commodities. Second, low interest rate increases the incentive to leave oil/minerals in 
                                                 
66
 Nearby futures contact is the contract with the closest settlement date, and it is by far the most 
heavily traded contract, so it is considered most important for price determination. 
67
 https://www.pinnacledata.com/ 
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the ground for the future than extract it today. This implies a lower supply of 
commodities thus higher prices. Finally, low interest rates means the cost of 
borrowing money is low and there is incentive for speculators to get out of the safe 
but low yield government bonds and get into to commodities futures market. (Calvo 
2008, Frankel 2006) 
US Nominal Broad Exchange Rate, US Federal Reserve: Since a majority of 
commodities are traded in the international market in US dollars, if the USD 
depreciates, then the price of the commodity in local currency will be lower and 
demand higher (Akram 2008). I will use the US nominal broad exchange rate index 
which is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the USD against the 
currencies of a large group of major US trading partners.  
US Inflation, urban, all items less food and energy, Bureau of Labor Statistics: 
Inflation can raise the overall level of commodity prices. To ensure that the measure 
of inflation is not contaminated by rise in prices of food and energy, I use the change 
in core CPI.     
Crude Oil Price (WTI), International Financial Statistics, IMF: The link between 
energy and food prices, through transportation and fertilizer costs, is well established. 
Soaring oil prices have also increased interest in biofuels, which has further 
strengthened the link between food and fuel. Crude oil prices thus, can be considered 
an important macroeconomic determinant of commodity prices. However, crude oil 
prices themselves may be influenced by financialization, therefore I show results for 
models both with and without crude oil prices.  
4.4 Empirical Strategy  
As the objective of this chapter is to study the cross-sectional correlation between 
prices of different commodities over time, panel data techniques that make use of 
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cross-sectional information would be better than using commodity specific equations.  
However, including 42 commodities and macroeconomic variables along with their 
lags will quickly erode the degrees of freedom. Non-parametric dimension-reduction 
tools like factor analysis and principal component analysis have been used to reduce a 
large set of possibly correlated variables to a small number of uncorrelated factors or 
components that still contain most of the information of the data. I use a 2-step factor-
augmented VAR (FAVAR) method of Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005).68 The first 
step of the method is to extract underlying factors of commodity price movements 
using principal component analysis. In the second step, the extracted factor is 
included in a vector autoregressive (VAR) model along with relevant macroeconomic 
variables.  
Under the factor model, commodity prices are decomposed into a small 
number of common factors, and idiosyncratic error terms that are commodity specific.  
P    λF   e                  4.1 
Where;  
P  price of commodity i at time t F  = r X 1 vector of common factors λ = vector of factor loadings for commodity i e = idiosyncratic error term 
 
Issues have been raised related to stationarity of the factor structure and 
consistency of the extracted factors. When e is stationary estimates of F and λ have 
been shown to be consistent. However, if e is I(1), the estimates are not consistent 
because the regression of P on F is spurious. We can get around this problem by using 
Panel Analysis of Nonstationary and Idiosyncratic Components (PANIC) method 
developed by Bai and Ng (2004) and extract consistent common and idiosyncratic 
                                                 
68
 Bernanke et al. (2005) use principal components analysis to extract a small number of unobservable 
factors that summarize the information about the economic environment contained in a large number of 
variables.  
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factors even when e  is I(1). This is achieved by applying the method of principal 
components on first-differenced data. Taking first difference of equation 1 above 
yields: 
ΔP    ΔFλ   Δe               4.2 
 
Applying the method of principal components we get an estimate of ∆Ft, from which 
we can reconstruct the factor(s) in levels (Ft).  
After exacting the common factor(s) using the PANIC method, the second step 
of the FAVAR method is to include the factor in a VAR model along with 
macroeconomic variables that are known to affect a given commodity. However, 
VAR technique requires stationarity of variables. If the variables are not stationary, 
test for cointegration must be carried out to check if the variables are cointegrated. If 
results indicate that the variables are not cointegrated then FAVAR on first-
differenced data might be appropriate. However, if the variables are cointegrated, then 
the FAVAR model will be mis-specified, and a Factor Augmented Vector Error 
Correction (FAVEC) model should be used instead. FAVEC model is a natural 
generalization of the FAVAR model. Banerjee and Marcellino (2008) show that in 
case of cointegration, FAVEC improves on the results from FAVAR.  
4.5 Empirical Results  
Key results of the empirical analysis are: i) Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
and cluster analysis show a significant rise in comovement between commodity prices 
in recent years; ii) the underlying common factor(s) and open interest were moving in 
the opposite direction until 2002, however since then they have been moving in the 
same direction, and during 2008-11, they show very strong correlation; iii) the 
extracted common factor(s) are I(1); and iv) both the proxies of financialization -- 
total open interest and total open interest in dollars-- are significant in explaining the 
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common factor(s), after accounting for other macroeconomic factors.  
The first step in the empirical analysis is to provide evidence that in fact 
comovement between commodities has increased in recent years. A general rise over 
time in Pearson’s correlation coefficient among commodities is the simplest method 
to do so. Figure 4B (appendix 4.2) shows correlation coefficient for select 
commodities (including grain, energy and soft commodities, livestock, and metals) for 
two time-periods 1995-2005 and 2006-2012. Except for a few cases, correlation is 
higher in the second time-period among most commodities. Even correlation between 
commodities that are seemingly unrelated such as copper and grains, have risen in the 
second-time period.  
Cluster analysis provides another method to analyze comovement among 
commodities. I use a single-linkage, agglomerative hierarchical clustering method. 
Under this method, each commodity is initially in its own cluster; then the pair of 
clusters that have the smallest distance among them are merged into one. The distance 
(dissimilarity measure) between two commodities is defined as (1-correlation 
coefficient). The distance between two clusters is defined as the smallest distance 
from any commodity of one cluster to any commodity of the other cluster. Starting 
from singleton clusters, each step merges two clusters with the smallest distance; and 
finally after a number of steps, we end up with a single cluster containing all 
commodities.  
The result of cluster analysis can be shown by a dendrogram. In Figure 4C 
(appendix 4.2), the first dendrogram shows gasoline and crude oil (WTI) have the 
smallest distance (or dissimilarity measure), and so they are the first to be clustered 
together. In the next step, natural gas is added to the gasoline-crude oil cluster; while 
corn and sorghum is clustered together and so on. At the end of the process all the 42 
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commodities are grouped together. The second dendrogram is similarly constructed 
for the 2006-2012 time period. A comparison of the two dendrograms reveals that the 
dissimilarity measure between commodities has reduced substantially in the second 
period. Another way of looking at it is, if we take a cut-off point of say 0.2 
dissimilarity measure (or correlation coefficient of at least 0.8) then in the first period 
we can identify 5 clusters; whereas in the second period, a majority of the 
commodities (27 out of 42) are grouped together in the same cluster. Both the 
correlation matrices and cluster analysis reveal that comovement among commodities 
has increased in recent years. In the next step, I examine the role of financialization in 
explaining this rise in comovement.  
Before, moving on to the PANIC method, I carry out unit root tests to 
understand stationarity properties of commodity prices. DFGLS and Dickey-Fuller 
Unit root tests show that except iron ore, all other commodities are I(1). Iron ore is 
excluded from the rest of the empirical analysis. As Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) is not scale-invariant, I standardize the data (demean and divide by variance) 
such that the mean of the series is 0 and variance is 1. Then, I first-difference the data 
and perform PCA to estimate the common factors and factor loadings. 
I carry out PANIC on the i) the entire set of 41 commodities, and the 
following groups of commodities: ii) grains & oil seeds, iii) energy & metals, iv) 
other soft commodities, and v) commodities that are part of S&P GSCI and DJ-UBS 
commodity index. Commodities included in each group are listed in Table 4A 
(appendix 4.1). The purpose of applying the PANIC method on different groups of 
commodities is so that we can identify shocks that might be specific to a particular 
commodity group. The common factor might be overestimated if we ignore these 
group-specific comovements. (Vansteenkiste 2009) 
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  Components with eigenvalues > 1 are listed in Table 4B.1 (appendix 4.3). For 
the first group, containing all commodities, the first factor is the most important as it 
explains 22 percent of the variance in prices. The first factor of grains & oil seeds, 
energy & metals, other softs, and indexed commodities explain 34.49 percent, 46.08 
percent, 19.56 percent, and 30.24 percent of the variance in prices respectively (see 
Table 4C.1 in the appendix). Table 4B.2 summarizes the variance explained by factor 
1 for each of the 41 commodities. As can be observed, the retained factor 1 explains 
more of the variance in some commodities and less in others; for soybean oil and 
aluminum it explains 28 and 22.4 percent of the variance respectively, while for rice it 
only explains 5 percent of the variance. Similarly results for the group-specific factors 
are summarized in Table 4C.2 (in the appendix).  
As the extracted factors are in first-difference, I reconstruct the factors in 
levels using the relationship f\  Δf\   f and assuming f = 0. Figure 4.1 below 
graphs reconstructed Factor 1 for all commodities along with Total Open Interest. As 
can be seen, the two series appear to be moving in the opposite direction until early 
2002; Factor 1 was declining while open interest was slowly increasing. Since 2002, 
the two series move in the same direction, and with very strong correlation between 
2008 and 2011. Similar trends in correlation can be observed between Total Open 
Interest and extracted group-specific factors (Figure 4D in appendix 4.2).  
To understand the time series properties of the extracted factors, I carry out 
unit root tests. I also perform unit root tests on the macroeconomic variables and the 
two proxies of financialization: total open interest and total open interest in dollars. 
Results show that all the series are I(1) (see Tables 4D and 4E in Appendix 4.3). 
Given all the variables are I(1), the next step in the analysis is to use a FAVEC model 
to examine if macroeconomic variables and proxies of financialization can explain 
 developments in the extracted factor(s). 
Figure 
 
To estimate the optimum lag length for the FAVEC model, I estimate a VAR 
model using maximum lag given by Ng
Information Criterion (
information criterion (
and carry out Johansen’s cointegration test using both trace statistics and maximum 
eigenvalue test. Table 4
Open Interest as proxy for financialization, trace test shows that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that rank 
null hypothesis that rank = 2. As results from both tests 
rank = 2. I also carry out tests for the group
from trace and eigenvalue tests give inconsistent results. For example, for grains 
factor with Total Open Interest as proxy, trace test c
that rank ≤ 2; while eigenvalue test cannot reject the null hypothesis that rank = 1. In 
such cases, I proceed with results given by eigenvalue test as the null hypothesis of 
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0.1: Trends in Factor 1 and Total Open Interest
-Perron criterion. For all models, 
AIC), Hanna-Quin information criterion (HQIC)
SBIC) show 14, 2 and 1 lags respectively. I proceed with 2 lags 
F (appendix 4.3) details the results. For factor 1, with Total 
≤ 2; while eigenvalue test shows that we cannot reject the 
are consistent, I proceed with 
-specific factors. In some cases, results 
annot reject the null hypothesis 
 
 
  
 
Akaike 
, and Schwarz 
  
114 
 
the eigenvalue test has a sharper alternative hypothesis.69  
The VEC model assumes that residuals approximate white noise. I examine 
this assumption by performing Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation 
and Jarque-Bera normality tests. Unfortunately, with the 2 lags model, residuals show 
evidence of serial correlation and excess skewness and kurtosis. I repeat the exercise 
with 14 lags (given by AIC) and in this case residuals are not serially correlated. 
Table 4G (appendix 4.3) summarizes the results for the normality tests with 14 lags 
model. For factor 1, the residuals are skewed for 3 variables in each model: US 
exchange rage, IP of OECD and Russia for the first model, and exchange rate, IP of 
India and Russia for the second model. The residuals are kurtotic for exchange rate 
and IP of Russia for both models. Results for the group-specific factors are detailed in 
Table 4G.70 Skewness is considered a more important assumption than kurtosis for 
normality of residuals.71 Given these results I proceed with the rest of the empirical 
analysis using 14 lags. 
Table 4H (appendix 4.3) summarizes results of unrestricted VEC model for 
Factor 1. I carry out four models including a proxy for financialization, with and 
without crude oil prices. For Factor 1, the first cointegrating equation in each model 
establishes relationship between Factor 1 and proxies of financialization, total open 
interest and total open interest in dollars. The proxies are significant and have the 
expected negative sign in all four models. This implies that Factor 1 and the proxies 
of financialization are cointegrated and move in the same direction.  
For factor 1, IP of OECD is not significant for M1, M2, and M3; while IP of 
China is not significant for M4. I restrict these coefficients to be 0 and re-estimate the 
                                                 
69
 Enders (2010), p. 392. 
70
 crude oil is excluded from the energy factor model.  
71Normality test is more sensitive to deviations from normality due to skewness than kurtosis because 
the variance of skewness is smaller than the variance of kurtosis (Juselius 2006, p.75). 
  
115 
 
model.72 Similar restrictions are also placed for group-specific factor models. Table 
4.1 below shows the results of restricted FAVEC model for Factor 1. Both proxies of 
financialization, total open interest and total open interest in dollars are significant in 
all cases. They also have the expected negative sign. These results appear to be robust. 
The industrial production indices of the emerging markets (India, China, Brazil, and 
Russia) are also significant for most cases, although IP of India has a positive sign 
while the sign for IP of Russia fluctuates. Crude oil is only significant in the M1, but 
it has a positive sign. The USD exchange rate is significant in all four models, and has 
the expected positive sign. Overall, the results factor 1 are provide evidence to 
support the thesis that financialization is a factor in explaining the recent comovement 
of commodity prices, after accounting for other macroeconomic variables. 
Table 0.1: Restricted VECM Results for Factor 1 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
exchange rate 1.013***  1.162***  0.987*** 0.712*** 
IP OECD -- -- -- 0.337*** 
IP India 1.842***  2.167***  0.870***  0.920 
IP China -1.387***  -1.825***  -0.263**  -- 
IP Brazil -1.553***  -2.847***  -1.424***  -1.46*** 
IP Russia -0.858***  0.576**  0.846***  0.719*** 
Crude oil 1.198***  -- -0.081  -- 
Total OI -1.E-5*** -5.9E-6*** -- -- 
Total OID -- -- -2.E-8*** -2.1E-8*** 
constant -0.493 -38.769 -220.66 -211.548 
Factor 1 = 1. *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance  
 
Table 4J (appendix 4.3) summarizes results for group-specific factors. For the grains 
factor, total open interest is significant but has the positive sign in the model with 
crude oil (M1), and it is not significant in the model without crude oil (M2); while 
total open interest in dollars is significant and has the expected negative sign in both 
models (M3 and M4). For energy commodities, total open interest is significant and 
has the expected sign but total open interest in dollars is significant but has the 
                                                 
72
 chi-square tests reveal that these restrictions are not rejected. 
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positive sign. For softs and indexed commodities, proxies of financialization are 
significant and have the expected sign for 3 out of the 4 models (M1, M3 and M4 for 
softs and M1, M2 and M3 for indexed). Overall, the results for group-specific factors 
are not as strong and robust as they were for factor 1, although most of models 
(10/16) do show that the proxies explain the recent rise in comovement. One reason 
for the inconsistent results for group-specific factors is that commodities included in 
the groups are related; they are either complements or substitutes in demand or supply. 
For example, grains group consists of commodities including wheat, corn, oats, barley, 
oil seeds; similarly the energy group consists of crude oil, gasoline, natural gas, and a 
range of industrial metals. Commodity specific demand and supply factors may be 
more important in explaining comovement between these related commodities rather 
than macroeconomic factors, including financialization of the commodities futures 
market.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored one of the distinctive features of the 2008 
commodity price developments -- the remarkably synchronized rise and fall of prices 
of unrelated commodities. Unlike related commodities, that are either complements or 
substitutes in production or consumption, comovement of prices of unrelated 
commodities cannot be explained by commodity specific demand and supply shocks. 
Only factors that simultaneously affect several commodity markets such as: demand 
from emerging markets, devaluation of the US dollar and financialization of the 
commodities futures market, can explain such comovement. I identify three ways in 
which financialization may cause co-movement between commodity prices: i) if 
commodity futures are bought and sold not based on fundamentals, but based on pre-
set weights of a commodity index; ii) liquidity effects of commodity speculators trade 
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in two or more commodity markets; and iii) transmission of shocks in energy markets 
to other commodities due to the higher weight of energy commodities in popular 
commodity indices.  
For the empirical analysis, I extract common factors from 41 commodities and 
its sub-groups using the PANIC method of Bai and Ng (2004). The extracted common 
factor(s) were moving in the opposite direction as open interest until 2002, however 
since then they have been moving in the same direction, with very strong correlation 
during 2008-11. The extracted factor(s) are then included in a FAVEC model along 
with other macroeconomic factors including: industrial production indices of OECD 
and major emerging countries, inflation, USD exchange rate, and crude oil prices. 
Instead of assuming the excess comovement that is unexplained by macroeconomic 
factors is due to speculation, like previous studies, I also add a measure of 
financialization (total open interest and total open interest in dollars) in the FAVEC 
model. This is a stronger and more direct piece of evidence of the role of 
financialization in explaining comovement of commodity prices than previously 
provided in the literature.  
Results show that both proxies of financialization are significant and have the 
expected sign for the common factor (Factor 1) extracted using all 41 commodities. 
This implies that financialization of the commodities futures  markets explains the rise 
in comovement between unrelated commodity prices, after accounting for 
macroeconomic factors. Results for the group-specific factors are not as strong; the 
proxies of financialization are significant and have the expected sign for 10 out of the 
16 models. One reason for the inconsistent results for group-specific factors is that 
commodities included in the groups are related, so commodity specific demand and 
supply factors may be more important than macroeconomic factors in explaining 
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comovement between these commodities.  Overall, my empirical analysis provides 
strong evidence to support the thesis that financialization of the commodities futures 
market has led to increasing comovement between unrelated commodity prices. 
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Appendix 4 
Appendix 4.1: Data details and sources  
Commodity Prices, International Financial Statistics, IMF, Monthly 
Description taken from the IFS database 
1. Aluminum: LME, standard grade, spot price, 99.5% minimum purity, CIF UK ports, US$ per 
metric ton. 
2. Bananas: Central America and Ecuador, first class quality tropical pack, US importer’s price 
FOB U.S. Ports, US$ per metric ton. 
3. Barley: Canada, no.1 Western Barley, spot price, Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, US$ per 
metric ton. 
4. Beef: Australia and New Zealand, frozen boneless, 85% visible lean cow meat, US import 
price FOB US port of entry, US cents per pound. 
5. Cocoa Beans: New York and London, International Cocoa Organization daily price, Average 
of the daily prices of the nearest three active future trading months. CIF US and European 
ports, US$ per metric ton. 
6. Coconut Oil: Philippines/Indonesia, US $ per metric ton.  
7. Coffee (Brazil): Unwashed Arabica, Santos No. 4, ex-dock, New York 
8 Coffee (Uganda): Robusta, New York Cash Price, Cote d’Ivoire Grade II, and Uganda 
Standard. Prompt shipment, ex-dock, New York 
9. Copper: United Kingdom, grade A cathode, LME spot price, CIF European ports, US$ per 
metric ton. 
10 Corn (Maize): United States. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric ton. 
11. Cotton: Cotton Outlook, Liverpool Index A, Middling 1-3/32 inch staple, CIF Liverpool, US 
cents per pound. 
12. Crude Oil WTI: United States, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), 40 API, spot, FOB midland 
Texas, US$ per barrel. 
13. Gasoline: regular unleaded, Petroleum Product Assessments, US cents per gallon  
14. Groundnuts: Any origin, 40 to 50 count per ounce, in-shell Argentina, US $ per ton.  
15. Hides: United States, Heavy native steers, over 53 pounds, wholesale dealer’s price, Chicago, 
fob Shipping Point, US cents per pound. 
16. Iron Ore: Brazil, Caraja fines, 67.55 percent FE content, contract price to Europe, FOB Ponta 
da Madeira. US cents per dry metric ton unit. 
17. Jute: Raw Bangladesh, FOB Chittagong/Chalna, US $ per ton. 
18. Lamb: New Zealand, frozen, wholesale price at Smithfield Market London. US cents per 
pound. 
19. Lead: United Kingdom, 99.97% pure, LME spot price, CIF European Ports, US$ per metric 
ton. 
20. Linseed Oil: Any Origin, ex-tank Rotterdam, US $ per ton.  
21. Natural Gas: United States, Natural Gas Spot Price, Henry Hub, Louisiana, US$ per 
Thousands of Cubic Meters. 
22. Nickel: United Kingdom, LME melting grade, spot, CIF North European Ports, US$ per ton. 
23. Olive Oil: United Kingdom, extra virgin less than 1% free fatty acid, ex-tanker price U.K., 
US$ per metric ton. 
24. Oranges: France, miscellaneous oranges CIF French import price, US$ per metric ton. 
25. Palm oil: Malaysia, Crude Palm Oil Futures (first contract forward) 4-5 percent FFA, US$ per 
metric ton 
26. Pepper: Malaysia, Black, average US wholesale price, bagged, carlots, FOB New York. US 
cents per pound. 
27. Poultry (chicken): United States, Whole bird spot price, Ready-to-cook, whole, iced, Georgia 
docks, US cents per pound. 
28. Rice: Thailand, 5 percent broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, FOB 
Bangkok, US$ per ton. 
29. Rubber: Malaysia, No.1 Smoked Sheet, FOB Malaysia/Singapore ports, US cents per pound 
30. Shrimp: United States, No.1 shell-on headless, 26-30 count per pound, Mexican, New York 
port, US cents per pound. 
31. Sorghum: United States, No 2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico ports, US $ per ton. 
32. Soybeans: United States, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 
yellow and par, US$ per metric ton. 
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33. Soybean Meal: United States, Chicago Soybean Meal Futures (first contract forward) 
Minimum 48 percent protein, US$ per metric ton. 
34. Soybean Oil: United States, Chicago Soybean Oil Futures (first contract forward) exchange 
approved grades, US$ per metric ton. 
35. Sugar: United States import price, contract no.14 nearest futures position, US cents per 
pound. 
36. Sunflower oil: United Kingdom, US export price from Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric ton. 
37. Swine Meat (pork): United States (Iowa), 51-52% lean hogs, US cents per pound. 
38. Tea: Mombasa, Kenya, Auction Price for best PF1, Kenyan tea. US cents per kilogram. 
39. Tin: Any origin, United Kingdom LME spot price, standard grade, spot, CIF European ports. 
US$ per metric ton. 
40. Wheat: United States, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, 
US$ per metric ton 
41. Wool 48’s: Austraila-New Zealand, coarse wool 23 micron, Australian Wool Exchange spot 
quote, US cents per kilogram. 
42. Zinc: United Kingdom, LME, high grade 98% pure, spot, CIF UK ports, US$ per metric ton. 
 
 
Table 4A: Commodity sub-groups 
Grains & oil 
seeds 
 
barley, coconut oil, groundnuts, linseed oil, corn, olive oil, palm oil, 
rice, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, soybean meal, soybean oil, sugar, 
sunflower oil 
Energy & 
metals  
crude oil (WTI), gasoline, natural gas, aluminum, coppers, lead, 
nickel, zinc 
Soft 
commodities  
Cocoas, coffee Brazil, coffee Uganda, cotton, jute, sugar, teas, 
bananas, oranges, pepper   
Indexed  wheat, corn, soybeans, coffee, sugar, cocoa, cotton, live cattle, feeder 
cattle, crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, natural gas, zinc, nickel, 
aluminum, copper, lead 
 
 Figure 4A: Price Trends in Select Commodities
Standardized by demeaning and dividing by standard deviation of each series
Source: IFS, commodity prices
Pearson’s correlation coefficient: first row 1995
Source: author’s own calculations
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Appendix 4.2: Figures  
 
 
 
Figure 4B: correlation matrix 
-2005, second row 2006
 
 
 
 
 
-2012 
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Figure 4C: Dendrograms 
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Figure 4D: Extracted Factors and Total Open Interest 
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Appendix 4.3: Tables 
 
Table 4B: Results of PCA on All Commodities 
 
Table 4B.1: Components and Eigenvalues 
 Eigenvalues Cumulative 
variance 
explained 
Component 1 9.0521 0.2208 
Component 2 2.7390 0.2876 
Component 3 2.1819 0.3408 
Component 4 1.8119 0.385 
Component 5 1.6467 0.4252 
Component 6 1.4663 0.4609 
Component 7 1.4190 0.4955 
Component 8 1.3502 0.5285 
Component 9 1.2807 0.5597 
Component 10 1.2178 0.5894 
Component 11 1.1788 0.6182 
Component 12 1.0984 0.6449 
Component 13 1.0754 0.6712 
Component 14 1.0284 0.6963 
 
 
Table 4B.2: Variance explained by factor 1 
All commodities Variance explained  
Aluminum 0.2242 
Banana 0.0346 
Barley 0.2153 
Beef 0.0963 
Cocoa 0.1381 
Coconut oil 0.2252 
Coffee Brazil 0.1314 
Coffee Uganda 0.1271 
Copper  0.2361 
Cotton  0.145 
Gasoline 0.2073 
Groundnuts 0.0914 
Hides 0.049 
Jute  0.0447 
Lamb 0.106 
Lead 0.1498 
Linseed oil 0.1601 
Corn 0.2244 
Natural gas 0.0702 
Nickel 0.1441 
Olive oil 0.0702 
Oranges 0.0629 
Palm oil 0.2326 
Pepper 0.0358 
Crude oil (WTI) 0.2248 
Rice 0.0562 
Poultry  -0.0021 
Rubber  0.2087 
Shrimp  0.0041 
Sorghum  0.1872 
Soybeans  0.2415 
Soybean meal 0.1853 
Soybean oil 0.2799 
Sugar 0.0839 
Sunflower oil 0.1295 
Swine 0.032 
Tea 0.0543 
Tin 0.2263 
Wheat 0.1689 
Wool48   0.1617 
Zinc  0.1434 
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Table 4C.1: Components and Eigenvalues for group-specific factors 
 Eigenvalues Cumulative variance explained 
 grains Energy& 
metals 
softs indexed grains Energy& 
metals 
softs indexed 
Component 1 5.1736 3.6866 1.9558 4.8379 0.3449 0.4608 0.1956 0.3024 
Component 2 1.7030 1.3695 1.3023 1.8573 0.4584 0.632 0.3258 0.4185 
Component 3 1.3220  1.1905 1.5556 0.5466  0.4449 0.5157 
Component 4 1.1052  1.0893 1.1175 0.6202  0.5538 0.5855 
Component 5 1.0732    0.6918    
Component 6         
Component 7         
Component 8         
Component 9         
Component 10         
Component 11         
Component 12         
Component 13         
Component 14         
 
 
Table 4C.2: Variance explained by factor 1 
Grains Energy + Metals Softs Indexed 
 variance  variance  variance  variance 
Barley 0.0622 aluminum 0.4297 Cocoa 0.356 Aluminum 0.3436 
Coconut oil 0.302 Gasoline 0.3537 Coffee Brazil 0.5434 Cocoa 0.2037 
Groundnuts 0.1461 Copper 0.4579 Coffee Uganda 0.5198 
Coffee 
Brazil 0.1959 
Linseed oil 0.1924 Lead  0.3154 Cotton 0.3306 Coffee Uganda 0.1928 
Corn  0.3496 Natural gas 0.0931 Jute -0.106 Copper 0.3664 
Olive oil 0.0528 Nickel  0.3182 Sugar 0.2826 Cotton 0.1933 
Palm oil 0.332 Crude oil 0.3678 Tea 0.2053 Gasoline 0.3009 
Rice 0.0506 Zinc  0.3687 Banana 0.158 Lead 0.2481 
Sorghum 0.2876 
  
Orange 0.1394 Corn 0.2681 
Soybeans  0.3839 
  
Pepper  0.144 Natural gas 0.0883 
Wheat  0.2743 
    
Nickel 0.2331 
Soybean 
meal 0.3209 
    Crude oil 0.311 
Soybean oil 0.3945 
    
Soybeans 0.2815 
Sugar 0.1309 
    
Sugar 0.1054 
Sunflower 
oil 0.1663 
    Wheat 0.225 
  
    
Zinc 0.2636 
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Table 4D: Clemente-Montanes-Reyes unit-root test with double mean shifts, IO model 
 Break 1 Coefficient Break 2 Coefficient Test 
stat 
Lags Result 
Factor 1 2006m8 2.3819** 2008m5 -1.5707* -2.709 13 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
Grains 2007m7 2.7523** 2008m5 -2.2552** -2.642 12 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
Energy 2005m10 3.0546** 2008m6 -1.7704** -5.161 11 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
Softs 1998m3 -0.4639 2005m10 0.8603** -3.289 3 1 break, non-
stationary 
Indexed 2005m10 1.7930** 2008m5 -0.9414* -3.083 8 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
IP China 2004m5 0.8605** 2008m11 0.5772* 0.773 12 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
IP India 2003m3 2.791** 2005m10 2.623** -3.023 13 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
IP Brazil 2003m7 1.9058** 2006m9 1.0071* -3.622 0 2 beaks, non-
stationary 
IP Russia 1999m9 - 1.848* 2002m11 2.284** -2.922 4 1 break, non-
stationary 
IP OECD 2003m7 2.422** 2008m5 -1.405 -3.020 10 1 break, non-
stationary 
Fed. 
funds  
2000m10 -0.1094** 2007m8 -0.09291** -5.491* 8 2 breaks, 
stationary 
USD 2003m7 -0.70323 2007m1 -0.22677 -3.050 12 No break, 
non-stationary 
Inflation 2003m10 0.02230 2008m2 -0.05061 -3.066 11 No break, 
non-stationary 
Total OI 2003m8 169451.4** 2005m11 312777.97** -4.207 13 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
Total 
OID 
2006m8 1.64e+08** 2008m5 -3.88e+07** -1.803 13 2 breaks, non-
stationary 
** 1% significance level, * 5% significance level. Critical value: -5.490, max-lag given by Ng-Perron, trim: 
0.15, #m: month
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Table 4E: DFGLS and Dickey Fuller Unit root tests for extracted factors 
 Lags DFGLS 
test 
Dfuller w/ 
constant 
Dfuller no 
constant 
Dfuller 
w/ trend 
Result 
Factor 1 (level) 13 -1.292 -1.656 -1.079 -2.418 I(1) 
Factor 1 (diff.) 12 -4.845** -4.102** -4.115** -4.279* 
Grains (level) 11 -1.6635 -2.1589 -1.2352 -2.1907 I(1) 
Grains (diff.) 11 -4.566** -4.4489** -4.46073** -4.676** 
Energy (level) 13 -1.827 -1.806 -1.720 -2.409 I(1) 
Energy (diff.) 12 -4.106** -3.798* -3.808** -3.796* 
Softs (level) 11 -1.28342 -1.4314 -1.11884 -2.2051 I(1) 
Softs (diff.) 7 -4.9513** -5.0363** -5.04113** -5.068** 
Indexed  (level) 13 -1.31078 -1.5209 -1.12074 -2.433 I(1) 
Indexed (diff.) 12 -4.50525 -4.5677** -4.58114 -4.669** 
IP OECD (level) 14 -3.038* 0.533 -2.563 -3.026 I(1) 
IP OECD  (diff.) 14 -1.521 -5.495** -5.618** -5.822** 
IP China (level) 14 -1.469 -0.542 -1.958 -2.216 I(1) 
IP China  (diff.) 14 -2.535 -4.830** -4.819** -4.806** 
IP India (level) 13 -1.092 2.363* 1.103 -1.762 I(1) 
IP India  (diff.) 12 -1.072 -1.880 -3.083* -3.687* 
IP Brazil (level) 14 -1.724 -1.920 -0.508 -2.950 I(1) 
IP Brazil (diff.) 14 -3.055* -4.295** -4.796** -4.782** 
IP Russia (level) 12 -1.725 -0.041 -1.814 -2.451 Non-
stationary IP Russia (diff.) 11 -1.770 -2.770** -2.771 -2.949 
Inflation (level) 13 -2.489 -0.500 -2.761 -2.726 I(1) 
Inflation (diff.) 14 -1.543 -6.103** -6.086** -6.079** 
Nom. exchange rate (level) 2 -0.637 -0.122 -1.661 -2.247 I(1) 
Nom. exchange rate (diff.) 9 -2.161 3.940** -3.926** -4.356** 
Total OI (level) 13 -1.66109 -0.56631 1.003016 -2.13189 I(1) 
Total OI (diff.) 12 -2.8812* -3.8247** -3.5193** -3.8152* 
Total OID (level) 13 -1.6157 -0.20705 0.734472 -2.30445 I(1) 
Total OID (diff.) 12 -3.6932** -4.7596** -4.6157** -4.879** 
Fed funds rate (level) 9 -3.097* -1.465 -1.902 -3.177 I(1) 
Fed funds rate (diff.) 14 -3.389* -3.401** -3.495** -3.489* 
 
 
Table 4F: Johansen’s Cointegration Test: Trace and Max Eigenvalue Tests 
 All 41 Grains Energy Softs Indexed 
Total Open Interest 
Rank Trace 
stat 
Max 
test 
Trace 
stat Max test 
Trace 
stat Max test 
Trace  
stat 
Max 
test 
Trace 
stat 
Max 
test 
0 398.13  185.89 405.94 186.60 374.21  194.45  405.64 187.41 404.63 188.23  
1 212.243  59.491  219.342  55.84** 179.760  62.125  218.23 57.732  216.40 66.37  
2 152.7** 43.9** 163.5** 47.49  117.6** 44.65**  160** 42.8** 150.0** 43.1** 
Total Open Interest in Dollars 
0 406.19  189.78  410.69  187.59  346.71  194.89  404.61 188.19  393.93 194.71 
1 216.41  57.46  223.1  54.7** 151.82** 49.7**  216.42  51.3** 199.2** 50.1** 
2 158.9** 48.13** 168.4  51.07    165** 47.1    
3   117.3**        
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Table 4G: Normality Tests of the Residuals from VECM 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
All 41 Grains Energy Softs Indexed All 41 Grains Energy Softs Indexed 
Total Open Interest 
Factor 1 -0.024  (0.891)  
0.229  
(0.187)  
-0.250  
(0.150)  
0.021  
(0.903)  
-0.228  
(0.188)  
2.830  
(0.623)  
3.194  
(0.575)  
4.064  
(0.002)  
3.991  
(0.003)  
2.748  
(0.466)  
inflation -0.076  (0.662)  
-0.106  
(0.540)  
-0.208  
(0.229)  
0.268  
(0.111)  
-0.168  
(0.331)  
3.011  
(0.976)  
3.366  
(0.290)  
3.155  
(0.655)  
3.158  
(0.640)  
2.782  
(0.529)  
USD -0.542  (0.002)  
-0.337  
(0.051)  
-0.364  
(0.036)  
0.218  
(0.196)  
-0.457  
(0.008)  
4.167  
(0.001)  
3.457  
(0.187)  
4.079  
(0.002)  
4.095  
(0.001)  
4.343  
(0.000)  
IP OECD -0.459  (0.008)  
-0.467  
(0.007)  
-0.088  
(0.611)  
-0.562  
(0.001)  
-0.311  
(0.073)  
3.530  
(0.126)  
3.948  
(0.006)  
2.913  
(0.801)  
3.882  
(0.009)  
3.226  
(0.514)  
IP India 0.048  (0.780)  
-0.095  
(0.584)  
0.200  
(0.248)  
0.478  
(0.005)  
0.093  
(0.593)  
3.228  
(0.510)  
3.953  
(0.006)  
3.062  
(0.858)  
7.039  
(0.000)  
3.098  
(0.777)  
IP China -0.273  (0.115)  
-0.379  
(0.029)  
-0.300  
(0.083)  
-0.675  
(0.000)  
-0.284  
(0.101)  
3.201  
(0.562)  
3.387  
(0.265)  
3.691  
(0.046)  
4.027  
(0.002)  
3.494  
(0.154)  
IP Brazil 0.070  (0.684)  
0.066  
(0.705)  
-0.012  
(0.944)  
-0.149  
(0.376)  
0.088  
(0.611)  
2.949  
(0.883)  
3.217  
(0.532)  
2.841  
(0.646)  
4.978  
(0.000)  
3.275  
(0.427)  
IP Russia 0.539  (0.002)  
0.536  
(0.002)  
1.101  
(0.000)  
1.431  
(0.000)  
0.874  
(0.000)  
6.988  
(0.000)  
6.702  
(0.000)  
11.020  
(0.000)  
12.831  
(0.000)  
9.374  
(0.000)  
Crude oil 0.030  (0.862)  
0.030  
(0.864)  -- 
-0.198  
(0.239)  
-0.071  
(0.682)  
2.841  
(0.647)  
2.942  
(0.866)  -- 
3.722  
(0.032)  
3.058  
(0.866)  
Total OI -0.157  (0.365)  
-0.190  
(0.273)  
-0.250  
(0.148)  
0.086  
(0.610)  
-0.308  
(0.075)  
3.419  
(0.227)  
3.895  
(0.010)  
3.842  
(0.015)  
5.002  
(0.000)  
3.259  
(0.455)  
 Total Open Interest in Dollars 
Factor 1 -0.072  (0.679)  
0.087  
(0.617)  
-0.361  
(0.037)  
0.234  
(0.177)  
-0.234  
(0.177)  
2.879  
(0.728)  
4.259  
(0.000)  
4.458  
(0.000)  
2.741  
(0.455)  
3.458  
(0.186)  
inflation -0.171  (0.322)  
-0.113  
(0.513)  
-0.357  
(0.039)  
-0.363  
(0.036)  
-0.353  
(0.042)  
2.807  
(0.577)  
3.399  
(0.249)  
3.262  
(0.449)  
3.479  
(0.167)  
2.868  
(0.703)  
USD -0.495 (0.004) 
-0.297  
(0.086)  
-0.309  
(0.074)  
-0.325  
(0.061)  
-0.323  
(0.062)  
4.433  
(0.000)  
3.800  
(0.021)  
4.180  
(0.001)  
4.357  
(0.000)  
4.258  
(0.000)  
IP OECD -0.339  (0.051)  
-0.299  
(0.084)  
-0.407  
(0.019)  
-0.175  
(0.311)  
-0.458  
(0.008)  
3.552  
(0.111)  
3.131  
(0.706)  
3.231  
(0.504)  
3.060  
(0.863)  
3.544  
(0.116)  
IP India 0.492  (0.005)  
0.476  
(0.006)  
0.069  
(0.692)  
0.104  
(0.549)  
0.226  
(0.192)  
3.364  
(0.293)  
4.198  
(0.001)  
3.450  
(0.194)  
4.055  
(0.002)  
3.239  
(0.491)  
IP China -0.042  (0.810)  
-0.515  
(0.003)  
-0.110  
(0.524)  
-0.233  
(0.179)  
-0.386  
(0.026)  
3.156  
(0.652)  
4.420 
(0.000) 
3.577  
(0.096)  
3.247  
(0.476)  
3.848  
(0.014)  
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IP Brazil 0.048  (0.783)  
-0.055  
(0.751)  
-0.084  
(0.627)  
-0.069  
(0.691)  
-0.041  
(0.812)  
3.044  
(0.899)  
3.233  
(0.502)  
2.920  
(0.817)  
3.400  
(0.248)  
3.321  
(0.354)  
IP Russia 0.591  (0.001)  
0.344  
(0.047)  
0.888  
(0.000)  
0.543  
(0.002)  
1.080  
(0.000)  
6.140  
(0.000)  
4.513  
(0.000)  
9.739  
(0.000)  
5.957  
(0.000)  
11.226  
(0.000)  
Crude oil 0.011  (0.947)  
0.157  
(0.364)  -- 
-0.072  
(0.677)  
0.235  
(0.174)  
3.125  
(0.718)  
2.688  
(0.367)  -- 
3.173  
(0.618)  
3.603  
(0.082)  
Total OID -0.100 (0.562)  
-0.043  
(0.803)  
0.087  
(0.616)  
-0.058  
(0.736)  
-0.187  
(0.280)  
3.012  
(0.972)  
2.960  
(0.907)  
2.683  
(0.360)  
3.014  
(0.967)  
3.246  
(0.477)  
 
 
 
Table 4H: Unrestricted VECM for Factor 1 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_2 
Factor 1 1  -- 1 2E-18 1  2.E-18 1  
inflation  -- 1  -- 1 -- 1  -- 1 
USD 1.094***  -0.002  0.949*** -2.E-4 0.902***  0.002  0.761*** 0.004** 
IP OECD -0.237  -0.004  0.989* -0.02*** 0.223  -0.018***  0.272* -0.020*** 
IP India 1.727***  0.006  3.828*** -0.03*** 1.003***  0.001  1.027*** -0.004 
IP China -1.325***  -0.009***  -2.57*** 0.013* -0.253*  -0.011***  -0.108 -0.007* 
IP Brazil  -1.412***  0.008  -5.523*** 0.062*** -1.680***  0.024***  -1.579*** 0.024*** 
IP Russia -0.906***  0.007***  1.345*** -0.02*** 0.960***  -0.011***  0.810*** -0.012*** 
Crude oil 1.271***  -0.016***  -- -- -0.142*  -0.001  -- -- 
Total OI  -1.E-5*** 8.E-8*** -1.3E-5*** 8.6E-8** -- -- -- -- 
Total OID -- -- -- -- -2.E-8*** 8.E-11*** -2.1E-8*** 9.7E-11*** 
constant 6.687  -0.954  -19.196 0.018 --  -2.211  -- -2.346 
lags: 14 (AIC). *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance 
OI: open interest, IF: investment inflow 
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Table 4I: Unrestricted VECM for Grains and Soft Commodities 
 
Table 4J: Unrestricted VECM for Energy and Indexed Commodities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Grains Softs 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ce_1 ce_1 ce_2  ce_1 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_1 
Factor 1 1  1  1  1 1  -- 1 4.3E-19 1  1 
inflation  334.5***  -7E-15 1 43.02***  58.496*** -- 1   1 -28.396**  6.091 
USD -0.140  0.806*** -0.001 0.586***  0.627*** 1.15**  0.002  0.219 0.001 0.554***  0.420*** 
IP OECD -0.885  0.903* -0.013** 0.089*  -0.118 0.853  -1.E-4  2.380** 0.002 0.034  0.169 
IP India 4.11***  3.397*** -0.017* 0.707***  0.782*** 6.32***  0.015***  7.553*** 0.021*** -0.306  0.606*** 
IP China -4.96***  -2.596*** 0.010 -0.410***  -0.524*** -4.06***  -0.009**  -4.835*** -0.014*** 0.527***  -0.335** 
IP Brazil  0.826  -5.121*** 0.042*** -0.518***  -0.594*** -9.74***  -0.016**  -9.211*** -0.021*** -1.075***  -1.37*** 
IP Russia 2.266***  1.578*** -0.017*** 0.196***  0.309*** 2.27***  0.005  2.556*** 0.007 0.577***  1.006*** 
Crude oil -4.66***  --  0.156***   1.45***  0.002  -- -- 0.565***  -- 
Total OI 2.E-5*** -8.5E-6*** 3.4E-8*** -- -- -2.E-5*** -5.E-8 -2.E-5*** -6.0E-8* -- -- 
Total OID -- -- -- -2.E-8*** -1.3E-8*** -- -- -- -- -1.E-8*** -9E-9*** 
constant -346.698  -20.91 -0.217 -- -68.945 155.45  -0.048  12.25 -0.337 15.568  -1292 
 Energy Indexed 
 M1 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_2 ce_1 ce_1 
Factor 1 1  -- 1  1  -- 1 -4.34E-19 1  1 
inflation  -1.E-16 1  -943.3***  -- 1   1 -77.6***  -153.86*** 
USD 0.249**  -0.01***  5.755***  2.220**  0.002  -9.066*** -0.050*** 0.486***  0.98*** 
IP OECD -0.203  0.005  2.700  -5.73***  -0.02***  11.751 0.048 1.006***  0.929 
IP India 1.403***  0.010  4.954  -3.003  -0.005  19.027* 0.079 0.725*  0.908 
IP China -0.310  0.002  -2.876  1.494  -0.003  -0.163 0.005 0.497  0.118 
IP Brazil  -1.397***  -0.009  -18.15***  6.318**  0.025  -26.62* -0.102 -2.49***  -3.099*** 
IP Russia 0.180  -0.013***  14.57***  -8.45***  -0.02***  -3.945 -0.037 1.672***  2.218*** 
Crude oil -- -- -- 7.52***  0.007***    -0.60***  -- 
Total OI -9.E-6*** -1.E-7*** -- -3.E-5*** -2.E-8** -1.3E-4*** -6.0E-7*** -- -- 
Total OID -- -- 6.E-8*    -- -1.E-8*** -8.9E-9** 
constant 42.902  1.754  -461.400  428.251  0.316  1730 9.234 -54.632  -64.14 
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Table 4K: Restricted VECM Results  
 Grains Softs Indexed 
 M1 M3 M1 M3 M1 M3 
inflation 217.1***  43.02***  -- -12.67 -- -66.7*** 
USD 
-- 0.59***  0.58***  0.52*** 1.45***  0.47**  
IP OECD 
-- 0.09*  -- -- -2.55***  1.13***  
IP India 3.314***  0.71***  0.669**  -- -- 1.35***  
IP China 
-3.77***  -0.41***  -0.78***  0.28***  -- -- 
IP Brazil 
-- -0.52***  -0.80***  -1.22***  1.394  -3.11***  
IP Russia 1.33***  0.19***  0.192*  0.71***  -3.63***  2.16***  
Crude oil 
-2.87***  0.16***  0.632***  0.414***  3.86***  -0.93***  
Total OI 9.E-6***  -6.E-6***  -2.E-5***  
Total OID 
 -2.E-8***  -1.E-8***  -9.E-9*** 
constant 
-256.6  -77.68 -25.43 8.48 193.05  -76.26  
 M2 M4 M2 M4 M2 M3 
inflation 217.1***  53.714*** -- -- -- -577.48*** 
USD 1.200*** 0.575*** -- 0.481*** -144.8*** 4.608*** 
IP OECD 
-- -- -2.851*** -- -- -- 
IP India 1.959*** 0.738*** -5.807*** 0.656*** 412.9*** -- 
IP China 
-1.881*** -0.445*** 1.174 -0.471*** -- -- 
IP Brazil 
-3.500*** -0.584*** 15.67*** -1.19*** -399.6** -3.552 
IP Russia 1.302*** 0.278*** -4.012*** 1.065*** -- 8.341*** 
Total OI 
-1.89E-6  1.1E-5***  -2.4E-3***  
Total OID 
 -1.3E-8***  -7.9E-9***  4.2E-8*** 
constant 
-37.63 -68.803 -413.6 -101.15 -- -625.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor 1 = 1. *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance 
 Energy 
 M2 M3 
inflation 
-- -282.2*** 
USD 0.14**  2.03*** 
IP OECD 
-- -- 
IP India 1.24***  -- 
IP China 
-- -- 
IP Brazil 
-1.61***  -2.58***  
IP Russia 
-- 3.19***  
Total OI 
-9.E-6***  
Total OID 
 2.E-8*** 
constant 74.81  -170.1  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
In mid-2008, prices of a range of commodities reached unexpected heights. In 
June 2008 the food price index of the FAO reached 185, a 90 percent increase from 
January 2002.73 This development was striking because commodity prices had been 
slowly declining for the prior three decades. Another distinctive feature of the 2008 
price developments was that it affected a wide range of commodities including grains, 
oil seeds, soft commodities, energy, and metals. These price developments coincided 
with a vast inflow of money into the commodities futures market, along with the 
emergence of new classes of traders, trading strategies, and financial instruments. I 
refer to this phenomenon as financialization of commodities futures market. A 
majority of this new liquidity entered the futures market through commodity index 
funds. In 2002, commodity index investment was negligible, by 2008 it was estimated 
to be over USD 200 billion, and in 2012 it had reached USD 400 billion (BIS). Large 
institutional investors like pension funds, university endowments were especially 
active in this kind of passive investment strategies, accounting for over 42 percent of 
the total notional value (CFTC 2008). In this dissertation, I have explored the links 
between these two developments in the commodities market.  
My research approach consists of two inter-related parts: First, I establish that 
there exists a relationship between spot and futures prices, so that developments in the 
futures market affect the prices we see in the spot market (Chapter 1). Then I show 
that financialization has affected both the magnitude (Chapter 3) and comovement 
(Chapter 4) of commodity prices. In this chapter, I summarize the major conclusions 
of the dissertation, and provide some policy implications and directions for future 
                                                 
73
 In January 2002, the FAO food price index was at 97. 
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research. 
In Chapter 2, I study the long-run relationship between spot and futures prices, 
in particular the nature of lead-lag dynamics between the two markets that may 
explain the process of price determination. I conduct empirical analysis for 19 
commodities, consisting of agriculture, energy, livestock, and metals from 1991-2012. 
I use the cointegration framework accounting for up to two structural breaks that have 
been mostly ignored in the previous literature. Results show that spot and futures 
prices are cointegrated for 16 of the 19 commodities analyzed. For 11 of these 
commodities, futures markets are more influential than spot markets for price 
determination. These results suggest that market participants perceive futures prices 
as containing valuable information regarding supply-demand fundamentals, and look 
to the futures market to form expectations regarding spot prices. However, given this 
critical “price discovery” role of futures market, my research suggests that if futures 
market experience speculative bubbles, it will most likely be transmitted to the spot 
market.  
In Chapter 3, I analyze commodity markets individually to understand the 
effect of financialization of the commodities market on prices. Unlike a majority of 
papers that study correlation between trading positions of different categories of 
traders and prices, I focus on the general inflow of money in each commodity futures 
market. I do this for three important reasons: i) the inability of publicly available data 
to accurately identify trader positions, ii) it allows me to study the broader aspect of 
financialization instead of focusing on a specific category of traders, and iii) to test 
the hypothesis that rapid inflow of liquidity increased the relative demand for long 
position, which led to an upward pressure on prices. I use the cointegration 
framework accounting for up to two structural breaks, to understand the relations 
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between open interest and prices for 16 commodities for a time period of 15 years 
(1995-2012). Results show that prices and open interest for 14 of the 16l commodities 
analyzed share a long-run cointegrating relationship. More importantly for most 
commodities, if there is a deviation from the long run relationship, both open interest 
and prices adjust to maintain the relationship. It is reasonable to expect the adjustment 
parameter of open interest to be significant -- as prices rise more traders enter the 
market to gain from the rise in prices, so the overall liquidity in the market rises. But 
these results suggest that as liquidity rises, prices are pushed further up, leading to a 
bubble-like feedback mechanism. As futures prices act as a benchmark for spot prices, 
this development in the futures market is transmitted to the spot market, leading to a 
rise in spot prices. In conclusion, this paper provides strong empirical evidence to 
support the thesis that the 2008 rise in commodity prices were partly driven by the 
financialization of the commodities futures market.  
In Chapter 4, I take a broader approach and explored one of the distinctive 
features of the 2008 commodity price developments -- the remarkably synchronized 
rise and fall of prices of unrelated commodities. My empirical approach is based on 
the notion that only factors that affect several commodity markets simultaneously, can 
explain synchronized movement of unrelated commodity prices. First, I extract 
common factors from 41 commodities and its sub-groups, using the PANIC method. 
The extracted common factor(s) were moving in the opposite direction as open 
interest until 2002, however since then they have been moving in the same direction, 
and during 2008-11, they show very strong correlation. The extracted factor(s) are 
then included in a FAVEC model along with macroeconomic factors and a proxy of 
financialization. Results for the common factor from extracted from the 41 
commodities are quite robust; both proxies of financialization are significant and have 
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the expected negative sign. They provide evidence to support the thesis that 
financialization of the commodities futures market has led to increasing comovement 
between unrelated commodity prices. However, results for the group-specific factors 
are not as strong; the proxies of financialization are significant and have the expected 
sign for 10 out of the 16 models. One reason for the inconsistent results for group-
specific factors may be that commodities included in the groups are related, so 
commodity specific demand and supply factors may be more important than 
macroeconomic factors in explaining comovement between these commodities.  
The overall results of my dissertation can be summarized as follows: 
i) Spot and futures prices of commodities move together in the long run and 
market participants perceive futures prices to contain valuable information 
regarding supply-demand fundamentals; they look to the futures market to form 
expectations regarding spot prices.  
ii) There was a tremendous rise of liquidity in commodities futures markets leading 
up to the 2008 price spike. This rise in liquidity increased demand for long 
positions, creating an upward pressure on prices. 
iii) The new variety of traders and trading strategies also led to synchronization of 
prices of commodities that are unrelated. Although results are not as strong for 
group-specific factors, overall results show that financialization is a significant 
factor after accounting for other macroeconomic factors.   
Together these three chapters of this dissertation provide strong evidence to 
support the thesis that financialization of the commodities futures market is a factor in 
explaining the rise in magnitude and comovement of commodity prices in recent years. 
This does not mean that fundamentals did not have a role to play in causing these 
price developments. Demand for oil and minerals from the emerging markets, effects 
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of biofuels, and other macroeconomic effects may have been important. However, I 
argue that the level of rise in prices cannot be explained by these fundamentals alone. 
These findings have direct implications for food security and development in general. 
As mentioned at the outset of this paper, according to the USDA the 2008 price spike 
was responsible for increasing malnutrition for 80 million people worldwide and 
slowing down the global progress in reducing hunger. These results thus highlight the 
need to minimize distortions on prices due to financialization of commodities futures 
markets.   
Directions for Future Research 
In this dissertation, I presented recent developments in the commodities 
futures markets vis-à-vis financialization. However, the nature of financialization is 
changing rapidly as market participants find new trading strategies and instruments. 
Long-only, passive, index trading used to be the primary way new investors exposed 
themselves to commodity futures markets. However, in recent years second and third 
generation commodity indices called “enhanced”, “dynamic”, or “active” indices 
(such as the S&P GSCI dynamic roll index) that use different rolling strategies and 
market exposure based on state of the particular market (contango or backwardation), 
have overtaken the market. Moreover, by 2008 the relative importance of index 
trading had decreased as ETFs and ETNs grew in popularity and increasingly 
controlled a large share of the market. In the future, as the process of financialization 
proceeds, we should expect new financial instruments and trading strategies. One 
important direction for future research is to keep up with these new developments in 
the commodities futures market. As the financial sector comes up to new investment 
products and new strategies to invest, we need to understand the changing nature of 
financialization, and the various ways in which it may distort the market.  
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Besides financialization of the commodities futures market, finance has crept 
into commodity markets in other ways that are not covered in this dissertation, but are 
equally important. For example, in recent years production and distribution of 
commodities have also been financialized. Murphy et al. (2012) provide a detailed 
discussion of how the four largest grain traders: Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), 
Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Drefyus, (collectively referred to as ABCDs) have all 
established investment divisions offering external investors a range of financial 
services and products including commodity index funds, asset management services, 
insurance. In Chapter 3, I briefly discussed Cargill and its hedge fund Black River 
Asset Management to explain how the line between hedgers and speculators are 
blurred by these developments. Given that these grain trading companies have access 
to food suppliers and information regarding supply factors in agricultural markets, 
Murphy et al. (2012) go on further to compare their activities to insider trading. 
Questions have also emerged about whether these grain traders are manipulating the 
markets for their own financial gain. For example Cargill was among the first to 
speculate on falling wheat prices in 2008, which led to significant profits (Murphy et 
al. 2012 and Isakson 2014). These aspects of financialization have received very little 
attention in the literature; the focus has primarily been on the activities of commodity 
index traders. Future work in this area is required to comprehend the changing nature 
of commodity markets and they affect prices. 
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